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Motivation and Outline 
Chapter 1 
Motivation and Outline 
This work studies distributive decision making and exclusion processes in 
economically unequal small-scale societies. It builds on the increased recogni-
tion within economics that economic actors are embedded in social structures, 
which exert a determinant influence on their decision making and the related 
performance of markets and organizations (Granovetter, 1985). With small-scale 
societies, we refer to societies that are characterized by repeated and frequent 
interactions among their members. Examples range from social relations on the 
job floor of companies in well-developed economies to social relations in rural 
villages in countries confronted with extreme poverty. 
 More specifically, we will study how the embeddedness of economic agents 
in small-scale societies influences distributive decision making and exclusion 
processes. We will not only look at the individual decision making of agents 
who distribute economic resources, but also at the decision making of potential 
recipients of these resources when they are given the means to react. In other 
words, we will also examine the political dimensions at work when economic 
resources are distributed within small-scale societies. Ultimately, taking account 
of the decision making of both distributors and potential recipients of economic 
resources, we want to identify and understand the processes responsible for the 
reproduction of economic inequality. 
 Although these issues are important in many settings, where possible, we 
will focus on their relevance for local development and poverty reduction. 
Recently, economic inequality has received renewed attention within the debate 
on how to combat global poverty and stimulate economic development. The 
World Bank concluded in its 2006 World Development Report that correction of 
economic inequity has the potential to facilitate sustained development and 
poverty reduction. This justifies why policy makers should pay attention to the 
equity implications of their policies, and why it may be justified to implement 
redistributive policies. 
 This debate is particularly relevant in Latin America, where we conducted 
field research for this thesis. Income distributions in this continent are among 
the most unequal in the developing world. As early as 1990, the World Bank 
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stated that “nowhere in the developing world are the contrasts between poverty 
and national wealth more striking than in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Despite average per capita incomes that are five to six times those in South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly one-fifth of the population still lives in poverty” 
(World Bank, 1990: 141). Based on recent evidence, the current picture has 
barely changed as economic inequality in Latin America remains among the 
highest in the developing world (WDR, 2006). The main question is, therefore, 
why such inequality can be so persistent. 
 One of the main reasons relates to the fact that inequity-reducing policies 
often face a lack of political feasibility (Sen, 1995). The bottom line is, of 
course, that when designing and implementing redistributive policies, policy 
makers have to pay attention to voters’ preferences and that politically the 
poorest groups tend to be weakly represented. In the same vein, it has often been 
documented how programs and policies that are intended to benefit the ‘poor’ 
are often of ‘poor’ quality (Goodin & Le Grand, 1987), as they lack the support 
of more powerful sectors. 
 In this work, we focus on two elements that have received insufficient 
attention within the policy debate and that might exert an important influence on 
the political feasibility of redistributive policies. Both are related to the ‘social 
distance’ between the agents involved. 
 First, it is often ignored that those people affected by redistributive policy 
schemes are embedded in social networks. The importance of social networks, 
and their influence on the feasibility of redistributive schemes, is well illustrated 
by the armed peasant resistance against the Nicaraguan government in the early 
1980s. Particularly striking is the fact that some of the poor peasants who had 
previously fought for the Sandinista revolution took up arms against the 
revolutionary Sandinista government. Among other reasons, their resistance 
resulted from a reaction against the potentially negative side-effects a national 
redistribution program, through state-led agrarian reforms, would have on local 
social networks (Horton, 1998). Many poor peasants had established informal 
support relationships with large landowners which guaranteed them privileged 
access to essential resources. The Sandinista agrarian reform, based on the 
confiscation of large private properties, affected these landowners and thereby 
endangered peasants’ access to these resources. Accordingly, many peasants 
perceived the government’s redistributive program as a serious threat, even if 
the government had promised them land, employment and social services. This 
illustrates how social networks have to be seriously considered when imple-
menting redistributive economic policies, as they are an important source of 
resources and opportunities to the agents involved. 
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 Second, it is often assumed that the agents who take distributive decisions 
are socially distant from the potentially benefited and affected. This is the case 
when the central state is the only agent that takes distributive decisions. How-
ever, with policy makers paying increasing attention to decentralization and 
local participation (World Bank, 2000), this assumption becomes quite unrealis-
tic. To the extent that discriminatory power to (re)distribute is transferred to the 
local level, social distance decreases between those who distribute resources and 
those who are potentially benefited or affected. 
 It is the objective of this work to come to a better understanding of the 
complex processes behind exclusion and persistent inequality, and the influence 
social networks and economic inequality exert on them. For this, we look at 
distributive decision making within small-scale societies using different tools 
such as surveys, laboratory experiments and field experiments. 
 This work starts with an empirical field study on the influence community 
representatives exert on exclusion rates from development aid (chapter 2). 
Making use of a household survey in 33 Nicaraguan rural villages, we observe 
that many people rely on community representatives to obtain access to outside 
aid resources. We also observe that village representation structures can exert a 
determinant influence on (recurrent) aid exclusion processes. In particular, the 
more representation is monopolized by a limited number of representatives, the 
larger becomes the group that is excluded from all aid resources. Since the 
poorest rely especially on community representatives to facilitate access to aid, 
they are the most vulnerable to this type of exclusion. As a more decentralized 
representation structure should lessen this type of exclusion, we have looked at 
the local politics responsible for the perpetuation and/or transformation of these 
structures. 
 Several impediments to political change are identified. First, in villages 
with more centralized representation fewer political alternatives are identified, 
and so opportunities for a more decentralized structure are more limited. 
Second, the most excluded there-in know fewer representatives and have less 
ability to propose political alternatives. Consequently, if political change is 
supported from within a community, it is not likely that it will improve represen-
tation for the most excluded. We conclude, therefore, that there is a strong case 
for a more active role of external aid donors. 
 In the following chapters, we extend this work in two directions – the 
political economy at work behind distributive decision making in small-scale 
societies and the importance of social ties and social network positions. In 
chapter 3, we examine the political economy at work when a permanent group 
representative distributes economic resources among group members. We study 
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the strategies of community members who have the option to protest against the 
distributive decisions of this local representative, and how they interact with the 
strategies of the representative. For this, we make use of a laboratory experi-
ment. This experiment consists of a repeated game wherein a permanent group 
representative; the richest of an economically-heterogeneous group, distributes 
resources among group members. The latter are given the opportunity to punish 
the representative by means of simple majority voting. Four different treatments 
are organized by combining conditions of public and private information on the 
distribution and voting decisions. 
 The experimental results show that the lower the share of the resources a 
respondent receives from the representative, the lower his/her satisfaction about 
this share. When receiving information on the complete distribution, his/her 
satisfaction also decreases the more a representative keeps for him/herself, and 
the less the respondent receives in comparison with other respondents. As 
expected, lower satisfaction increases the propensity to vote in favour of 
punishing the representative. In addition, there are important strategic elements 
behind voting decisions. When voting decisions are made public, respondents 
are somewhat more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment, but this reluctance 
decreases with lower satisfaction. Moreover, the more a respondent believes that 
both other respondents will vote in favour of punishment, the more he/she is 
inclined to do so as well. Furthermore, it is observed that female or middle-
endowment respondents are more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment 
unless information on the distribution is public. This results in significantly 
higher punishment rates with common information on the distribution decisions. 
 When punishment rates are high, representatives tend to follow a strategy of 
keeping all the resources to themselves. This is the case in all treatments except 
with public voting and private information on the distribution. Under the latter, 
representatives are able to keep punishment rates down by successfully applying 
an exclusion strategy, wherein one respondent is completely excluded from the 
distributed resources. In most of the cases, it is the poorest respondent who is 
excluded in this way. 
 To study the influence of political change in favour of the poorest, we 
organized a second scenario with the poorest player as the permanent represen-
tative. We observe that the final distribution of earnings becomes much more 
equal and that punishment rates are substantially lower for all treatments. This 
type of political change is thus beneficial in both distributional and efficiency 
terms. 
 In chapter 4, we examine the influence of real social networks on distribu-
tive decision making. In particular, we study to what extent social network 
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positions are taken into account when agents make distributive decisions. For 
this we conducted a series of dictator game experiments in a rural Nicaraguan 
village, complemented by a social network survey. The results indicate that 
social network positions correlate strongly with generosity, but that this correla-
tion is highly contingent upon the type of network we look at. Social proximity 
in general networks, friendship networks and extended family networks, 
increases generosity. In addition, generosity increases the more the dictator’s 
friends have relatively few other friends, the denser the support networks of the 
dictator, the smaller the family networks of the dictator and/or the recipient (if 
both have a direct family relation), and the larger the recipient’s ego network 
through social public activities. Finally, looking at the determinants of network 
formation, we found that the poor, the less mobile, women and young people 
have a lower likelihood of links with other village members. Accordingly, these 
people are more vulnerable to exclusion because they tend to be more socially 
isolated from others. 
 Whereas chapter 4 confirmed the importance of social networks in distribu-
tive decision making, in chapter 5, we look at how networks of social ties are 
formed and how economic inequality exerts an influence on them. For this, we 
conducted a laboratory experiment that consists of a repeated ‘favour game’ 
with groups of six players. In each round, one player is randomly chosen to have 
the opportunity to ask one or more of the other five players for support. Each 
player that is asked for support then decides on the amount of support to give, 
which is multiplied with an efficiency factor. 
 The results confirm that both favour requests and favour giving are influ-
enced by direct reciprocity motives and by individual beliefs about future 
returns. Both expected returns and direct reciprocity are somewhat biased by 
economic inequality. High-endowment players give more support to low-
endowment players than what the latter give to them, and this difference 
becomes larger, the larger the most recent support they received from low-
endowment players. At the same time, low-endowment players are more likely 
to request support from high-endowment players than from low-endowment 
players, and if asked for support tend to give more support to high-endowment 
players than to other low-endowment players. They do so because they (cor-
rectly) expect higher returned support from high-endowment players. It is this 
bias in reciprocity and expectations which lies at the heart of certain centraliza-
tion in the formed networks of social ties in economically-heterogeneous 
groups. It also explains why, in such groups, very high levels of support-giving 
can be obtained if significant support is given between low-endowment players 
and from low-endowment players to high-endowment players early in the game. 
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Excluded Again: Village Politics at the Aid Interface 
Chapter 2  
Excluded Again 
1. Introduction1 
By now, it is generally recognized that the romantic view of local communities 
as homogenous entities – often implicit in community-based or other participa-
tory development approaches – is problematic (Cleaver, 1999; Kothari, 2001; 
Mosse, 2001; Platteau & Abraham, 2002). Just as society as a whole, local 
communities are indeed places where different and often conflicting interests co-
exist. One can therefore not assume that agents operating as intermediaries at 
the interface between their community and outside aid donors automatically 
represent and respond to all community members. All too often, aid resources 
are captured by local elites (Galasso & Ravallion, 2001; Conning & Kevane, 
2002; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Ravallion, 2003). It 
has been less documented, however, how this implies that certain groups of 
people tend to be excluded from aid resources. To the extent that interface 
structures remain unchanged, the same group of people may be excluded from 
each aid donor that arrives at the village. This justifies the need for a study of 
the possibilities of transforming the aid interface, so that this type of recurrent 
exclusion is reduced. The following case of a village in rural Nicaragua exem-
plifies our starting-point: 
 
In this village, a small group of land-rich peasants had historically dominated the 
interface with aid projects. They organized village meetings when development 
projects asked for such and they identified village needs. As a result, development 
                                                        
1 I am highly indebted to the Nicaraguan research and development institute Nitlapán-UCA for its 
cooperation and support, with special thanks to Miguel Alemán Robleto for support on the survey 
design, the fieldwork and several interesting discussions. Substantial improvements were realized 
thanks to useful comments on earlier versions by Tekabe Ayalew, Johan Bastiaensen, Tom De 
Herdt, Renato Flores, Nathalie Holvoet, Wendy Janssens, Nadia Molenaers, Jean-Philippe Platteau, 
Robrecht Renard, Jos Vaessen and Bjorn Van Campenhout. 
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actors mainly supported productive activities apt for land-rich peasants, whereas the 
considerable land-poor part of the village remained neglected. 
  Important at this interface is the village committee, representing the village to 
the mayor of the municipality to which the village belongs, which was also domi-
nated by the land-rich elite. About a year before our visit, however, a local assem-
bly managed to replace this committee by a new one that was more representative 
of the ample landless sector. This change was the result of a clear rejection of the 
old elitist committee by the landless. According to some informants, the open rejec-
tion of the most powerful local broker and president of the village committee by the 
mayor was instrumental for the coordinated collective action to reject the existing 
village committee. The new village committee, however, is less experienced and 
less well connected with aid providers than its predecessor. During a focus group 
interview, we observed that they did not have many project ideas that could attract 
the attention of potential aid donors. 
 
Undoubtedly, every development worker at the grassroots could report numer-
ous anecdotes of local elites being highly active at the interface. Far less 
attention is paid, however, to how such situation may make certain community 
sectors recurrently excluded from aid flows. In this respect, our case calls 
several important questions to attention. First, abstracting from local specifici-
ties, can we generalize on the importance of interface structures and its influence 
on exclusion processes? More particularly, does the concentration of interme-
diation among a limited number of agents increase the proportion of people 
recurrently excluded from aid resources? Second, if this is the case are the poor 
more vulnerable to this kind of exclusion? Third, if both previous questions are 
confirmed, it is important to understand how interface structures are (re)created, 
and what role local agents can have in political change processes. In particular, 
to what extent are the recurrently excluded able to change representation 
structures? Fourth, studying these processes, it is important to examine the 
potential dangers that political change entails in terms of reducing a commu-
nity’s potential to attract future aid resources. Finally, questions concerning the 
role policymakers can play in political change processes arise. 
 Making use of a household survey in 33 rural villages in Nicaragua, our 
empirical evidence confirms that the concentration of intermediation in a limited 
number of agents strongly increases the village proportion of households 
excluded from all aid. In combination with the evidence that it is especially the 
poor that rely on local intermediation to obtain access to aid, this correlation 
strongly suggests that the political change in the direction of a more decentral-
ized intermediation structure has the potential to benefit especially the poor. 
 Several impediments to political change are identified. First, in villages 
with more centralized representation fewer political alternatives are identified, 
so that the perspectives for a more decentralized structure are more limited. 
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Second, the most excluded know fewer representatives and have less ability to 
propose political alternatives. Consequently, if political change is supported 
from within a community, it is not likely that it will improve representation for 
the most excluded. We conclude, therefore, that there is a strong case for a more 
active role of external aid donors. 
2. Conceptual issues 
To address the research questions outlined above, we first define some concepts 
and describe some processes related to the (re)creation of intermediation 
structures at the interface. In particular, we elaborate in this conceptual section 
on interface brokerage, the politics behind brokerage and political change 
processes. In the course of this section, we formulate specific hypotheses that 
will be tested in the empirical section. 
2.1. Encounters at the interface 
The worlds of the development community and people in local communities 
tend to be so divergent, that specialised ‘interface brokers’ are required to bridge 
both worlds (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Long, 2001). According to Burt (1995) 
brokers are agents who occupy a bridging function between different social 
agents. Interface brokers are brokers from local communities who operate at the 
interface with the outside donor community and therefore occupy a bridging 
function between agents in both worlds. 
 Brokerage at the interface may not only be profitable for brokers, who have 
privileged access to the resources provided by aid donors. It may also be for the 
other parties involved. For peer community members brokers are useful as they 
have the capacity to attract external aid flows. Brokers often have valuable 
assets, such as previously built trust relations with aid providers, the knowledge 
and understanding of the current development discourse pursued by aid provid-
ers as well as the capacity to act on this discourse (Laurent, 1998). For aid 
donors, brokers are useful as they can facilitate local operations. In this respect, 
brokers’ access to local information, their capacity to contribute to the analysis 
of local problems, and their ability to convoke and convince local people are 
important assets. 
 It should be clear, however, that not all community agents need intermedia-
tion by interface brokers to get in contact with external donors. As documented 
by Bierschenk et al. (2000) the capacity to work at the interface and to make 
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contact with aid providers is mainly acquired through experience at the inter-
face. In particular, we expect that the economically better off are in a better 
position to gain this experience, as they usually also have higher social and 
geographical mobility. For this reason, we expect them to have more capacity to 
make direct contact with aid providers, whereas the poorer community members 
have to rely relatively more on interface brokers to obtain access to the devel-
opment community and its resources. This will be tested in the empirical section 
as hypothesis 1a. 
 Also on the donor side, not all actors may make equal use of interface 
brokers. Brokers tend to maintain patron-client relations, characterized by rules 
of loyalty and paternalistic protection, which are difficult to make compatible 
with the rules of a market-oriented program, such as objective selection proce-
dures and credit repayment under all conditions (Bastiaensen & D’Exelle, 2002). 
Market-oriented programs may therefore be reluctant to rely on interface 
brokers. In contrast, programs that channel resources by means of donations 
may rely more on the participation of community brokers for the definition and 
management of their activities. Moreover, brokers themselves may also be more 
interested in resources with less severe strings attached because such resources 
can be more easily conditioned on political loyalty (see next section on this). 
This leads to hypothesis 1b: In comparison with other types of projects, it is less 
likely that market-oriented projects relations are intermediated by interface 
brokers. 
2.2. The politics behind aid brokerage 
Aid donors, interface brokers and community members are involved in a 
political game around the attraction and local distribution of aid resources. The 
power interface brokers can accumulate in this game depends on several 
elements. 
 First, as information carriers at the interface, brokers have a privileged 
position to manipulate information flows to aid providers. This is evident when 
aid providers entrust brokers the task to identify local needs (and thus implicitly 
the criteria to select potential beneficiaries). Yet, this is also the case when aid 
providers rely on potentially more democratic methods for this purpose, like 
village meetings. Brokers are often the conveners of such meetings and thus 
influence their composition. Some agents may not be invited to participate in 
these meetings, so that their interests remain unrepresented. Moreover, even if 
there are different interests represented in such meetings, it is unclear if these are 
equally taken account of. To the extent that these meetings are based on public 
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discussion and consensus seeking, it is likely that the interests of the dominant 
are acknowledged whereas the interests of the marginalized are ignored (Mosse, 
1994). Brokers may not only control information flows to aid donors on the 
community needs, they may also control information flows towards the commu-
nity concerning the arrival and selection criteria of aid resources. By controlling 
information flows in both directions, brokers can become real gatekeepers to aid 
flows. 
 Second, aid donors often ensure that the mandate of the brokers they work 
with is locally legitimized. For this, they usually rely on informal talks with 
local informants or sometimes they even organize formal elections. In both 
cases, the more people politically support a certain representative, the more 
likely it becomes that external aid providers decide to work with that representa-
tive. Representatives, therefore, need sufficient political support to be selected 
by outside aid donors, and thus to become interface brokers2. This, however, 
does not imply that representatives need the support of the entire community. 
They do not even require the support of the majority. 
 This may be due to a lack of political alternatives. But even when there 
were political alternatives, brokers are not forced to look for the support of the 
entire community. Brokerage of aid resources often goes hand in hand with 
clientelism, defined as an interchange of tangible personal benefits (in our case 
aid resources) in return for intangible resources in the form of loyalty and 
political support (Wolf, 1977). Clientelism can only be effective if clients 
receive sufficient amounts of benefits. With a constraint on the resources 
channelled by each aid donor, representatives are forced to divide resources 
among a limited group. Dividing the available resources so that all community 
members would be benefited would dilute political support too much3. 
 Thus, brokers are not stimulated to look for a large group of political 
supporters. They only represent and are accountable to a limited group of 
community members. To maintain this political support, brokers have a strong 
incentive to benefit the same group of community members with every new aid 
program arriving at the village. Any sign of disregarding the clientelistic 
reciprocity logic might lead to a rapid disintegration of clientelistic relations, 
and with it the broker’s power basis (Landé, 1977: 508)4. 
                                                        
2 Note here the explicit difference we make between representatives and interface brokers. 
3 In many cases, dividing the aid resources to benefit the entire community is not even feasible. 
This is the case when aid donors channel an insufficient amount of resources. 
4 Any broker considering altruistic acts beyond the own client-group is therefore likely to lose 
political power. We think for instance about fairness-minded brokers who are willing to rotate the 
group of beneficiaries so that after a certain period all village members have received benefits. 
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 With each broker tied to a limited group of political clients, we expect that 
the more brokerage is concentrated in a limited number of brokers, the larger the 
proportion of community agents that is recurrently excluded from aid flows. 
This is hypothesis 2 that we will test in the empirical section of this paper. 
 Brokerage concentration, however, may also have certain advantages, such 
as its contribution to a community’s capacity to attract aid resources. Where 
brokerage is highly concentrated brokers may have large experience and 
capacity to make contact with aid providers and convince them to start opera-
tions in their community. As our case at the beginning of this chapter suggests, 
replacing current brokers by less experienced representatives may result in a 
worse outcome, as the latter may have less ability to attract future aid resources. 
This will be tested as hypothesis 3 in the empirical section. 
2.3. Political change processes at the interface 
To the extent that aid brokerage structures are determinant in processes of 
recurrent exclusion from aid flows, it is of interest to look at reinforcement 
mechanisms of brokerage structures and how political change at the interface 
might eventually occur. In particular, we are interested in possible mechanisms 
that hamper political change, necessary to improve the perspectives of the 
recurrently excluded. To investigate this, we borrow from recent theories that 
suggest that socio-political structures are being continuously re-created by the 
ongoing interaction between social structure and agency (Cleaver, 1999; Long, 
2001). Due to “increasing returns to adoption of a particular institutional form” 
these structures may eventually become ‘locked in’ (Bardhan, 2000: 223). 
 Applied to brokerage, the (re)production of brokerage structures is closely 
related to the identification of local representatives by community members. Aid 
providers usually make use of informal talks with local informants or sometimes 
they even organize formal elections to select community brokers to work with. 
In both cases, the perspectives for a community agent of being approached by a 
new aid provider increase with more community members identifying him/her 
as their potential representative. There are, however, two mechanisms behind 
the increasing returns to adoption of brokerage structures, which might hamper 
political change processes5, necessary to reduce exclusion. 
                                                        
5 For political change to be realized aid donors have to start cooperating with new interface brokers. 
Consequently, any political change implies a decentralization of brokerage. 
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 First, as illustrated by Bierschenk et al. (2000), a community representative 
acquires brokerage capacity through his/her experience at the interface. The 
more capacity the higher the possible returns of calling upon him/her, not only 
for aid providers but also for community members. At the same time, the 
number of aid providers that arrive at a village is limited and potential brokers 
compete with each other to become the community’s spokesperson towards aid 
providers. With centralized brokerage, a limited number of brokers are highly 
active at the interface, and thus acquire large experience, capacity and visibility. 
Consequently, it results difficult for any political alternative to compete. We 
therefore expect that in villages with higher brokerage concentration fewer 
political alternatives are identified, which will be tested as hypothesis 4a. If this 
hypothesis is true, political alternatives are not given the opportunity to acquire 
the necessary experience, capacity and visibility to challenge the ruling brokers. 
Consequently, once a village has high brokerage concentration it is hard to 
escape the ‘exclusion trap’. 
 Second, community members who are benefited by aid brokerage get to 
know the important key-persons, whereas excluded people often do not know 
whom to contact to obtain information on aid opportunities, and thus eventually 
access to aid resources. This also means that the excluded, as being disconnected 
from the interface, have limited information on the representatives that could 
replace the elite representatives. In contrast, we expect them to identify rela-
tively more the elite, not necessarily because they hope this increases their 
chances of getting part of the aid resources, but simply because the elite is most 
visible to them. We will test this as hypothesis 4b in the empirical section. 
Concomitantly, if political change is supported from within a community, it is 
not very probable that it improves the representation of the most excluded, so 
that their exclusion is reduced. 
3. Empirical review 
In this part, we test the hypotheses set out in the conceptual section. We start by 
studying the importance of brokerage for community agents and aid providers. 
Thereafter, we investigate the influence of brokerage concentration on recurrent 
exclusion processes from aid flows and a village’s access to aid resources. We 
close by examining the importance of people’s voice in political change proc-
esses and how brokerage concentration may hamper political change. 
 For the empirical analyses, we make use of a household survey in 33 
Nicaraguan rural villages. These villages were selected such that they are a 
representative sample of the socio-economic and geographical variation of the 
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Pacific and Interior regions of Nicaragua where the largest part of the population 
lives. For the definition of the village boundaries and the composition of a 
village census we triangulated different local information sources. From these 
censuses, we randomly selected 50 households in each village. As village sizes 
differ considerably, we weighted observations to correct under-weighing (over-
weighing) – in the total population – of observations in large (small) villages. 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics on village characteristics (N = 33) 
 Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. 
Proportion of households excluded from all aid 0.029 0.626 0.212 0.141 
Community size 50 332 141.09 57.265 
Number of projects 3 14 8.33 2.814 
Household mean number of aid relations 0.45 2.55 1.25 0.541 
Brokerage activity 0.11 0.59 0.31 0.136 
Brokerage concentration 0.15 1.00 0.46 0.224 
Household mean number of identified representatives 0.85 2.28 1.61 0.380 
Number of elite representatives 1.00 8.00 4.73 1.587 
Proportion of landless households 0.04 0.76 0.41 0.172 
Proportion of households dependent on salaried 
agricultural work 
0.18 0.80 0.48 0.134 
 
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics of the most important variables we will 
use in our analyses. Each of these variables will be defined and discussed when 
they are used in the empirical analysis. One variable we want to highlight here 
already, because it is one of the most important variables, is the village propor-
tion of households excluded from all aid. We observe that in most villages this 
proportion is considerable, averaging around 0.21. It also varies a lot. In the 
most extreme cases, more than half of the village has been excluded from all aid. 
3.1. The use of aid brokerage 
In this subsection, we examine the use of brokers by community members and 
aid donors. In particular, we will look at possible correlations between the use of 
brokers on the one hand, and the community members’ poverty and donors’ 
market-orientedness on the other hand. To investigate local brokerage and other 
mediation mechanisms, we asked each household in the sample for details of all 
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(governmental and non-governmental) aid providers it received benefits from in 
recent years6. As we are interested in recurrent exclusion processes, we not only 
asked for currently active donors, but also for recently concluded aid initiatives. 
For each relation with an aid provider, we asked the respondent how the contact 
was established. The ‘Total’ columns of Table 2.2 confirm the importance of 
local intermediation and brokerage. More than half of the identified aid relations 
were established through mediation by someone of the community, of which 
38.6% by a community broker and 14.5% by a community peer7. 
 To test whether the use of brokerage depends on the poverty of community 
members (hypothesis 1a) we grouped aid relations based on the poverty charac-
teristics of the household. More specifically, we compared landless and non-
landless households, and households dependent on salaried agricultural work 
and those not. We did so, as being landless or being a salaried agricultural 
worker are very good proxies for poverty in the areas of study (Maldidier & 
Marchetti, 1996). 
 Table 2.2 demonstrates that percentages of the different categories differ 
substantially between landless and non-landless households, and between 
households dependent on salaried agricultural work and those not. Based on a 
Pearson F-statistic we observe that mediation by a community broker is signifi-
cantly different between landless and non-landless households, and between 
households dependent on salaried agricultural work and those not. The percent-
ages indicate that landless households or households engaging in salaried 
agricultural work tend to rely more on brokerage, which confirms hypothesis 1a. 
The statistically significant differences of ‘own initiative’ and ‘visit by project 
staff’, and the higher percentages of these categories for non-landless house-
holds and households not dependent on salaried agricultural work, indicate that 
economic strength increases a households’ ability to get directly in touch with 
aid flows. 
 
                                                        
6 We did not pose this question in an open way, but used a list with the names of the programs that 
have been active in each of the respective villages. This reduced the risk of response bias. For 
instance, some might expect that by claiming not having received aid they might be eligible for 
more aid (assuming that the information they give to our fieldworkers would in some way or 
another influence their access to future aid). Asking this question for each of the aid initiatives 
instead of using one open question makes it more difficult to hide any information on received aid. 
Another potential response bias (which is reduced in this way) could occur when those participating 
in almost all aid initiatives forget to mention one of the programs they have worked with. 
7 We define brokers as contact persons identified as community representatives by more than one 
respondent in the village. Other contact persons in the community are considered community peers. 
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Table 2.2. Access mechanisms vs. household poverty levels 
 Landless 
 Total No Yes P-value 
Own initiative 13.6% 16.1% 7.4% .000 
Visit by project staff 27.9% 30.3% 22.0% .012 
Mediation by a community broker 38.6% 34.4% 48.9% .000 
Mediation by a community peer 14.5% 13.5% 16.9% .173 
Mediation by someone from outside the community 5.4% 5.7% 4.8% .498 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
Number of relations with projects 1674 1198 476  
     
 Salaried agricultural worker 
 Total No Yes P-value 
Own initiative 13.6% 15.2% 11.2% .095 
Visit by project staff 27.9% 31.6% 22.6% .002 
Mediation by a community broker 38.6% 34.3% 44.9% .001 
Mediation by a community peer 14.5% 13.9% 15.2% .529 
Mediation by someone from outside the community 5.4% 5.0% 6.1% .413 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
Number of relations with projects 1679 990 689  
Notes. P-values (two-sided) are the result of a two-way comparison along the economic categoriza-
tion of the household and the access mechanism. For each access mechanism we make the 
comparison with all other access mechanisms. The chi-square test is converted into a Pearson F-
statistic after correcting for dependencies of observations due to multiple observations per 
household and after applying weights to correct for underestimation of observations in large 
villages. 
 
The intermediation by community brokers may also depend on the type of aid 
provider. According to hypothesis 1b, we expect that relations with market-
oriented projects are less likely established through the mediation of community 
brokers. To test this, we distinguished three categories: ‘market-oriented’ 
development programs offering credit at market conditions (aiming for the 
complete recuperation of operation costs and the resources provided); aid 
programs offering credit on ‘subsidized’ terms and conditions (sometimes 
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combined with donations); and ‘charity-oriented’ donors transferring resources 
exclusively by means of donations8.  
 
Table 2.3. Access mechanisms vs. project type 
 Type of aid provider   
 Charity
Subs. 
finance Market P-value
a P-valueb 
Own initiative 8.9% 8.2% 24.7% .000 .000 
Visit by project staff 28.1% 28.0% 28.2% .996 .936 
Mediation by a community broker 51.8% 44.5% 20.7% .000 .000 
Mediation by a community peer 8.3% 13.5% 19.8% .000 .000 
Mediation by someone from outside the community 2.9% 5.8% 6.6% .048 .125 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%   
Number of relations with projects 399 741 506   
Notes. P-values (two-sided) are the result of a two-way comparison along the types of aid provider 
and the access mechanism. For each access mechanism we make the comparison with all other 
access mechanisms. The chi-square test is converted into a Pearson F-statistic after correcting for 
dependencies of observations due to multiple observations per household and after applying 
weights to correct for underestimation of observations in large villages. 
a Comparison over all types of aid providers; b Comparison between market-oriented aid projects 
and all other types of aid providers. 
 
Table 2.3 shows that brokerage use is significantly different when comparing the 
three types of aid and when comparing market-oriented aid and the others types 
of aid. The percentages indicate that relations with market-oriented programs are 
substantially less likely established through the intermediation by interface 
brokers, which confirms hypothesis 1b. We also observe that relations with 
market-oriented donors are more likely established as a result of the household’s 
own initiative or through mediation by a community peer (who is not a broker). 
3.2. Brokerage and exclusion from aid 
We now examine how village brokerage structures, as part of the aid interface, 
influence recurrent exclusion from aid flows. Whereas in the previous subsec-
                                                        
8 Of the 82 development interventions we identified in the survey, 55 projects channeled resources 
by means of credit. Of this group, 26 projects offered credit at market conditions. 
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tion we only took account of the established relations with aid providers and 
examined how they were established, in this subsection we look at all potential 
links with aid donors and thus also those links that for one reason or another 
were not established. This allows us to study exclusion processes from aid 
flows. 
 To test whether higher brokerage concentration in a village increases the 
proportion of households recurrently excluded from aid flows (hypothesis 2) we 
first define exclusion from aid flows. We asked the households in the sample 
whether they work or have worked with each of the programs we had previously 
identified in their village. Aggregating all potential relations with aid programs, 
we observe in Table 2.4 that only less than 20% of the potential relations with 
aid providers were established. There are, however, many reasons why people 
do not work with a particular aid provider, and not all of them are the result of 
‘exclusion’. Some people simply do not like the project or do not have any 
necessity. To detect real exclusion we asked each household for the reason of 
not working with a particular aid provider.  
 
Table 2.4. Do you work or have you worked with the mentioned project? 
 Frequency Percent 
No 8228 82.80% 
Yes 1715 17.20% 
Total 9944 100.00% 
 
On the basis of their answers, different categories were created (see Table 2.5). 
We considered the following possible reasons of not working with a particular 
project as indications of exclusion. First, when people do not know about the 
presence of the program in their village, as this means in practice that they are 
cut off from any information on the project. Second, they know about the 
program but did not manage to get in contact with it. In Table 2.5, we observe 
that for more than 75% of the potential but not established relations with 
development programs this was due to one of these two reasons9. 
                                                        
9 People could also be excluded by a project itself. This is the case when a project imposes certain 
requirements or selection criteria (the two last rows in Table 2.5). However, as we are only 
interested in exclusion caused by intermediary agents at the interface, we do not include these 
cases. 
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Table 2.5. Reasons for not working with the mentioned project 
 Frequency Percent 
Does not know the project 4316 52.78% 
Knows the project, but . . .    
 did not manage to get in contact 2124 25.98% 
 does not like the project 576 7.04% 
 does not have any necessity 140 1.71% 
 other reason why not interested 527 6.45% 
 does not fulfil project requirements 380 4.65% 
 fulfils project requirements, but was not selected 114 1.39% 
Total 8177 100.00% 
 
We are now able to test hypothesis 2. For this we estimated a standard OLS 
regression model (Table 2.6). As dependent variable, we use the village propor-
tion of households excluded (as defined above) from all projects that work or 
have worked in the village. We thus look at the most extreme form of recurrent 
exclusion. Recall from Table 2.1, that in most villages this proportion is consid-
erable, averaging around 0.21. We now explain the explanatory variables we 
used in the regression model. We refer to Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics on 
these variables. 
 In a first model, we control for the level of ‘brokerage activity’ and 
‘brokerage concentration’. Brokerage activity is defined as the proportion of aid 
relations established with the help of brokers. Brokerage concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl index, that is the sum of the squared shares of each 
identified broker within the total number of relations intermediated by brokers. 
Table 2.6 shows the results. We observe that for a given level of brokerage 
activity, the village proportion of households excluded from all aid substantially 
and significantly increases with higher brokerage concentration. An increase of 
brokerage concentration by one standard deviation (i.e. by 0.224, see Table 2.1 
for this) increases the proportion of excluded households with more than half a 
standard deviation, or 0.076. 
 As exclusion is also expected to be highly contingent on the presence of aid 
at the village level, we control for this in a second model by adding the ‘house-
hold mean number of aid relations’ in the village as explanatory variable. The 
influence of brokerage concentration is robust to adding this variable, although it 
decreases somewhat due to its correlation with this variable (see next section 
where we study the correlation between both variables). The results demonstrate 
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that increasing the household mean number of aid relations in the village with 
one standard deviation (i.e. by 0.541, see Table 2.1 for this), reduces the village 
proportion of households excluded from all aid with more than half a standard 
deviation, or 0.077. 
 
Table 2.6. OLS on the village proportion of households excluded from all aid (N = 33) 
 Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. 
 
Stand. 
Coef. 
two-
sided P
Stand. 
Coef. 
two-
sided P
Stand. 
Coef. 
Two-
sided P 
Number of projects – – – – 0.378 .007 
Household mean number of aid relations – – -0.549 .000 -0.732 .000 
Brokerage activity -0.261 .081 -0.076 .557 -0.063 .582 
Brokerage concentration 0.541 .001 0.332 .016 0.407 .002 
Adj. R-squared 0.333  0.552  0.645  
F 8.989  14.165  15.510  
Prob > F 0.001  0.000  0.000  
 
Finally, we expect that exclusion is not only dependent on brokerage concentra-
tion and the quantity of aid resources, but also on the ‘number of projects’ 
through which these aid resources are channelled. We control for this in a third 
model. The effect of brokerage concentration is robust to adding this variable. 
Despite the high correlation between the number of projects and the household 
mean number of aid relations, both coefficients remain statistically significant. 
The results indicate that all other things equal, the more projects are used to 
establish the same number of aid relations, the larger the excluded sector. This 
implies that different projects arrive at the same group of people, being it for 
different reasons (most projects work with the middle-class, the same interme-
diation structures are used, the same persons meet first with aid programme 
officers, etc.). To establish a given number of aid relations, it is therefore 
preferable to use a few larger projects instead of using several smaller projects, 
as this results in a smaller village proportion of excluded households. 
 The strong correlation that we identified between brokerage concentration 
and the proportion of the village that is excluded from all aid, combined with the 
evidence that it is especially the poorest that rely on brokerage to obtain access 
to aid, suggests that political change in the direction of more decentralized 
brokerage would benefit especially the poorest. Decentralizing brokerage 
Excluded Again 
 
 
21
structures may therefore also be justified by its potential contribution to poverty 
reduction. 
3.3. Brokerage concentration and village access to aid 
Whereas brokerage concentration tends to increase the proportion of a commu-
nity that is excluded from all aid resources, it may also positively influence the 
arrival of aid resources at the village. In particular, as was suggested by our case 
at the beginning of this chapter, replacing current brokers by less experienced 
representatives may reduce a community’s capacity to attract future aid re-
sources. 
 
Figure 2.1. Correlation between brokerage concentration and aid presence 
 
 Pearson correlation = -0.405 (two-sided P = .019)  Pearson correlation = -0.396 (two-sided P = .022) 
 
To test this hypothesis, we look at the correlation between brokerage concentra-
tion and aid presence. Our data indicate that the correlations with aid presence, 
as measured by ‘number of projects’ and ‘household mean number of aid 
relations’, are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level (Figure 2.1). 
This suggests that villages with more decentralized brokerage have actually a 
higher capacity to attract aid resources10. This is probably due to the higher 
diversification of social ties with outside aid providers that goes with more 
decentralized brokerage. A more decentralized brokerage implies that more 
                                                        
10 The causality in the other direction seems little plausible. Given the numerous case-studies of 
recurrent capture by local elites (even when different projects simultaneously operate at the 
village), it is little plausible that simply channelling more aid leads to lower brokerage concentra-
tion.  
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brokers are active at the interface. As a result, a higher proportion of the village 
might be represented and/or more contacts are made with aid donors. This 
makes it more likely that preferences of aid donors and beneficiaries meet each 
other, so that at the end more aid providers find their ‘niche’ and initiate 
operations in the village. 
 We should remark, however, that these correlations are based on a cross-
sectional analysis and do not allow us to look at dynamic processes at play when 
new and inexperienced brokers would become active at the interface. In particu-
lar, although the negative correlation between brokerage concentration and aid 
access at the village level suggests that decentralizing brokerage does not lower 
a village’s capacity to attract future aid resources, there may be a temporary 
capacity drop. Replacing elite representatives in a village by inexperienced 
representatives may temporarily reduce a village’s capacity to attract future aid 
resources.  
 Here, two remarks are warranted. First, political change is often considera-
bly less drastic than exemplified in the case at the beginning of this chapter. In 
most cases, the ruling elite remains active at the interface and new actors only 
gradually acquire prominence at the interface, enabling them to build capacity. 
Second, even when political change is very drastic a lack of capacity tends to be 
temporal as capacity is acquired through experience at the interface. This of 
course assumes that the new brokers are given sufficient time and opportunities 
to acquire this experience. Where political change is extremely drastic, coordi-
nation among donors at the supra-community level may be necessary to give 
new actors the opportunity to acquire more experience and thus capacity to act 
at the interface. 
3.4. Perspectives for political change 
In this section, we look at the perspectives for political change, and how this 
political change may be initiated by community members – i.e. without inter-
vention of external aid providers. In particular, we will show that it is hard to 
escape the ‘exclusion trap’ once a village has high brokerage concentration and 
that if political change is supported from within a community it is not likely that 
it will improve representation for the most excluded, which is necessary to 
reduce their exclusion. 
 New aid donors often rely on informal talks with local informants or 
organize formal elections to select local representatives to work with. In such a 
case, the number of community members that identify a particular representative 
may be crucial for a representative to be selected by aid donors to work with, 
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and thus to become an interface broker. Consequently, the identification of 
representatives by community members when new aid providers arrive at their 
community, may be a crucial element for the (re)creation of a community’s 
representation structures. 
 Two particular questions will be studied in this section. First, we study 
whether brokerage concentration itself hampers political change, through a 
limitation of the identification of political alternatives. In particular, we expect 
that with centralized brokerage, political alternatives are relatively less visible 
and thus less identified by community members. This will be tested as hypothe-
sis 4a. 
 Second, there may be a correlation between one’s exclusion level and the 
number and type of representatives one identifies. In particular, it may be that 
the recurrently excluded – as being disconnected from the interface – have 
limited information on who could be proposed as political alternative (hypothe-
sis 4b). If this is the case, the excluded may have little capacity to influence 
political change and improve their perspectives of getting access to future aid 
flows. 
 To study these questions, we asked each survey respondent to identify up to 
three (in their opinion) most important representatives in the village. In each 
community, we also drew up a list with the most important community represen-
tatives by interviewing local informants such as local representatives of the 
mayor or aid program officers. As this is a very similar approach aid providers 
follow when they visit a village for the first time, we identified those representa-
tives that are most visible for new aid donors. We call these representatives the 
elite representatives. Representatives identified by survey respondents that did 
not appear on these lists were considered non-elite representatives. We consider 
them to be potential alternatives for the elite representatives. For descriptive 
statistics on the mean number of representatives identified by the households 
and the number of elite representatives we identified in each village we refer to 
Table 2.1. 
 We are now able to study the first question. For this, we looked at the 
correlation between brokerage concentration and the household mean number of 
identified non-elite representatives in a village. For the calculation of the latter 
variable we divided the total number of non-elite representatives identified by 
the interviewed households in a village by the number of interviewed house-
holds in that village. The correlation between both variables is negative and 
statistically significant (Pearson correlation = -0.496; two-sided P = .003). 
Assuming that the proportion of the village that identifies a certain representa-
tive directly influences the probability that this representative is chosen by an 
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aid donor to work with, this negative correlation suggests that in villages with 
highly centralized brokerage, political change is more difficult to attain and thus 
brokerage tends to remain relatively centralized. This is so because the non-elite 
representatives are relatively little identified and therefore less visible for 
external aid providers. This confirms hypothesis 4a. 
 The correlation with the household mean number of identified elite repre-
sentatives (Pearson correlation of -0.245; two-sided P = .169), in contrast, is 
small and statistically insignificant. Elite representatives are just more visible in 
general, so that their identification tends to be less influenced by the concentra-
tion of brokerage. 
 To study the second question, we look at possible correlations between the 
identification of community representatives and the exclusion level of the survey 
respondents, measured as the proportion of aid projects in the village from 
which they had been excluded. For this we created three different classes of 
households according to their exclusion level. We defined the range of the 
classes so that they contain a similar amount of households. A class of low 
exclusion consists of all households with exclusion levels lower or equal than 
0.5. Households face moderate exclusion if they have exclusion levels higher 
than 0.5 and lower or equal than 0.8. Highly excluded households have exclu-
sion levels higher than 0.8. We then compared the identification of community 
representatives across the different classes of households. Table 2.7 shows the 
results. 
 Table 2.7 shows that on average the highly excluded group identified 1.494 
representatives, whereas the moderately excluded group and the group of low 
exclusion identified respectively 1.635 and 1.875 representatives. Applying a 
Mann-Whitney test, we observe that all pair-wise comparisons result in signifi-
cant differences. Thus, there is a clear relation between being excluded and 
identifying representatives. A household that is frequently excluded from aid 
resources has less information on who acts as community representative. 
 When doing the same analysis for elite and non-elite representatives 
separately, we obtain similar results for non-elite representatives. The higher a 
household’s exclusion from aid resources the fewer non-elite representatives the 
household identifies. Comparing the absolute number of identified elite repre-
sentatives differences are smaller. According to a Mann-Whitney test, differ-
ences are only significant between the group of high exclusion and low exclu-
sion. Elite representatives are more visible in general, so that their identification 
in absolute terms tends to be somewhat less influenced by a household’s 
exclusion. 
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Table 2.7. Influence of exclusion on the identification of community representatives 
 Exclusion a 
Comparison between classes 
(two sided P-values) b 
 low moderate high low – 
mod 
mod – 
high 
low – 
high 
       
Elite representatives       
absolute number (class average) 1.242 1.181 1.105 .540 .201 .049 
relative number c (class average) 0.678 0.720 0.738 .075 .225 .001 
percentage that identified none 28.6% 30.9% 36.8% .431 .051 .004 
       
Non-elite representatives       
absolute number (class average) 0.664 0.469 0.397 .003 .019 .000 
relative number c (class average) 0.346 0.295 0.267 .074 .167 .001 
proportion that identified none 54.1% 64.8% 70.4% .001 .061 .000 
       
Elite + non-elite representatives       
absolute number (class average)  1.875 1.635 1.494 .002 .014 .000 
proportion that identified none 15.0% 17.0% 25.0% .413 .002 .000 
       
       
Number of households 529 445 509    
        
a Low exclusion: x ≤ 0.5; Moderate exclusion: 0.5 < x ≤ 0.8; High exclusion: x > 0.8; with x = 
number of exclusions over total number of projects in the village. 
b A Mann-Whitney test is used to compare means between classes, whereas a chi-square test to 
compare percentages between classes. 
c In comparison with the total number of identified representatives (elite + non-elite). 
 
Looking at the relative number of identified elite and non-elite representatives 
(second and fifth row in Table 2.7) we observe that these are significantly 
different between highly and lowly excluded groups. In particular, the highly 
excluded group identifies relatively more elite representatives and relatively less 
non-elite representatives. Moreover, in the sixth row of Table 2.7 we observe 
that more than 70% of the highly excluded households do not identify any non-
elite representative, which is a significantly higher percentage compared with 
each of the other classes of households. These results confirm hypothesis 4b. 
They suggest that the highly excluded have limited information on who could be 
proposed as political alternative. 
 Based on the empirical evidence in this section, we come to the following 
conclusions regarding the perspectives for political change. First, in villages 
with more centralized brokerage fewer non-elite representatives are identified, 
so that the perspectives for political change are more limited. Second, highly 
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excluded households exert less influence on any political change process, as 
they identify fewer representatives and they identify relatively more elite 
representatives. If political change is supported from within a community, it is 
therefore not very likely that it will improve representation for the most ex-
cluded, which is necessary to reduce their exclusion. 
4. Conclusion: The role of aid providers 
We now summarize our empirical results and then turn to the role of aid 
providers within political change processes. Our results have demonstrated that 
village brokerage structures, as part of the interface with aid providers, exert a 
determinant influence on recurrent exclusion processes from aid flows. The 
more brokerage is monopolised by a limited number of brokers, the larger 
becomes the group that is excluded from all aid resources. As it is especially the 
poorest that rely relatively more on brokerage to get access to aid, brokerage 
concentration and complete exclusion from aid flows tend to affect especially 
the poorest. Given the benefits of a more decentralized brokerage, we have 
looked upon some mechanisms that are responsible for the perpetuation or 
transformation of brokerage structures. 
 To the extent that new outside aid donors rely on informal talks with local 
informants or organize formal elections to select the local representative to work 
with, the probability of a certain representative to be selected by an outside aid 
donor increases with the number of community members that identify that 
representative. Consequently, the identification of community representatives is 
a crucial element for the (re)creation of representation structures when new aid 
providers arrive at the village. In particular, we assume that the perspectives for 
political change are closely related with the identification of non-elite represen-
tatives. 
 We identified several impediments to political change, which result from an 
insufficient identification of non-elite representatives. First, in villages with 
more centralized brokerage fewer political alternatives are identified, which 
reduces the perspectives for a more decentralized brokerage structure. Second, 
we observed that the most excluded, as being disconnected from the interface, 
have little capacity to propose political alternatives. This implies that if political 
change is supported from within a community, it is not very likely that it will 
improve representation for the most excluded, which is necessary to reduce their 
exclusion. 
 This leaves aid donors that are really engaged with combating recurrent 
exclusion processes, with no other option than to follow a more interventionist 
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logic. In particular, it is not impossible for aid donors to find new political actors 
that represent the most excluded even if they are not very intensively identified 
by community members. Because of the lower identification by community 
members, however, it increases search and operation costs, and requires more 
time and energy than aid donors usually invest in such activities. 
 Here an important remark is warranted on the ability of aid donors to 
support political change processes. We have seen that relations with market-
oriented donors are less mediated by interface brokers. Consequently, market-
oriented aid donors have less capacity to change brokerage structures. Other aid 
donors make more use of local brokerage, so they may have more potential to 
change local brokerage structures. However, their higher reliance on local 
brokerage necessary to facilitate their local operations makes them at the same 
time also vulnerable to local resistance from the ruling brokers and their 
clientele, especially when brokerage power is concentrated in the hands of a 
limited number of brokers. This constitutes a real dilemma, which hampers 
donors to make an effort to expand their outreach beyond the networks of the 
ruling brokers. Yet, given the demonstrated benefits of a more decentralized 
brokerage this does not free them from that responsibility. 
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 3 
Aid Brokerage, Voice and Exclusion in 
Heterogeneous Communities: A Laboratory 
Study 
Chapter 3 
Aid Brokerage, Voice and Exclusion 
1. Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, community representatives tend to 
exert an important influence on the local distribution of aid. This is particularly 
true where donors give them a formal mandate to distribute resources among 
community members, as is the case with the growing number of government and 
non-government donors that follow a community-based approach (Mansuri & 
Rao, 2004). 
 It is, however, all but evident that these local representatives – generally 
among the better-off community members – have similar interests as the aid 
donors who are interested in supporting the poorest classes. In contrast to aid 
donors, local representatives may also be motivated by individual profit seeking. 
The ‘social preferences’ of these representatives may not be strong enough to 
outweigh individual profit-seeking, not to mention to give similar shares to the 
poorest classes as the aid donor would do. The delegation of distribution tasks to 
local representatives is, therefore, bound to increase social exclusion. 
 At the same time, however, potential beneficiaries are not passive agents. 
Very often they have the ability to influence the representative’s distributive 
decision-making by making use of a political voice and control institution. The 
workings of such an institution, however, may be dependent on certain informa-
tion conditions. In particular, local communities are often not small enough for 
information flows to reach all members. In many cases, respondents only 
receive information on their own share without knowing the share received by 
other community members. The information received on the distribution of 
resources might influence their satisfaction and eventually their use of the 
political control institution. Information on who disagrees with the proposed 
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distribution and who makes use of the political control institution, however, 
might also matter. In local communities, information on who disagrees with the 
representative’s distribution decision may be made public (e.g. through a quick 
hand raising procedure), or it may remain secret (e.g. through an anonymous 
voting procedure). If this information is public, representatives may take account 
of this information when making their distribution decision. In particular, it is 
plausible that community members who express dissatisfaction may receive less 
from the representative and thus eventually become worse-off in comparison 
with those who remain silent. 
 To comprehend the complex interaction between the distribution of aid by 
community representatives and the voice of community members as potential 
beneficiaries of these resources, we organized a laboratory experiment. In 
subsequent rounds, a permanent representative, being the richest of an economi-
cally-heterogeneous group, is asked to distribute a fixed quantity of resources 
among group members11. After each distribution decision, the other members 
have the ability to punish the representative if a majority of them vote in favour 
of doing so. 
 To examine the influence of information on the distribution decisions made 
by the representative, and of information on the use of the political control 
institution by the respondents, we constructed four treatments, by combining 
two information conditions. The first condition relates to information on the 
distribution of the aid. We compare a situation with public information on the 
complete distribution of the resources with one where the respondents only 
know their individual shares. The second condition relates to information on the 
respondents’ voting decisions. We compare a situation where this information is 
kept secret with a situation where both the representative and the other respon-
dents obtain complete information on individual voting. 
 Not only can aid donors influence these information conditions12, they can 
also resort to a drastic political change in favour of the poorest, if they are not 
satisfied with the representative’s decisions. To study the implications of such 
                                                        
11 Note the following two assumptions. First, it is the richest player who acts as representative. We 
justify this by the observation that most community representatives tend to be among the better-off. 
Second, the representative cannot be replaced. In most communities, the local ‘elite’, although 
contested, remain firmly in power. For empirical evidence that supports both assumptions, we refer 
to the previous chapter. 
12 Although aid programs transfer distributive-decision power to local representatives, they do not 
completely give up their agency. As providers of aid they may still influence some rules of the 
game related to information access on the distribution of the resources and on the use of the 
political control institution by the community members. 
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an externally-imposed political change, we organized a second part of the same 
experimental game, but with the poorest player as the permanent representative. 
 The experimental results show that the lower the share of the resources a 
respondent receives from the representative, the lower his/her satisfaction about 
this share. When receiving information on the complete distribution, his/her 
satisfaction also decreases the more a representative keeps for him/herself, and 
the less the respondent receives in comparison with the other respondents. As 
expected, lower satisfaction increases the propensity to vote in favour of 
punishing the representative. In addition, there are important strategic elements 
behind voting decisions. When voting decisions are made public, respondents 
are somewhat more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment, but this reluctance 
is lower with lower satisfaction. Moreover, the more a respondent believes that 
both other respondents will vote in favour of punishment, the more he/she is 
inclined to do as well. Furthermore, it is observed that female or richer respon-
dents are more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment unless information on 
the distribution is public. Consequently, with common information on the 
distribution decisions punishment rates are significantly higher. 
 We also observe that being punished induces representatives to keep all 
resources to themselves. Only with public voting and private information on the 
distribution are representatives able to keep punishment rates down. They do so 
by successfully applying an exclusion strategy, where one respondent is com-
pletely excluded from the distributed resources. Poorer respondents have a 
higher likelihood of becoming the victims of this type of exclusion. When the 
poorest player becomes the permanent representative, the final distribution of 
the net earnings becomes much more equal and punishment rates substantially 
decrease. 
2. Related literature 
An increasing number of government and non-government aid programs follow 
a community-based development approach. According to conservative calcula-
tions, the World Bank’s portfolio of projects that follow such an approach has 
increased from $325 million in 1996 to $2 billion in 2003 (Mansuri & Rao, 
2004). In practice, this approach amounts to donors giving community represen-
tatives a formal mandate to distribute aid resources among community members. 
In comparison with the officers of aid programs, local representatives tend to 
have important advantages such as their superior screening capacity and lower 
information and operation costs, which might increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such programmes. ‘Moral hazard’, however, in the form of 
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distributions that conflict with the interests of the donor, such as resource 
misappropriation by these representatives, or the complete exclusion of certain 
agents, might outweigh the advantages of relying on local representatives 
(Alderman, 2001; Galasso & Ravallion, 2001; Conning & Kevane, 2002; 
Platteau & Gaspart, 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). 
 To reduce such a bias in the distribution of resources, aid donors may apply 
control mechanisms that reduce such moral hazards. Platteau & Gaspart (2003), 
for instance, discuss the feasibility of a political control mechanism that consists 
of incremental resource transfers by the donor, conditional on the agreement of 
the community. Two assumptions, which are implicit in their model as well as in 
most aid donors’ conceptualization of local communities, should be reconsid-
ered, however. 
 First, the assumption that a community acts as one decision maker is not 
evident. This is important as community representatives may take advantage of 
this. In particular, they may strategically undermine any political coalition that 
obliges them to retain fewer resources. They can do so by favouring some of the 
potential beneficiaries while excluding others. Second, communities can hardly 
be considered as economically-homogenous entities. In most communities, no 
matter how poor they are, economic inequality is the rule rather than the 
exception. Consequently, community members may have very different and, 
perhaps, even competing interests, with possible behavioural implications for 
community representatives who distribute aid and for community members as 
potential beneficiaries.  
 It is the aim of this research to consider these realities. As we will make use 
of a laboratory experiment, it is interesting to look at the experimental literature 
and the insights it has produced related to these assumptions. An important 
experimental game that bears a considerable resemblance to ours is the ultima-
tum game. We will look briefly at three extensions that make this basic bargain-
ing setting more resemble the small societies we study: repeated play with fixed 
partners, economic inequality and multiple respondents. 
 In the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982), one player (the proposer) 
receives a fixed amount of money that he/she has to distribute between 
him/herself and another player, the respondent. The respondent can accept or 
reject the proposal, but if he/she rejects it, both players receive nothing. Experi-
mental results typically show that the mean of the proposals is around 30-40% 
of the available amount and the mode is the equal split. At the same time, most 
offers of less than 20% are rejected by the respondent (Camerer & Thaler, 
1995). 
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 This strongly contrasts with standard economic theory that predicts that 
profit-maximizing respondents would not make use of the rejection possibility if 
this would make them worse off. By backward induction, knowing that respon-
dents would never reject a proposal, distributors would, therefore, keep every-
thing. However, as ample evidence of ultimatum game experiments indicates, 
respondents reject very unequal distributions, even if this means that they would 
end up with nothing. This is behaviourally rationalized as a reaction to unfair 
distributions. 
 Comparing these results with proposals made in dictator game experiments, 
where the respondent can only accept, distributors do give more to the respon-
dent when the latter has a punishment option (Hoffman et al., 1994). These 
results confirm that distributors pay more attention to the will of potential 
recipient-respondents when the latter have the means to punish the distributor in 
the form of reducing their pay-off, even if this can only be done at a positive 
cost for the respondent. 
 Many extensions have been made to this basic setting. In contrast with the 
bulk of repeated ultimatum game experiments where players are rematched each 
round, keeping the players fixed adds reputation considerations and may reduce 
the relative importance of fairness concerns. Slembeck (1999) has demonstrated 
that in such a setting representatives demand more and rejection rates are higher 
than in the standard ultimatum game. He attributes this to the super game 
strategies of income-maximizing representatives who try to obtain a reputation 
as a tough player in the early rounds in order to increase future earnings. 
 Other extensions have allowed for economic heterogeneity of the partici-
pants. Introducing endowment inequality increases the number of focal points, 
which may increase punishment rates. In particular, when assessing the fairness 
of a distribution people may compare with the equal split of the distributed 
resources, but they may equally well compare with the equal split of the final 
pay-offs. It may also be plausible that ‘rich’ representatives (i.e. with large 
endowments), instead of being motivated by fairness concerns and giving more 
to poorer respondents, actually play more selfishly as their higher endowments 
give them more bargaining power (Armantier, 2006). 
 A third avenue of extensions to the ultimatum game have allowed for 
multiple respondents. They provide behavioural evidence about more complex 
interpersonal comparisons. Knez & Camerer (1995) let a proposer simultane-
ously play two independent ultimatum games. Their results indicated that half of 
the respondents demand more when they know that the other respondent 
receives more. Proposers, however, do not anticipate that respondents make 
such social comparisons, so that rejection rates tend to be higher than in the 
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standard ultimatum game. Riedl & Vyrastekova (2004) have studied a setting 
where respondents are involved in the same distribution game, so that their 
acceptance or rejection decision may have consequences for the pay-off of other 
respondents. In their three-player ultimatum game, each of the two respondents 
has to decide whether or not to reject the proposal. They observed that half of 
the respondents, when deliberating about such a decision, consider the pay-off 
of the other respondent. 
 In contrast with two-player ultimatum games where there is a one-to-one 
link between the respondent’s decision and his/her final pay-off, with multiple 
respondents there are different procedures possible that link the respondents’ 
rejection decisions with the final outcome. In contrast with Riedl & Vyrastekova 
(2004), where each respondent has veto power, with larger respondent groups 
majority voting may be more common. Extensions that allow for such voting 
procedures within a bargaining setting are new. They are one of the main 
contributions of this research. The following possible behavioural implications 
of such voting procedures are important to consider. First, as distributors do not 
require the support of all respondents, they may strategically distribute resources 
in a way that the minimum required support is obtained, while excluding the 
respondents whose votes are not required, i.e. they try to obtain the ‘smallest 
coalition’. This allows them to maximize their share of resources without being 
punished. Second, some distributors may also take account of the cost to obtain 
support form such a coalition (i.e. the resources they need to transfer to the 
coalition to safeguard its political support). Profit-seeking representatives may 
explicitly look for the respondents who are satisfied with a smaller share of the 
pie. It may, therefore, be a profit-maximizing strategy to exclude the poorest 
respondents if they are believed to have higher acceptance thresholds (see also 
Abbink & Ellman (2005) who tested a similar hypothesis). 
3. Experimental design 
In this section, we start with a description of the game that was used in our 
experiment, which consists of a distribution game followed by a voting stage for 
punishment. We identify possible equilibria of the voting subgame under 
standard and social preferences and the resulting optimal strategies of the 
representative. Thereafter, we explain the procedures and parameters that were 
used to implement this game in an experimental setting. The treatment condi-
tions are explained as well as possible hypotheses on the influence of these 
conditions on the experimental results. 
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3.1. A non-cooperative distribution game with voting for punishment 
The game implemented in the laboratory consists of a four-player dictator game, 
followed by a voting stage that determines whether or not the dictator-
representative is punished (see Figure 3.1. for the game tree). The four players 
are labelled A, B, C and D, and player A assumes the role of representative. The 
game proceeds as follows: 
(1)  The representative A distributes a fixed amount of resources M among a 
group of four players, him/herself included, such that 
Mxxxx DCBA =+++  
(2) The respondents simultaneously decide whether or not to vote in favour 
of punishing the representative. 
 
Figure 3.1 Game tree 
 
The pay-offs of the players are determined in the following way. If less then two 
respondents vote in favour of punishment, the distribution will be implemented 
as proposed by the representative. In any other case, these pay-offs will be 
reduced by k for each respondent and by K for the representative, whereby K is 
much larger than k13. This might be conceived as a control and punishment 
procedure implemented by the aid donor if a majority of respondents votes in 
                                                        
13 This cost scheme is different from the one used in the classical ultimatum game. In particular, the 
cost of punishment does not depend on the proposed distribution, and thus the foregone profits. 
A
yesyesyes 
C
B 
no nono
C D
DB
{ }DCBDCB xxxxxxM ,,,−−−  distribution
punishment 
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favour of this. In such a case, the aid donor interprets this as a collective action 
from the community, and charges the costs of this procedure to the entire 
community, also those who did not vote in favour of punishment. 
 It is important to stress that we opted for three instead of two respondents 
because of our interest in potential exclusionary dynamics induced by majority 
voting systems. In particular, with three respondents it is possible that one 
respondent is excluded by the representative who only needs a majority to avoid 
punishment. 
 We now characterize the pure strategy equilibria of the voting subgame. 
According to standard economic theory, the respondents when taking a voting 
decision only look at the effect of their voting decision on their final income. As 
costly punishment would make respondents worse off, respondents prefer that 
the representative is not punished. However, whether the representative is 
punished also depends on the other respondents’ voting decision. When two 
other respondents vote in favour of punishment, the third respondent cannot 
change the voting outcome and is therefore indifferent between voting in favour 
of or against punishment. When he/she votes in favour of punishment we obtain 
strategy combination ( )yyy ,, , which is an equilibrium as no one can increase 
his/her utility by changing his/her individual strategy. However, when he/she 
votes against punishment, it becomes better for the other respondents to vote 
against punishment. Consequently, a voting outcome with exactly two respon-
dents voting in favour of punishment cannot be an equilibrium. When exactly 
one or zero respondents vote in favour of punishment, ( )nny ,, , ( )nyn ,, , ( )ynn ,, , 
( )nnn ,, , the representative is not punished and no respondent can improve his/her 
pay-off by changing his/her voting decision. These strategy combinations are 
thus also equilibria. As all identified equilibria are not dependent on the distribu-
tion decision made by the representative, the optimal strategy for the representa-
tive will always be to keep all resources. 
 Up to now, we assumed that respondents and representatives only take 
account of their final income and not how their income compares with the 
income of the other players. However, according to the extensive literature on 
ultimatum game experiments, respondents do take account of how their income 
compares with the others’ income and many representatives in an attempt to 
avoid rejection give substantial amounts to the respondents. Recent theoretical 
models have rationalized this by including an inequality term in the utility 
function (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). 
 In contrast with standard preferences where punishment reduces the utility 
of each of the respondents, with social preferences this might be different, as 
individual utility also depends on the social comparison with the representative. 
Aid Brokerage, Voice and Exclusion 
 
 
37
In contrast with standard preferences where the voting equilibria are independ-
ent from the representative’s distribution decision, we will show that with social 
preferences some of the voting equilibria depend on the representative’s 
distribution decision. In particular, we will look at the impact of assuming that 
the players in our game have Fehr-Schmidt social preferences (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999) instead of standard preferences. Due to the majority voting rule, ( )yyy ,,  
and ( )nnn ,,  remain equilibria. If all respondents take the same voting decision, no 
respondent can increase his/her utility by changing his/her strategy as he/she 
cannot change the voting outcome. 
 For the other strategy combinations, ( )nny ,, , ( )nyn ,, , ( )ynn ,, , which were 
equilibria with standard preferences and resulted in non-punishment, we study 
under what conditions they are not longer equilibria with social preferences. For 
this to be the case it is needed that at least two respondents are better-off when 
the representative is punished (and thus the representative is punished). As 
shown in appendix 2 (proposition 1), this is the case when the envy parameters 
of the respondents are above a certain threshold. The new equilibria under these 
conditions are ( )nyy ,, , ( )yny ,, , ( )yyn ,,  and ( )yyy ,, . These equilibria exist irrespective 
of the distribution of the representative.  
 It is also shown that if envy parameters are below this threshold, the best 
response of the respondents becomes dependent on the distribution decision 
made by the representative. At least two respondents are better-off when the 
representative is punished, if their final income remains below a certain ‘accep-
tance threshold’. Under these conditions ( )yyy ,,  is always an equilibrium, and 
also ( )nyy ,, , ( )yny ,,  or ( )yyn ,,  may be equilibria in dependence of which respon-
dent has his/her final income remaining below the acceptance threshold. 
 Regarding the representative’s optimal strategy, we make a distinction 
between the voting equilibria that are dependent on and those that are independ-
ent from the representative’s distribution. If the representative believes that the 
respondents will play one of the equilibria that are independent from his/her 
distribution decision, the representative will keep all resources if his/her guilt 
parameter is not higher than ¾, otherwise he/she will distribute the resources 
such that the final income of all players is equalized (for a proof of this proposi-
tion 2 see appendix 2). 
 If the representative believes that the respondents will play one of the 
equilibria that are dependent on his/her distribution, he/she may be interested in 
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avoiding punishment14. He/she may achieve this by giving at least two respon-
dents more than their acceptance threshold so that they prefer non-punishment. 
As he/she only needs two respondents to abstain from voting for punishment to 
avoid punishment, he/she may increase his/her income by excluding the third 
respondent. Moreover, as CBD EEE =< , respondent D has a higher acceptance 
threshold, so that the representative can increase his/her income even more 
without being punished by excluding respondent D instead of one of the other 
respondents. As indicated by the calculations of proposition 2 (appendix 2), 
following such an exclusion-strategy would only increase the representative’s 
utility if his/her guilt parameter is lower than ¾. Otherwise he/she will prefer to 
equalize the final income of all players. According to the distribution of envy 
and guilt parameters assumed by Fehr & Schmidt (1999), guilt parameters 
higher than ¾ are very rare. Consequently, with Fehr-Schmidt social preferences 
it is predicted that most representatives will opt for the exclusion strategy by 
forming a coalition with the middle-income players. 
 None of these models, however, satisfactorily explain why respondents in 
our experiment should take account of the share the other respondents receive. 
As each respondent pays the same punishment cost, punishing the representative 
leaves inequalities among respondents unaffected. Consequently, a vote for 
punishment cannot be rationalized as an attempt to reduce inequality among the 
respondents. Intention-based models are more promising in this respect. A 
reciprocal action by a respondent towards the representative through votes for 
punishment is determined by the perceived kindness of the action of the repre-
sentative. It is the representative who is responsible for possible unkind treat-
ments and this does not only depend on how outcomes compare between the 
representative and the respondent, but also on differences between the outcomes 
of the respondents. If a respondent is given less in comparison with other 
respondents, he/she might interpret this as unkind behaviour from the part of the 
representative.  
 Moreover, perceived kindness might also depend on the relative income 
positions (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Richer respondents might not perceive it 
unkind to receive lower shares in comparison with poorer respondents whereas 
poorer respondents might perceive it very unkind if they receive lower shares in 
comparison with richer respondents. Such model would predict that respon-
dents’ behaviour is correlated with the differences between their received share 
                                                        
14 The representative will only be interested in avoiding punishment if the cost of punishment is 
sufficiently high so that the utility of any non-punishment outcome is equal or higher than the 
maximum attainable utility with punishment. 
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and the shares of the other respondents, which would not be the case in our 
model with standard and social preferences. 
 Finally, when taking a voting decision respondents may also be influenced 
by their expectations on the voting decisions of the other respondents. Some 
respondents may act as conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al., 2001) and 
therefore vote in favour of punishment the more respondents they believe will 
do as well. This would make ( )yyy ,,  a likely outcome. However, as this strategy 
combination is also an equilibrium with standard and social preferences, 
empirical observation of this strategy combination does not allow us to draw any 
conclusions on its behavioural foundations. For this, we also need to test for a 
correlation between a respondent’s propensity to vote in favour of punishment 
and his/her beliefs that the two other respondents will do as well. With standard 
or social preferences such a correlation is absent as the respondent is indifferent 
between voting in favour of or against punishment in case he/she expects the 
two other respondents will vote in favour of punishment. 
3.2. Experimental procedures and parameters 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants are told that the experiment 
consists of three independent parts, in the sense that the earnings in one part will 
not be influenced by their decisions in subsequent parts of the experiment. 
Moreover, each part is explained after the previous part has finished. The first 
part is a one-shot dictator game15. In the second and third part of the experiment, 
participants are matched in groups of four. Group composition remains un-
changed in these parts of the experiment. In each part, participants play the 
previously described game for 10 rounds. At the beginning of each round, all 
players receive a fixed endowment. To study the influence of economic inequal-
ity in this game we let the players receive different endowments. One person 
receives 200 ‘francs’ (= 1 Euro) each round, two players receive each 150 and 
one player receives 100. We call them respectively high-endowment, middle-
endowment and low-endowment players. Inequality is introduced before the 
start of the first round in a purely arbitrary way16. The endowment each player 
                                                        
15 We changed this somewhat to allow for the possibility of destroying (see Bardsley (2005) on 
this). This makes that keeping everything is not a corner solution anymore, so that more players 
would choose this option. By doing so, selfish agents reluctant to choose a corner solution are more 
likely to be detected. 
16 Thus, inequality is difficult to justify morally. In reality, however, it is common that economic 
inequality is justified by certain actors, which would reduce the effect of inequality. 
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receives at the beginning of each round is publicly known. The accumulated 
earnings of each participant are private knowledge throughout the experiment. 
 One participant is a permanent representative who each round is asked to 
distribute an additional (publicly known) pie of 200 ‘francs’ between all 
members. Whereas in the second part it is the high-endowment player who is the 
permanent representative, in the third part this role is assumed by the low-
endowment player. After each distribution decision of the representative, 
respondents are asked for their satisfaction (on a 9-point scale) about their share 
received17 and they decide whether or not to vote in favour of punishing the 
representative. In case of punishment the pay-off of the representative is reduced 
with 200 ‘francs’18, whereas the cost of punishment is 20 ‘francs’ for each of the 
respondents (also for those who did not vote in favour of punishment). Player 
roles do not change during the 10 rounds. 
 To be able to study the influence of strategic elements more thoroughly, we 
asked participants after each decision for their beliefs about the voting decisions 
of the respondents. In particular, whereas each respondent is asked for the 
likelihood that exactly two, one or none other respondents vote in favour of 
punishment, the representative is asked for the likelihood that a specific respon-
dent votes in favour of punishment and this for each of the respondents. To 
induce sincere estimates we used the quadratic scoring rule for belief elicitation 
(see e.g. Offerman, 1997). In brief, the amount they earn with these estimates 
depends on the reported likelihood estimates and the actual voting decisions of 
the other members19. 
                                                        
17 This helps us to disentangle psychological elements from strategic elements. 
18 Note that this is exactly the same amount as the resources to be distributed. As a consequence, 
keeping all resources but being punished results in a status-quo for the representative. Compared 
with this benchmark, representatives have a strong incentive to try to avoid punishment by giving 
more resources to the others, as this could lead to positive net earnings. If they fail to avoid 
punishment, however, not keeping all resources leads to negative net earnings. 
19 The additional earnings for a respondent are equal to ( ) ( ) ( )( )222120363 pppp j ++−+  if j respondents vote 
in favor of punishment (with j = 0,1,2). pj = Pj/100, with the reported percentages Pj representing 
the percentage that j respondents vote in favor of punishment. The additional earnings for the 
representative are ( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ +−+3 2221
i
noyesj ppp
, with pj = Pj/100. The reported percentages Pj (j = yes, no) 
represent the probability that a specific respondent votes in favor of punishment. Consequently, 
both the representative and the respondents can earn an additional earning of maximum 6 ‘francs’ 
in case their likelihood estimates are completely correct. The participants got to see the formulas in 
the instructions, but they were told that it was not important to understand them exactly and it was 
sufficient that they realized that their expected earnings were maximized if they indicated their true 
likelihood estimates. 
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 We organized four different treatments (Table 3.1), by combining two 
information conditions. The first information condition relates to the information 
on the distribution decision made by the representative. We compare a setting 
wherein information about the distribution remains private for the respondents 
with a setting with common information on the distribution. Only when respon-
dents have full information on the distribution, they are able to compare their 
share with the share of the other group members and social comparison may 
enter their subsequent voting decisions. Representatives may anticipate that 
respondents engage in social comparison and therefore adapt their distribution 
decisions. 
 The second information condition relates to information on the voting 
decisions of the respondents. We distinguish between a setting wherein voting 
decisions remain secret and a setting wherein voting decisions are made public. 
The difference might be crucial as our game is a repeated game with fixed 
partners. In particular, the voting decision of a respondent may influence 
subsequent distribution decisions of the representative. If multiple respondents 
have to vote about punishment and voting is public (and thus the representative 
knows who has been dissatisfied with his/her distribution decision) the represen-
tative also obtains information about the relative acceptance thresholds of the 
respondents. Representatives may use this information to shift resources away 
from those agents that are more difficult to satisfy. Such an exclusion-strategy 
allows them to increase their personal share and remain unpunished. Respon-
dents who actually disagree with the current distribution, however, may antici-
pate this and therefore refrain from voting in favour of punishment if voting is 
public. 
 
Table 3.1. Treatments 
 Secret 
voting 
Public vot-
ing 
Private information on the distribution 8 groups 8 groups 
Common information on the distribution 7 groups 8 groups 
 
The experiment was conducted in the computer lab of Maastricht University in 
the second half of 2006. It was computerized using Z-tree software (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). In total 124 students participated in 31 groups, most of them 
students in economics and business administration, all from Maastricht Univer-
sity. 52.4% of the participants were male and average age was 21.8 with a 
minimum of 18 and maximum of 31. None of the students had participated in a 
similar experiment before. Each session took between 90 and 120 minutes, and 
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average earnings were 22.2 Euros, with the highest earnings 31.7 Euros and 
lowest earnings 10.7 Euros. More detailed experimental procedures and the 
instructions can be found in Appendix 1. 
4. Empirical results 
In this section we look at the representatives’ distribution decisions and the 
respondents’ voting decisions, and how they interact with each other. We first 
look at the determinants of the satisfaction of the respondents about their 
received share and their subsequent voting decisions. Thereafter, we study the 
strategies of the representatives and their relation with punishment and exclu-
sion. Treatment effects will be identified and discussed while analyzing the 
decision-making of both respondents and representatives. 
4.1. The respondents: satisfaction and voting 
The respondents’ voting decisions might depend on both psychological and 
strategic elements. To disentangle both behavioural motives, we measured the 
respondents’ satisfaction with their received share. We expect their voting 
decision to be highly correlated with their satisfaction. It seems intuitive that 
respondents are more inclined to vote in favour of punishment the less satisfied 
they are with the resources they receive from the representative. Before studying 
the respondents’ voting decision we therefore start with an analysis of the 
determinants of their satisfaction. 
 We asked the respondents about their satisfaction level with the share they 
received, on a 9 point scale with range [-4, 4], and used this measure as depend-
ent variable in a regression model. We expect that the less a respondent receives 
from the representative, the lower his/her satisfaction. As the satisfaction level 
for a given received share might differ between low and middle-endowment 
respondents we add a dummy variable to control for the endowment of the 
respondent. As the influence of the received share might also differ between low 
and middle-endowment players, we add an interaction variable between the 
received share and the endowment dummy variable. In addition, to study 
whether female respondents have different satisfaction levels for a given 
received share we control for the sex of the respondent. Finally, we add two 
dummies to control for the information conditions on the voting and distribution 
decisions, and we control for the round number to test whether there exists any 
time trend. 
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 Table 3.2 shows the results. Pooling the data of all treatments in the first 
model we observe that the received share is a very strong determinant of the 
satisfaction about that share. We also observe that it is the only significant 
variable in this model. 
 
Table 3.2. Satisfaction with the received share 
 Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. 
 Pooled Private  
information 
Common 
information 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Own share 0.090 0.008*** 0.100 0.008*** 0.084 0.013*** 
Middle-endowment player (dummy) 0.314 0.272 0.438 0.310 0.188 0.470 
Own share x middle-endowment player 0.001 0.010 -0.013 0.011 0.014 0.016 
Share representative – – – – 0.001 0.004 
Sex (1 = male; 0 = female) -0.343 0.289 -0.404 0.387 -0.332 0.433 
Public voting (dummy) 0.230 0.348 0.476 0.412 -0.039 0.581 
Common information (dummy) 0.045 0.328 – – – – 
Round 0.016 0.024 -0.018 0.025 0.050 0.042 
Constant -4.008 0.424*** -4.008 0.383*** -4.145 0.975*** 
N 930  480  450  
R-squared 0.5730  0.6181  0.5443  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
F 68.20  200.22  40.17  
Notes. OLS regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations. We ran 
separate regressions for public and secret voting, but results were not very different, so that we 
decided to pool observations under public and secret voting. Significance levels (two-sided): * = 
10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Pooling data of both private and common information treatments, however, 
might conceal influences that are specific to one of both treatment conditions. In 
particular, when information on the distribution is common social comparison 
might become important. Therefore, we estimate separate models for private and 
common information on the distribution. In the model with data from the 
common information treatments we also controlled for the share the representa-
tives keep for themselves. In these models too the received share results the only 
significant explanatory variable. 
 In case of common information on the distribution decisions the following 
modifications make sense. First, if respondents engage in social comparison, 
their relative position vis-à-vis the person of comparison might be an important 
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determinant. More specifically, it might matter if the inequality is advantageous 
(in the sense that the received share is larger than the share of the person of 
comparison) or disadvantageous (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Second, social 
comparison might be very different between low and middle-endowment 
respondents. In particular, whereas low-endowment respondents are only able to 
compare with high and middle-endowment players, middle-endowment respon-
dents are able to compare with high, middle and low-endowment players. Thus, 
it is necessary to estimate separate models for both types of respondents. 
 Table 3.3 reports the estimation results for low- and middle-endowment 
respondents separately. In both models we observe that once we control for 
relative standing the received share does not exert any significant direct influ-
ence on the satisfaction of the respondents. The relative positions vis-à-vis the 
other group members, in contrast, are important determinants of a respondent’s 
satisfaction. We observe that disadvantageous inequality (envy) towards the 
high-endowment player (the representative) exerts a significant negative 
influence on the satisfaction level of the respondent. The higher the inequality in 
favour of the representative, the less satisfied the respondent becomes with 
his/her own share. The coefficient is similar for both types of respondents. 
Advantageous inequality (guilt) increases the satisfaction of the middle-
endowment respondents. For low-endowment respondents we do not observe 
such effect. 
 Respondents also compare with the middle-endowment players. Coeffi-
cients of advantageous inequality are positive whereas coefficients of disadvan-
tageous inequality are negative. As indicated by the size of the coefficients, for 
middle-endowment players advantageous inequality with respect to other 
middle-endowment respondents weighs more than advantageous inequality 
towards the representative (F(1, 14) = 5.77; two-sided P = .031). This suggests a 
group reference effect. The fact that respondents find themselves in a similar 
position seems to make them focus on the differences between them. Regarding 
disadvantageous inequality we do not find such effect (F(1, 14) = 3.00; two-
sided P = .105). 
 Low-endowment players are less satisfied if they receive less than the 
average of both middle-endowment players and their satisfaction becomes lower 
the larger this difference. In case inequality is advantageous for the low-
endowment player we do not observe any influence on his/her satisfaction level. 
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Table 3.3. Satisfaction with the received share (common information) 
 Model 1. Model 2. 
 
Middle-endowment 
respondents (players 2-3)
Low-endowment 
respondents (player 4) 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Own share 0.019 0.016 0.026 0.022 
Max {own share – share high-endow, 0} 0.018 0.010* -0.025 0.021 
Max {share high-endow – own share, 0} -0.021 0.003*** -0.017 0.006** 
Max {own share – share middle-endow, 0} 0.022 0.010** 0.031 0.034 
Max {share middle-endow – own share, 0} -0.037 0.009*** -0.042 0.013*** 
Max {own share – share low-endow, 0} -0.004 0.012 – – 
Max {share low-endow – own share, 0} -0.019 0.006** – – 
Sex (1 = male; 0 = female) -0.106 0.527 -0.719 0.977 
Public voting 0.583 0.521 -1.128 0.943 
Round 0.061 0.064 0.091 0.072 
N 300  150  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
F 135.75  113.03  
a In the first model the respondent compares with the other middle-endowment player, whereas in 
the second model we let the low-endowment respondent compare with the average of both middle-
endowment players. 
Notes. OLS regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations. As all 
shares sum up to a constant, we estimate a model without constant to avoid complete collinearity. 
R-squared is not included as it is overestimated in models without a constant term. Significance 
levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
Middle-endowment players are also able to compare with the low-endowment 
respondents. We observe that advantageous inequality does not influence their 
satisfaction level. Disadvantageous inequality, in contrast matters. In case a 
middle-endowment player receives less than the low-endowment respondent, the 
former will be more dissatisfied the larger this difference. Based on an F-test, 
we find that the influence of disadvantageous inequality with the low-
endowment respondents is not statistically different from the influence of 
disadvantageous inequality with other middle-endowment respondents (F(1, 14) 
= 2.21; two-sided P = .160). Moreover, it is also not statistically different from 
the influence of disadvantageous inequality with the high-endowment player 
(F(1, 14) = 0.10; two-sided P = .756). The latter suggests that in their satisfac-
tion levels with their share middle-endowment players do not recognize the less 
favorable and unfair position of low-endowment respondents in comparison 
with the high-endowment representative. Finally, the sex of the respondent does 
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not exert a significant effect on the satisfaction with the received share. We 
summarize the findings discussed so far in our first result. 
 
Result 1  Satisfaction with the received share 
When information is private, satisfaction with the received share increases with 
the share, which is the only statistically significant determinant. With common 
information on the distribution, a respondent is less satisfied if the representa-
tive keeps more than what he/she gives to the respondent, and the more so the 
larger this difference. Respondents also compare with the other respondents. 
Disadvantageous inequality lowers the satisfaction of respondents irrespective 
of their endowment, whereas advantageous inequality only increases satisfac-
tion for middle-endowment respondents comparing with each other. 
 
After having studied the determinants of the respondents’ satisfaction with their 
received share, we now estimate an explanatory model on the voting decisions 
of the respondents. Next to their satisfaction level, there are more strategic 
elements that might influence respondents’ voting decisions. These may 
influence voting decisions in different ways. 
 First, we expect that it matters whether voting is public or secret. When 
voting is public, representatives receive information about who wants to punish 
him/her. This makes it possible for representatives to retaliate against ‘protest-
ing’ respondents when making new distribution decisions in subsequent rounds. 
Anticipating such behaviour, respondents may be more reluctant to vote in 
favour of punishment when voting is public. However, there might be an 
interaction effect with the respondent’s satisfaction. More dissatisfied respon-
dents may care less about the consequences of their voting decision on future 
earnings. This may be due to an emotional reaction that outweighs strategic 
behaviour. Another reason for this might be that they already receive low shares 
from the representative. Potential profit losses as a result of representatives 
lowering their shares in response to their protest votes are therefore limited as 
well. 
 Second, the beliefs about the voting decisions of the other respondents may 
be important. Respondents may be conditional voters. Considering punishment a 
public good, respondents may cast a vote in favour of punishment only if they 
expect the other respondents to do the same (Fischbacher et al., 2001). To 
control for such conditional voter effect, we add the respondent’s likelihood 
estimates that one other respondent votes in favour of punishment and the 
likelihood estimates that both other respondents vote in favour of punishment. 
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Furthermore, we control for the information condition on the distribution 
decisions and the sex and the endowment of the respondent. 
 The results of model 1 in Table 3.4 show that the satisfaction level with the 
received share exerts a significant negative influence on a respondent’s likeli-
hood of voting in favour of punishment. The results also show that with public 
voting the respondents are more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment. At 
the same time, as indicated by the significant interaction effect, this reluctance 
reduces with lower satisfaction levels.  
 As hypothesized, when taking a voting decision, respondents are also 
influenced by their beliefs about what the other respondents would do. The 
higher their likelihood estimates that both other respondents will vote in favour 
of punishing the representative, the more they are inclined to do as well. This 
conditional voter effect is not different between private and public voting as 
indicated by the insignificant coefficient of the interaction term with the voting 
condition. The influence of the beliefs that exactly one other respondent votes in 
favour of punishment is very small and insignificant.  
 Interestingly, we observe a large influence of the sex of the respondents. 
Female respondents have a 14.7% lower probability of voting in favour of 
punishment in comparison with male respondents. A similar effect exists with 
the endowment of the respondents. Middle-endowment players have a 13.6% 
lower probability of voting in favour of punishment in comparison with low-
endowment players. We also observe that with common information on the 
distribution decisions, the respondents’ propensity to vote in favour of punish-
ment increases with 11.7%. 
 A relevant question to ask, however, is whether the sex and endowment 
effects are equally present under both private and common information on the 
representative’s distribution decisions. It might be the case that with common 
information respondents do not only take account of their relative position vis-à-
vis the other players (which is captured by the satisfaction with the received 
share as confirmed by previous regression results); but also of the distribution in 
general, which tends to be very unfair (see next section on this) with most 
representatives trying to keep as much as possible. If middle-endowment or 
female respondents are more sensitive to this than low-income or male respon-
dents respectively, their lower propensity to vote in favour of punishment might 
then disappear once information on the distribution is public.  
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To study these possible interaction effects, we control in model 2 for the 
different combinations of the respondents’ sex and the information condition on 
the distribution decisions. In model 3, we do the same for the respondents’ 
endowment. The regression results in models 2 and 3 indicate that middle-
income or female respondents only have a lower propensity to vote in favour of 
punishment when information on the distribution is private. Once information 
on the distribution is made public, differences between male and female 
respondents disappear. According to a chi-squared test both dummy coefficients 
are not significantly different (chi2(1) = 0.00; two-sided P = .965). The same 
applies to differences between low-endowment and high-endowment respon-
dents (chi2(1) = 0.22; two-sided P = .641). Building on these results we are able 
to combine models 2 and 3 into a model 4. Our findings on the respondents’ 
likelihood of voting in favour of punishment are summarized in a second result. 
 
Result 2  Propensity to vote in favour of punishment 
A respondent’s propensity to vote in favour of punishment decreases with higher 
satisfaction with the received share. It also decreases when voting is public, 
although this effect becomes weaker with lower satisfaction. A respondent’s 
propensity to vote in favour of punishment also decreases the less he/she 
believes that both other respondents will vote in favour of punishment. Female 
or middle-endowment respondents have a lower propensity to vote in favour of 
punishment unless information on the distribution is common. 
4.2. The representatives 
In this section we study the representatives’ decision making when the high-
endowment player is the representative, i.e. the first 10 rounds of the experi-
ment. We start with some descriptive statistics on the representatives’ distribu-
tion decisions. We then elaborate a classification of strategies and look at the 
relative frequency of the strategies under the different treatment conditions. 
After this static analysis, we examine the dynamics of strategy choice and its 
relation with punishment. 
 Two focal ways of allocating the additional resources might be interpreted 
as ‘fair’. First, the additional resources can be distributed in an equal way, i.e. 50 
‘francs’ for each of the four players. Second, resources may be distributed so 
that the final distribution among the respondents is equalized. This is obtained if 
the representative gives 100 ‘francs’ to the low-endowment players, 50 ‘francs’ 
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to each of the middle-endowment players and keeps nothing to him/herself, so 
that each player would end up with 200 ‘francs’. 
 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics of distributive decisions  
 
 Mean share of . . . 
 
 Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 
1. Secret voting - private information 
106.88 
(56.67) a 
28.68 
(27.00) 
34.13 
(26.06) 
30.33 
(25.06) 
2. Public voting - private information 
98.25 
(46.88) 
38.26 
(21.66) 
32.59 
(25.21) 
30.90 
(28.76) 
3. Secret voting - common information 
102.33 
(63.60) 
29.64 
(26.02) 
35.81 
(25.65) 
32.21 
(29.50) T
re
at
m
en
t 
4. Public voting - common information 
88.49 
(61.43) 
38.59 
(25.67) 
39.96 
(23.97) 
32.96 
(27.09) 
 
Total 
98.88 
(57.71) 
33.93 
(25.57) 
35.62 
(25.38) 
31.58 
(27.61) 
a Standard deviation between parentheses. Group averages over all rounds. 
Notes. Taking group averages over all rounds the shares are not significantly different over the four 
treatments. Based on a Kruskal-Wallis test two-sided P-values for the respective shares are .799; 
.513; .809 and .998. 
 
In the experiment, however, representatives keep much more for themselves 
than dictated by any of both ‘fair’ ways of allocating resources. In Table 3.5, 
which shows some descriptive statistics on the representatives’ distribution 
decisions, we observe that on average the share representatives keep is almost 
three times as much as what they give to each of the respondents. In other 
words, they only give around 50% to the three respondents in total, although 
their endowment is already 50% higher than the middle-endowment players or 
even 100% compared with the low-endowment players. This suggests that to a 
large extent profit-maximization outweighs concerns for fairness. 
 For representatives to maximize profits, they should not only consider the 
share they keep for themselves. It also matters whether or not they manage to 
avoid punishment as punishment costs are considerable. Recall that the punish-
ment cost for representatives equals the maximum profit they could make by 
keeping all resources. 
 Punishment is quite frequent as indicated by Table 3.6., which shows the 
average punishment frequency after pooling all rounds over all groups by 
treatment. At the same time, there are considerable differences between the 
treatments. Given the information condition, punishment rates are higher when 
voting is secret, and for a given voting condition, when information on the 
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distribution is common. This is consistent with the regression results in the 
previous section on the respondents’ propensity to vote in favour of punishment. 
Using group averages over all rounds as units of observation, differences are 
significant between public voting/private information and secret voting/common 
information (Mann-Whitney U = 4.50; two-sided P = .004). For all other pair-
wise treatment comparisons differences are not statistically significant (two-
sided P-values are larger than .200). 
 
Table 3.6. Average punishment frequency by treatment 
 
Private 
information 
Common 
information 
Secret voting 42.50% 60.00% 
Public voting 26.25% 42.25% 
Note. All rounds and groups pooled. 
 
Based on the observation that punishment rates differ between the treatments, 
we also expect that the strategy that leads to the highest profit differs across the 
treatments. Profit-maximizing representatives may take this into account when 
choosing their strategy. Before looking at this, we first classify the representa-
tives’ strategies. 
 For this classification, we use the following two dimensions. First, we take 
account of the share representatives keep. We distinguish between distributions 
where the representative keeps more than 50 ‘francs’ and distributions where 
he/she keeps less or equal than 50 ‘francs’. We do so, because distributions with 
the representative’s share being higher than 50 ‘francs’ cannot be justified by 
any of both – above described – ‘fair’ ways of allocating resources. Second, 
when taking a distribution decision, we also expect representatives to consider 
the number of respondents to exclude from the resources, where exclusion 
means not giving any resources. Combining both variables we have eight 
possible classes of strategies. However, as Table 3.7 shows, two of them are 
empty and another two have such low percentages that we can ignore them in 
the remaining analysis. As a result four classes of strategies remain. 
 A first strategy consists of keeping the entire pie and thus excluding all 
respondents from the resources. This strategy is followed in 17.74% of the 
cases. We will refer to this strategy as the ‘exclude-all’-strategy. A second 
strategy consists of excluding exactly one respondent. This is a very common 
strategy, as in more than one third of the cases this strategy is chosen. The 
representatives who follow this strategy seem to try to build a minimum 
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coalition. In an attempt to maximize their earnings, they exclude one respondent 
while trying to obtain the support of the other two respondents. The conjecture 
that they do so in an attempt to maximize their earnings is supported by the fact 
that this strategy is in almost all of the cases combined with the representative 
keeping shares higher than 50 ‘francs’. We will refer to this strategy as the 
‘exclude-one’-strategy. 
 
Table 3.7. Classification of strategies 
  Share of representative > 50 ‘francs’ 
  no yes 
0 26.13% 19.68% 
1 2.90% 32.90% 
2 0.00% 0.65% 
Excluded 
respondents 
3 0.00% 17.74% 
Notes. N = 1240. Pooled over all rounds, groups and treatments 
 
In a third and fourth strategy representatives do not exclude any respondent. The 
difference between both strategies relates to the share representatives keep. 
Whereas in the third strategy they keep less or equal than 50 ‘francs’, in the 
fourth strategy they keep more than 50 ‘francs’. We will refer to these strategies 
as the ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy and ‘no-exclusion-high-share’-strategy, 
respectively. Under the ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy also fall the distribu-
tions where the representative does not keep any resources (3.23% of the cases) 
or distributes the resources equally among all players (12.8% of the cases). 
 Also note that a strategy of excluding two respondents is almost never 
followed. This makes sense, because to avoid punishment a representative needs 
at least two respondents satisfied with their received share. It is very improbable 
that punishment can be avoided by excluding two respondents. Consequently, to 
the extent that excluding two respondents leads to similar punishment rates as 
excluding all respondents, the latter is preferred as it leads to a higher expected 
profit. 
 We now study whether the strategy choice is related to the treatment 
conditions. Figure 3.2 shows the relative frequencies of each strategy in each 
treatment. To test whether the relative frequencies of each of the strategies are 
significantly different between the treatments we calculate for each treatment the 
relative frequency of each strategy over all rounds and groups. For each strategy 
we applied a Mann-Whitney test to each treatment pair. 
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Figure 3.2. Representatives’ strategy choice by treatment 
 
Note. All rounds and groups pooled. 
 
As to the ‘exclude-all’-strategy, the relative frequencies of this strategy are 
significantly different between public voting/private information and secret 
voting/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 13.00; two-sided P = .071). 
For all other pair-wise treatment comparisons, differences are not statistically 
significant (two-sided P-values > .150). The significant difference between 
public voting/private information and secret voting/common information is 
attributed to the voting condition, as the relative frequency of this strategy is 
significantly different between public voting and secret voting (Mann-Whitney 
U = 77.00; two-sided P = .079) and not between common information and 
private information (Mann-Whitney U = 107.00; two-sided P = .545).  
 Regarding the ‘exclude-one’-strategy, the relative frequencies are signifi-
cantly different between public voting/private information and secret vot-
ing/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 11.50; two-sided P = .054) or 
public voting/common information (Mann-Whitney U = 13.50; two-sided P = 
.050). For all other pair-wise treatment comparisons differences are not statisti-
cally significant (two-sided P-values > .350). These significant differences are 
the result of the information condition (comparison between common informa-
tion and private information leads to Mann-Whitney U = 70.00; two-sided P = 
.049) and not of the voting condition (Mann-Whitney U = 102.00; two-sided P = 
.495). 
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 Finally, the relative frequencies of the ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy 
and the ‘no-exclusion-high-share’-strategy do not show any significant differ-
ence when compared between treatments, between secret voting and public 
voting, or between private information and common information. 
 We now examine whether the strategy choice is related to the punishment 
frequencies and the average earnings over the different treatment conditions. 
Punishment reduces the final earnings, and thus may change the optimal strategy 
for profit-maximizing representatives. For this, we examine whether the above 
observed differences in strategy choice are consistent with differences in 
punishment frequency and average earnings. We limit this analysis to the 
‘exclude-all’-strategy and the ‘exclude-one’-strategy, as for the other strategies 
we did not find significant differences in relative frequency across treatments. 
 Table 3.8 shows the punishment frequencies and the resulting average 
earnings by treatment and strategy choice. We observe that the ‘exclude-all’-
strategy almost always results in punishment, with small differences between the 
treatments. However, in case the representative is not punished earnings are very 
high, which makes average earnings positive for all treatments. In comparison 
with the average earnings of the other strategies within a given treatment, this 
strategy leads to the highest average earnings when information on the distribu-
tion is common (third and fourth row in Table 3.8b).  
 To test this statistically, we estimate a regression on the earnings of the 
representative controlling for the ‘exclude-all’-strategy. According to the 
estimated coefficient of the control variable, following the ‘exclude-all’-strategy 
in the secret voting/common information treatment increases the average 
earnings with 53.70 (two-sided P = .041, N = 70; applying robust standard errors 
to correct for intra-group correlations) in comparison with the other strategies. 
Following this strategy in the public voting/common information treatment 
increases the average earnings with 44.69 (two-sided P = .050, N = 80; applying 
robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations) in comparison with 
the other strategies. In both treatments with private information this coefficient 
is not significantly different from zero (two-sided P-values > .400). This is 
consistent with the above observed significant difference of the relative frequen-
cies of this strategy between the public voting/private information treatment and 
the secret voting/common information treatment.  
 Regarding the ‘exclude-one’-strategy, Table 3.8a shows that punishment 
frequencies with this strategy differ considerably across the treatments. When 
information on the distribution is common, punishment rates with this strategy 
are substantially higher in comparison with private information on the distribu-
tion decisions. Based on a probit regression with only a control for the informa-
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tion on the distribution, this difference is statistically significant (two-sided P of 
the coefficient of the information dummy = .006; N = 102; applying robust 
standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations). The higher punishment 
frequency with this strategy when information is common is consistent with the 
significantly lower frequencies of this strategy when information is common. 
 
Table 3.8. Relative frequency of punishment and average earnings 
 a. Relative frequency of punishment 
  Strategies 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
Sec.vot./pr.info 94.12% 30.77% 64.29% 0.00% 42.50% 
Pub.vot./pr.info 83.33% 25.00% 22.22% 7.14% 26.25% 
Sec.vot./com.info 88.88% 50.00% 93.75% 15.00% 60.00% 
Tr
ea
tm
en
ts
 
Pub.vot./com.info 78.57% 45.00% 46.15% 16.13% 42.25% 
 Total 87.27% 34.31% 55.74% 11.11% 41.94% 
       
 b. Average earnings (after punishment and exclusive endowments) 
  Strategies 
  1 2 3 4 Total 
Sec.vot./pr.info 11.77 37.89 -23.21 46.88 21.88 
Pub.vot./pr.info 33.33 50.13 63.61 23.57 45.75 
Sec.vot./com.info 22.22 -28.25 -88.75 11.75 -17.67 
Tr
ea
tm
en
ts
 
Pub.vot./com.info 42.86 4.25 -6.54 3.19 5.99 
 Total 25.46 25.72 -11.23 17.46 15.01 
Notes. Strategies: 1 = ‘exclude-all’-strategy; 2 = ‘exclude-one’-strategy; 3 = ‘no-exclusion-high-
share’-strategy; 4 = ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy. All rounds and groups pooled. 
 
Looking at the average earnings, we observe that with private information on the 
distribution this strategy is among the most profitable. To test whether the 
earnings with this strategy are also significantly higher in comparison with all 
other strategies, we estimate a regression on the earnings of the representative 
controlling for the ‘exclude-one’-strategy. According to the estimated coeffi-
cient of the control variable, following the ‘exclude-one’-strategy does not 
significantly change the earnings of the representative (two-sided P-values in 
each of the four treatments > .250) in comparison with the other strategies. Thus, 
the observed differences in relative frequency of this strategy across treatments 
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are consistent with differences in punishment frequency, but are not supported 
by any evidence based on the average earnings. 
 As there are middle-endowment and low-endowment respondents, a further 
question relates to which respondents are more likely to be excluded when the 
representative follows the ‘exclude-one’-strategy. For this, we estimated a probit 
regression where we only consider the observations with the ‘exclude-one’-
strategy and we only control for the endowment of the respondent. Pooling both 
secret voting treatments, the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant 
from zero (two-sided P = .780; N = 126; applying robust standard errors to 
correct for intra-group correlations). With public voting, however, low-
endowment respondent have a 40.00% higher probability to be excluded (two-
sided P = .015; N = 180; applying robust standard errors to correct for intra-
group correlations).  
 This is consistent with our previous analysis on the voting decisions of the 
respondents, where we found that low-endowment respondents have a higher 
propensity to vote in favour of punishment than middle-endowment respondents. 
With public voting, representatives obtain information on individual voting 
decisions and are able to make inferences about the respondents’ propensity to 
vote in favour of punishment. Observing that low-endowment respondents have 
a higher propensity to vote in favour of punishment, representatives may be 
more inclined to exclude low-endowment respondents than middle-endowment 
respondents. 
  
 
Result 3  Strategy choice and punishment (static view) 
a. Making voting public reduces the relative frequency of the ‘exclude-all’-
strategy. It does not change the punishment frequency with this strategy.  
b. Making information on the distribution common increases the punishment 
frequency with the ‘exclude-one’-strategy and reduces the relative fre-
quency of this strategy. 
c. When the representative follows the ‘exclude-one’-strategy, the low-
endowment respondent has a 40% higher probability of being excluded 
when voting is public. 
 
We have observed how punishment frequencies and average earnings differ 
across treatments and to what extent this is related to the relative frequencies of 
the different strategies. Our static analysis has shown that profit-maximization 
does not satisfactorily explain the representative’s strategy choice. This is not 
too surprising, because representatives do not know in advance which strategy 
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would maximize their profits, as they can only imperfectly anticipate the 
decisions of the respondents. Their strategy choice is conditional on their 
expectations about punishment. Being punished may change these expectations 
and make representatives change their strategy choice. This justifies a closer 
look at the dynamics of strategy choice. For this, we first look at the general 
evolution of the different strategies over time in the different treatments. 
Thereafter we look at the influence of punishment and expected earnings on 
individual strategy choice. 
 
Table 3.9. Correlations between round number and the relative frequencies of strategies and 
punishment 
 Strategies  
Treatments 1 2 3 4 punishment 
Sec.vot./pr.info 
0.833 
(.003) 
-0.634 
(.049) 
-0.463 
(.178) 
0.439 
(.205) 
0.514 (.128) 
Pub.vot./pr.info 
-0.275 
(.441) 
0.303 
(.396) 
0.120 
(.742) 
-0.199 
(.581) -0.222 (.538) 
Sec.vot./com.info 
0.749 
(.013) 
0.342 
(.334) 
-0.619 
(.056) 
0.178 
(.624) 
-0.044 (.903) 
Pub.vot./com.info 
0.818 
(.004) 
0.199 
(.582) 
-0.824 
(.003) 
0.386 
(.270) 0.161 (.657) 
Notes. Strategies: 1 = ‘exclude-all’-strategy; 2 = ‘exclude-one’-strategy; 3 = ‘no-exclusion-high-
share’-strategy; 4 = ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy. All groups pooled. Two-sided P-values 
between parentheses. 
 
Table 3.9 shows for each treatment the Spearman correlation coefficient 
between the round number and the relative frequency of the different strategies 
and the relative frequency of punishment (taking together all groups within a 
treatment). We observe that the frequency of the ‘exclude-all’-strategy tends to 
increase with time in all but the public voting/private information treatment. 
 In the secret voting/private information treatment this increase is combined 
with a decrease of the ‘exclude-one’-strategy over time as shown by the statisti-
cally significant Spearman correlation. When information on the distribution is 
common, this increase is combined with a statistically significant decrease in the 
‘no-exclusion-high-share’-strategy. We also observe that the ‘no-exclusion-low-
share’-strategy remains constant with time. 
 In the treatments where the frequency of the ‘exclude-all’-strategy increases 
with time punishment rates are considerable (see Table 3.8 above). One would 
expect that the increasing frequencies of the ‘exclude-all’-strategy results in 
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increasing punishment frequencies. However, as confirmed by the insignificant 
Spearman correlation coefficients in the last column of Table 3.9, punishment 
rates remain constant with time and thus have been high from the start. This 
suggests that the causality goes in the other direction, i.e. being unsuccessful in 
avoiding punishment induces representatives to switch to the ‘exclude-all’-
strategy. For representatives who face serious difficulties with avoiding punish-
ment, it may be a profit-maximizing strategy to exclude all respondents. 
Keeping less than 200 ‘francs’ and being punished (which deducts 200 ‘francs’ 
from their earnings) leads to a lower pay-off than keeping everything to them-
selves and being punished. 
 To find stronger evidence for this hypothesis, we estimate a probit regres-
sion on the probability that a representative changes his/her strategy into the 
‘exclude-all’-strategy, controlling for being punished in the previous round and 
only considering the rounds where the strategy in the previous round was not the 
‘exclude-all’-strategy. According to the estimated coefficient of the control 
variable, representatives who did not follow the ‘exclude-all’-strategy in the 
previous round have a 32.97% higher likelihood of changing their strategy into 
the ‘exclude-all’-strategy if they were punished in the previous round (two-sided 
P = .000; N = 222; applying robust standard to correct for intra-group correla-
tions). 
 When representatives change their strategy into the ‘exclude-all’-strategy, 
an interesting question becomes whether they insist on this strategy thereafter. 
Considering only the cases where in the previous round the representative 
followed the ‘exclude-all’-strategy and was punished, in 17 out of the 38 cases 
the representative did not insist on this strategy. As for the representative 
punishment costs are equal to the resources he/she has to distribute each round, 
keeping a non-zero share and avoiding punishment is always preferred over 
following the ‘exclude-all’-strategy and being punished. Such a strategy change 
will of course only be realized if the representative expects that with the new 
strategy he/she will be able to avoid punishment. If not, keeping all resources 
remains preferable.  
 To better understand the importance of a representative’s expectations 
about the respondents’ voting decisions for his/her strategy choice, we calculate 
the expected earnings and compare them across strategies. Recall that we asked 
the representative for the likelihood that a specific respondent votes in favour of 
punishment and this for each of the respondents. With this information we 
calculated the probability that two or more respondents vote in favour of 
punishment. We multiplied this probability with the punishment cost and 
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deducted this from the share the representative keeps. In this way we obtained 
the expected earnings. 
 Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the expected earnings by strategy. We 
observe that when the representative chooses the ‘exclude-all’-strategy, in more 
than 80% of the cases he/she expects that he/she will be punished, which implies 
that his/her expected earnings are equal to zero. This percentage is very similar 
to the observed punishment frequencies with this strategy (see Table 3.8 above), 
which indicates that representatives have very realistic expectations. In all 
strategies except the ‘no-exclusion-low-share’-strategy, are expected earnings 
significantly larger than zero. 
 
Figure 3.3. Expected earnings of the representative by strategy (rounds 1-10) 
Notes. All rounds and treatments pooled. Two-sided P-values were calculated by estimating an 
OLS regression with only a constant term and applying robust standard errors to correct for intra-
group correlations 
 
To find further evidence on the importance of the expected earnings for repre-
sentatives’ strategy choice, we look at the difference between their expected 
earnings in the current round and their earnings in the previous round. Figure 3.4 
shows the distribution of this difference and distinguishes between strategy 
choices that are different from those in the previous round and strategy choices 
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that are the same as in the previous round. We observe that when representatives 
do not change their strategy they expect to obtain similar earnings as in the 
previous round. When they change their strategy they expect to receive signifi-
cantly higher earnings than they obtained with the strategy in the previous 
round. This confirms that representatives follow a profit-maximizing logic 
taking account of their expectations on the respondents’ voting decisions. 
 
Figure 3.4. Expected earnings round t  –  earnings round t-1 (rounds 1-10) 
 
Notes. All rounds and treatments pooled. Two-sided P-values were calculated by estimating an 
OLS regression with only a constant term and applying robust standard errors to correct for intra-
group correlations 
 
A final note is required on the stability of strategy choice in the public vot-
ing/private information treatment, as confirmed by the insignificant Spearman 
correlations in Table 3.9. As shown by Table 3.8, in this treatment punishment 
rates are relatively low, so that the representative faces little incentives to revise 
his/her strategy. Receiving information on the respondents’ votes enables 
representatives to infer about the respondents’ acceptance thresholds, which 
helps them to avoid punishment. It also enables them to successfully apply the 
‘exclude-one’-strategy, which represents more than half of the strategy choices 
in this treatment. At the same time, respondents anticipating such behaviour of 
the representative are more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment, which is 
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even more the case when information on the distributed resources is private, as 
confirmed by our regression results in the previous section. We now summarize 
our results on the dynamics of strategy choice in a fourth result. 
 
Result 4  Strategy choice and punishment (dynamic view) 
Being punished induces representatives to switch to the ‘exclude-all’-strategy. 
Many representatives, however, do not persist in this strategy but switch to 
another strategy which they expect to be more profitable. In the public vot-
ing/private information treatment however, punishment frequency is limited and 
there is not any trend in strategy choice. Many representatives follow the 
‘exclude-one’-strategy in this treatment, which results successful in avoiding 
punishment and thus leads to high earnings. 
4.3. Political change 
We now look at the experimental results after implementing a political change, 
i.e. after giving the role of permanent representative to another group member. 
Given the observation that the endowment differences of the respondents do not 
drive high-endowment representatives to give higher shares to low-endowment 
players in comparison with middle-endowment players – when voting is public 
they may even be the target of exclusion –, we look at a political change where 
the low-endowment player becomes the representative. For this, we organized 
10 additional rounds with the same distribution game. 
 Figures 3.5a and 3.5b show the distribution of the final earnings (inclusive 
endowments and after deduction of punishment costs) of each player over all 
groups by treatment. They also show the distribution of the endowments. 
Comparing the distribution of the final earnings with the distribution of the 
endowment allows us to detect whether the distribution of the additional 
resources makes the final distribution more equal. Whereas the results are mixed 
when the high-endowment player is the representative, with the low-endowment 
player as representative in all treatments we observe that the final distributions 
are more equal than the distribution of the endowments. 
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Figure 3.5. Distribution of the final earnings by treatment 
 
 
Note. All rounds and groups pooled 
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To test whether the distributions of the final earnings in the second part are more 
equal than in the first part, we used the following procedure. After calculating 
the average final earnings of each player over all rounds, we calculate the 
standard deviation of these earnings within each group. We then test whether 
these standard deviations are significantly different between the first and the 
second part of the experiment by treatment. According to a Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test standard deviations are significantly different in the public vot-
ing/private information treatment (Z = -2.380; two-sided P = .017) and the 
public voting/common information treatment (Z = -2.380; two-sided P = .017), 
but not in the secret voting/private information treatment (Z = -1.540; two-sided 
P = .123) or the secret voting/common information treatment (Z = -0.845; two-
sided P = .398). 
 In most of the cases the low-endowment representative keeps a very high 
share of the resources to be distributed. In 99.68% of the decisions the represen-
tative keeps equal or more than 50 ‘francs’, in 73.87% even more or equal than 
100 ‘francs’. This also entails that the ‘exclude-one’-strategy is much more 
common. Percentages for the private information treatments are 82.5% and 
72.5%, when voting is secret and public respectively. For the common informa-
tion treatments these percentages are somewhat lower: 50.0% and 58.8% when 
voting is secret and public respectively.  
 Moreover, when this strategy is followed, in many cases it is the high-
endowment player who is excluded. Percentages for the private information 
treatments are 47.5% and 52.5% when voting is secret and public respectively. 
For the common information treatments these percentages are 50.0% and 
51.25% when voting is secret and public respectively. A large proportion of 
these exclusion-decisions (30.0% over all treatments) are the result of a 0-50-50-
100 proposal, which is of course also a focal point as it results in an equal 
distribution of the final pay-offs. Other strategies are less common. In 9.68% of 
the decisions exactly one of the middle-endowment players is excluded. In 
6.77% of the decisions the representative keeps everything and thus all respon-
dents are excluded. 
 Punishment rates are substantially lower with the low-endowment player as 
representative20. In only between 20% and 27% of the distribution decisions is 
the low-endowment representative punished, with little differences between the 
treatments. To test whether this decrease is statistically significant, we take the 
punishment frequency of each group over all rounds before and after the 
                                                        
20 For regression results on the satisfaction level and the voting decisions of the respondents in this 
part of the experiment we refer to appendix 3. 
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political change. Pooling all treatments we apply a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, 
which indicates that the decrease in punishment rates is highly significant (Z = 
-3.038; two-sided P = .002). We attribute this to the fact that, in contrast with the 
high-endowment player as representative, profit-maximization of the representa-
tive and fairness considerations go in the same direction, i.e. towards a more 
equal distribution. 
 Thus, political change in favour of the poorest player is not only beneficial 
in distributional terms. It also increases efficiency, measured as the sum of all 
incomes after punishment over the sum of all incomes before punishment. As 
punishment costs are constant irrespective of the distribution, there is a direct 
inverse relation between punishment rates and efficiency. Consequently, as 
punishment rates are considerably lower when the low-endowment player 
becomes the permanent representative, efficiency is considerably higher. 
 
Result 5  Political change 
Once the low-endowment player is the permanent representative, the distribu-
tion of the final earnings becomes more equal. In most of the cases the represen-
tative keeps equal or more than half of the pie. The ‘exclude-one’-strategy 
becomes more common and when it is followed in most of the cases it is the 
high-endowment player who is excluded. Moreover, punishment rates become 
substantially lower and thus efficiency higher. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we studied the political dimensions at play when external 
economic resources are channelled to a small group of economically-unequal 
agents through a permanent group representative. For this, we made use of a 
laboratory experiment where, in subsequent rounds, a permanent representative 
was asked to distribute a fixed quantity of resources among a group of four 
agents. After each distribution decision, the other members had the ability to 
punish the representative through simple majority voting. We organized four 
different treatments by combining conditions of public and private information 
on the distribution and voting decisions. 
 The experimental results showed that the lower the share of resources a 
respondent receives from the representative, the lower his/her satisfaction about 
this share. When receiving information on the complete distribution, his/her 
satisfaction about this share also decreases the more a representative keeps for 
him/herself, and, the less the respondent receives in comparison with the other 
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respondents. As expected, lower satisfaction increases the propensity to vote in 
favor of punishing the representative. In addition, there are important strategic 
elements behind voting decisions. When voting decisions are made public, 
respondents are somewhat more reluctant to vote in favour of punishment, but 
this reluctance is lower with lower satisfaction. Moreover, the more a respon-
dent believes that the other respondents will vote in favour of punishment, the 
more he/she is inclined to do as well. Furthermore, it is observed that female or 
middle-endowment respondents are more reluctant to vote in favour of punish-
ment unless information on the distribution is public. This results in higher 
punishment rates with common information on the distribution decisions. 
 Regarding the distribution decisions of the representative, punishment 
induces representatives to switch to a strategy of keeping all resources to 
themselves. Only with public voting and private information on the distribution 
are representatives able to keep punishment rates down. They do so by applying 
an exclusion strategy, wherein one respondent is completely excluded from the 
distributed resources. When voting is public, low-endowment respondents have 
a significantly larger probability of being excluded in this way in comparison 
with middle-endowment respondents. This is the result of their higher propen-
sity to vote in favour of punishment. 
 Political change, in the direction of making the low-endowment player the 
permanent representative, is beneficial in distributional terms, as the distribution 
of the final earnings becomes more equal. In most cases, the representative 
keeps equal or more than half of the pie. The ‘exclude one’-strategy becomes 
more common, and, when it is followed, in most of the cases it is the high-
endowment player who is excluded. Political change is also beneficial in 
efficiency terms, as punishment rates become substantially lower. 
 
Appendix 1: Experimental procedures and instructions 
Experimental procedures 
Several measures were taken to guarantee anonymity. To exclude the possibility 
that participants could make inferences about the group to which they belonged 
each session was organized with at least two groups. Moreover, participants 
were seated randomly in the computer lab with isolated cubicles. It was ex-
plained that computer numbers were used to recognize participants during the 
experiment and the data analysis afterwards, but could not be linked to the 
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participants’ names. In addition, during the experiment no communication was 
allowed, mobile phones were switched off and no participants could leave the 
lab. If participants had a question they were asked to raise their hand so that one 
of the experimenters could come and answer the question in private. 
 After reading the instructions, the participants had to go through some 
control questions. The experiment did not start before all participants had 
correctly answered these questions. At the end of the experiment, participants 
were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. After all had completed this question-
naire, they were paid out confidentially in cash. 
Instructions 
In this experiment, you can earn money. The experiment consists of three 
unrelated parts. That is, your earnings in one part are independent from your 
earnings in other parts. In each part you can earn ‘francs’. The ‘francs’ you earn 
will be converted to Euro according to the conversion rate 200 ‘francs’ = 1 
Euro and paid out to you privately and confidentially after the experiment. 
 
During the whole experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the 
other participants in any other way than described in these instructions. 
Instructions for part 1 
In part 1 of the experiment, all participants have an endowment of 400 ‘francs’. 
In this part you have the opportunity to give all, part or none of your endowment 
(400 ‘francs’) to one randomly chosen other participant, or to destroy - at costs 
for yourself - all, part or none of the endowment (400 ‘francs’) of this other 
participant. 
 
You will not get to know the identity of this other participant, nor will this other 
participant get to know your identity. 
 
At the same time, another participant will have to make a similar decision on an 
allocation between him/her and you. This other participant, however, will not be 
the one you are making your decision about. 
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Instructions for part 2 
The second part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. 
 
Before the start : 
You will be randomly assigned to a group of 4 participants. Group compositions 
do not change throughout the 10 rounds. The composition of your group is 
anonymous. 
 
Each group member receives randomly one of the letters A, B, C or D as ‘ID’. 
Each letter corresponds to the same person during all 10 rounds. 
 
During the experiment : 
At the beginning of each round, you and all other members in your group 
receive a fixed amount of ‘francs’. This is called your ‘endowment’. This 
endowment is not the same for everyone but depends on the letter ID. In each 
round, member A receives 200 ‘francs’, members B and C receive 150 ‘francs’ 
each, and member D receives 100 ‘francs’. 
 
In each round, participant A will also receive 200 additional ‘francs’ at his/her 
free disposal. Of these additional ‘francs’ member A can keep as much as he/she 
wants for him/herself and give as much as he/she wants to each of the other 
three participants in the group. We call member A a ‘type I’ participant, whereas 
we call the other participants ‘type II’ participants. 
 
After A has made his/her decision about the distribution of the additional 200 
‘francs’, each type II participant (members B, C, and D) will get to know his/her 
own received amount but not what the others received or what A kept21. 
 
Thereafter, the type II participants (members B, C and D) are asked to vote 
whether or not to deduct ‘francs’ from A’s income. In case a strict majority (that 
is, at least two out of the three) votes in favour of deduction, 200 ‘francs’ are 
deducted from A’s earnings. In this case, all type II members (also those who 
did not vote in favour of deduction!) have to bear costs of 20 ‘francs’ each. 
 
                                                        
21 With common information treatments this phrase was replaced by: “After A has made his/her 
decision, each member B, C, and D will get to know his/her own received amount, how much A 
kept, and the amounts received by the other two members.” 
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Voting is secret. This means that nobody will get to know anyone’s voting 
decision22. 
 
Before taking any decision in a specific round, you can review all information 
you received in all past rounds. 
 
After taking their respective decision, type I and type II participants are asked to 
give likelihood estimates about the voting decisions of the other participants. 
The amount they earn with these estimates depends on the reported likelihood 
estimates and the actual voting decisions of the other members. For your 
interest, we show here the mathematical formula used to calculate these addi-
tional earnings for a type II participant (The earnings calculated for a type I 
participant are calculated in a similar way). 
 
The reported percentages jP  (j = 0,1,2) where jP  is the percentage that j number 
of type II members vote in favour of deducting ‘francs’ from A’s income. 
Calculate 100jj Pp = for all j = 0,1,2. If j type II members vote in favour of 
deducting ‘francs’ from A’s income (with j = 0,1,2), then the additional earnings 
are equal to: ( ) ( ) ( )( )222120363 pppp j ++−+  
 
 
Once again, it is not important that you exactly understand this formula. It is 
sufficient that you realize that your expected earnings are maximized if you 
indicate your true estimation of the likelihood. 
Instructions for part 3 
You now continue during an additional 10 rounds. Groups remain the same, so 
you remain with the same participants in your group. 
 
A round in this part is precisely the same as before except that now member D 
has become the type I participant and member A has become a type II partici-
pant. This means that now it is member D who receives 200 additional ‘francs’ 
to his/her free disposal in each round. In addition, in each round participants A, 
                                                        
22 With public voting treatments this phrase was replaced by: “Voting is public. This means that 
everybody will get to know everyone’s voting decision.” 
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B and C will be given the opportunity to vote in favour of deducting ‘francs’ 
from the income of participant D. 
Appendix 2: an outcome-based fairness model  
In this appendix we calculate important equilibria of our model using a Fehr-
Schmidt utility function (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). This utility function allows for 
self-centred fairness and has been shown to lead to more realistic predictions in 
diverse settings. Preferences are represented by a utility function for player i (= 
1, …, n) of the following form: 
( ) { } { }∑∑ −−−−−−= j jiij ijiii yynyynyyU 0,max1
10,max
1
1 βα  
with ii βα ,  being respectively the envy and guilt parameters of player i, which 
determine the utility loss due to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality 
aversion respectively. It is assumed that ii αβ ≤ and 10 <≤ iβ . Applying this 
utility function to our experimental game we obtain the following results. 
Proposition 1 
Assuming that envy and guilt parameters are the same for all respondents23, 
strategy combinations with exactly one respondent voting in favour of punish-
ment (which lead to non-punishment), which were an equilibrium with standard 
preferences, are not longer an equilibrium with Fehr-Schmidt preferences if:  
a. 
kK
k
−≥ 3α ; 
possible equilibria are ( )nyy ,, , ( )yny ,, , ( )yyn ,, and ( )yyy ,,  
b. 
kK
k
−≤ 3α , and 
i) λ−≤ AB yy ; λ−≤ AC yy ; λ−≥ AD yy :  
possible equilibria are ( )nyy ,,  and ( )yyy ,,  
ii) λ−≤ AB yy ; λ−≥ AC yy ; λ−≤ AD yy :  
possible equilibria are ( )yny ,,  and ( )yyy ,,  
                                                        
23 This is a not unrealistic assumption as the representative cannot make any inference about these 
parameters before having interacted with the respondents, and thus does not have any reason to 
assume that these differ between the respondents 
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iii) λ−≥ AB yy ; λ−≤ AC yy ; λ−≤ AD yy :  
possible equilibria are ( )yyn ,,  and ( )yyy ,,  
iv) λ−≤ AB yy ; λ−≤ AC yy ; λ−≤ AD yy :  
possible equilibria are ( )nyy ,, , ( )yny ,, , ( )yyn ,, , ( )yyy ,,  
 
with ( )( )βα
βλ +
−+= kKk3  
 
 
Proof 
 
Strategy combinations with exactly one respondent voting in favour of punish-
ment (which thus lead to non-punishment) are not an equilibrium if at least two 
respondents are better-off when the representative is punished (and thus the 
representative is punished).  
 We assume that iE  is the endowment that player i receives before the 
distribution of the additional resources M. ix  is the share of the additional 
resources M player i obtains and iii xEy += . Suppose that the representative A 
proposes the distribution ( )DCBA xxxx ,,, , with Mxxxx DCBA =+++ , and 
 ( )DCBAiMxi ,,,,0 =≤≤ . We now look at the conditions that make a respon-
dent’s utility higher with punishment than without punishment. 
 
The utility of respondent B without punishment would then be24: 
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
10
BDBCBAB
P
B yyyyyyyU −+−+−−= α
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
1
DBCBAB yyyyyy −+−+−− β  
The utility of respondent B with punishment would be: 
                                                        
24 We elaborate here the more general case, where people include their endowment CBA EEE ,,  
or DE  in their utility function. However, it might also be that players only take account of the 
amount to be distributed and not of the final pay-offs. In such a case the endowment parameters 
must be removed from all expressions. 
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kyU B
P
B −=1
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
1 kykykykykyKy BDBCBA +−−++−−++−−−α
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
1 kykykykyKyky DBCBAB +−−++−−++−−− β
 
 
We have the following possible situations25: 
(a) AB yy ≥  and Kyky AB −≥−  
(b) AB yy ≥  and Kyky AB −≤−   
(c) AB yy ≤  and Kyky AB −≥−  
(d) AB yy ≤  and Kyky AB −≤−  
 
Case (a) 01 PBPB UU ≥ if ( ) ( )ABAB yyyKykk −−≥−++−−− 3
1
3
1 ββ  
( ) kkK −≤−⇔
3
1β  
this condition is infeasible as 0>> kK and 0≥β ; in this case the utility with 
punishment will always be lower than the utility without punishment. 
 
Case (b) this is infeasible because Kk <  
 
Case (c) 01 PBPB UU ≥ if ( ) ( )BAAB yyyKykk −−≥−++−−− 3
1
3
1 αβ  
 ( ) ( )BAAB yyyKykk −−≥−++−−−⇔ αβ3  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 03 ≤−−−++−+⇔ BAAB yyyyKkk αββ  
 ( ) ( ) ( )Kkkyyyy ABAB +−−−≤−+−⇔ βαβ 3  
                                                        
25 Note that a respondent’s preference for punishment does not depend on the inequality vis-à-vis 
the other respondents, as punishment costs are the same for all respondents, and consequently 
punishment does not have any impact on the inequality between respondents. The respondent’s 
utility depends on whether he/she faces advantageous or disadvantageous inequality towards the 
representative before and after punishment. This implies that the conditions as elaborated for 
respondent B equally apply for respondents C and D, who might have different endowments. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )Kkkyy AB +−−−≤−⋅+⇔ ββα 3  
 λ−≤⇔ AB yy with ( )( )βα
βλ +
−+= kKk3  
 
As for respondents C and D this condition becomes λ−≤ AC yy and λ−≤ AD yy  
respectively, we have the following four cases where at least two respondents 
are better-off when the representative is punished: 
 
i) if λ−≤ AB yy ; λ−≤ AC yy ; λ−≥ AD yy :  
( )nyy ,,  and ( )yyy ,, become possible equilibria 
 
ii) if λ−≤ AB yy ; λ−≥ AC yy ; λ−≤ AD yy :  
( )yny ,,  and ( )yyy ,, become possible equilibria 
 
iii) if λ−≥ AB yy ; λ−≤ AC yy ; λ−≤ AD yy :  
( )yyn ,,  and ( )yyy ,, become possible equilibria 
 
iv) if λ−≤ AB yy ; λ−≤ AC yy ; λ−≤ AD yy :  
( )nyy ,, , ( )yny ,, , ( )yyn ,, , ( )yyy ,, become possible equilibria 
 
 
Case (d) 01 PB
P
B UU ≥  if ( ) ( )BABA yyykyKk −−≥−++−−− 3
1
3
1 αα  
( ) 0
3
1 ≥+−−−⇔ kKk α  
kK
k
−≥⇔ 3α  
The same condition applies to respondents C and D. Thus, if 
kK
k
−≥ 3α  
all respondents prefer that the representative is punished, so 
that ( )nyy ,, , ( )yny ,, , ( )yyn ,, , ( )yyy ,, become possible equilibria. 
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Proposition 2  
If the representative believes that he/she cannot influence the punishment 
outcome with his/her distribution decision, his/her optimal distribution decision 
will be: 
a) keep all resources if 
4
3<Aβ  
b) distribute the resources so that the final income of all players is equalized, 
if
4
3>Aβ  
 
 
Proof 
 
The utility of the representative without punishment would be: 
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
10
ADACABAA
P
A yyyyyyyU −+−+−−= α
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
1
DACABAA yyyyyy −+−+−− β  
The utility of the representative with punishment would be: 
KyU A
P
A −=1
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
1 KkyyKkyyKkyy ADACABA +−−++−−++−−−α
{ } { } { }[ ]0,max0,max0,max
3
1 KkyyKkyyKkyy DACABAA −+−+−+−+−+−− β
 
We will show the case where the representative is punished. The non-
punishment case is similar as marginal utilities of changing the shares of the 
players are the same without punishment (K and k are not dependent on the 
shares of the players). 
 
Case a) all respondents receive an equal or lower share than the representative 
after punishment 
 
( )DCBAAAPA yyyKkyKyU −−−−+−−= 3333
11 β  
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01 >−=∂
∂
A
A
A
y
U β ; 0
3
1 >=∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂
A
D
A
C
A
B
A
y
U
y
U
y
U β  
B
A
A
A
y
U
y
U
∂
∂>∂
∂ if 
4
3<Aβ  
 
i) If 
4
3>Aβ the representative will maximize the income of the respondents. 
Therefore, 
( )KkEEEEMkykykyKy DCBADCBA −−++++=−=−=−=− 34
1 , and, 
( )KkEEEEMU DCBAPA −−++++= 34
11  
ii) If
4
3<Aβ  the representative will maximize his/her income by excluding all 
respondents from the resources. 
Consequently, ( )kEEEKMEKEMU DCBAAAPA 33333
11 +−−−−+−−+= β  
 
Case b) two respondents receive an equal or lower share, one respondent an 
equal or higher share than the representative after punishment 
( ) ( )kyyKyKkyyKyU DCAAABAAPA 2223
1
3
11 +−−−−+−−−−= βα
0
3
2
3
11 >−+=∂
∂
AA
A
A
y
U βα ; 0
3
1 <−=∂
∂
A
B
A
y
U α ; 0
3
1 >=∂
∂=∂
∂
A
D
A
C
A
y
U
y
U β  
D
A
C
A
B
A
y
U
y
U
y
U
∂
∂=∂
∂>∂
∂  if AA βα >+ 3
11 , which is always the case as 1<Aβ  and 
0≥Aα  
Consequently the resources will be distributed such that 
( )kEKEMkyKy BABA −+−+=−=− 2
1 , CC Ey = ; DD Ey = ;  
 
( ) ( )DCBAABAPA EEEkKEMkEKEMU −−++−+−−+−+= 3
1
2
1 β . 
 
Case c) one respondent receives an equal or lower share, two respondents an 
equal or higher share than the representative after punishment 
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( ) ( )KkyyKkyyyKyU DAACBAAAPA −+−−+−++−−−= 3
1222
3
11 βα  
0
3
1
3
21 >−+=∂
∂
AA
A
A
y
U βα ; 0
3
1 <−=∂
∂=∂
∂
A
C
A
B
A
y
U
y
U α ; 0
3
1 >=∂
∂
A
D
A
y
U β  
D
A
B
A
y
U
y
U
∂
∂>∂
∂  if ( ) 0
3
21 >−+ AA βα , which is always the case as AA βα ≥   
Consequently the resources will be distributed such that 
( )kEEKEMkykyKy CBACBA 23
1 −++−+=−=−=−  ; DD Ey = ; 
( ) ( )
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−++−+−−++−+= kEkEEKEMkEEKEMU DCBAACBAPA 3
2
3
1
3
21 β
 
Case d) all respondents receive an equal or higher share than the representative 
after punishment 
 
( )DCBAAAPA yyyKkyKyU ++++−−−−= 3333
11 α  
01 >+=∂
∂
A
A
A
y
U α ; 0
3
1 <−=∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂
A
D
A
C
A
B
A
y
U
y
U
y
U α ; consequently, the repre-
sentative will keep as much as possible, leading to a share of  
( )KkEEEEMkykykyKy DCBADcBA −−++++=−=−=−=− 34
1 , so that, 
( )KkEEEEMU DCBAPA −−++++= 34
11  
 
 
Comparing the utilities between the different cases, 
If 
4
3<Aβ : U(case a-ii) > U(case b) > U(case c) > U(case d). Thus, keeping all 
resources maximizes the representative’s utility 
If 
4
3>Aβ : U(case a-i) = U(case d) > U(case c) > U(case b). Thus, distributing 
resources so that each player has the same final income maximizes 
the representative’s utility. 
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Appendix 3: When the low-income player becomes the representative 
Table 3.9. Satisfaction with own share (common information) 
 Model 1. Model 2. 
 
Middle-endowment 
respondents (players 2-3) 
High-endowment 
respondent (player 1) 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Own share 0.027 0.026 0.080 0.041* 
Max {own share – share high-endow, 0} 0.042 0.023* – – 
Max {share high-endow – own share, 0} -0.004 0.016 – – 
Max {own share – share middle-endow, 0} 0.013 0.027 -0.051 0.064 
Max {share middle-endow – own share, 0} -0.049 0.011*** -0.032 0.022 
Max {own share – share low-endow, 0} -0.061 0.037 0.052 0.043 
Max {share low-endow – own share, 0} -0.018 0.006*** -0.001 0.012 
Sex (1 = male; 0 = female) 0.257 0.508 0.501 1.075 
Public voting 0.889 0.566 -0.644 1.131 
Round -0.039 0.052 -0.016 0.092 
N 300  150  
Prob > F 0.0000  –  
F 12409.82  –  
a In the first model the respondent compares with the other middle-endowment player, whereas in 
the second model we let the high-endowment respondent compare with the average of both middle-
endowment players. 
Notes. OLS regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations. As all 
shares sum up to a constant, we estimate a model without constant to avoid complete collinearity. 
R-squared is not included as it is overestimated in models without a constant term. Significance 
levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 3.10. Voting decision-making (probit) 
 
Marg. 
prob. 
S.E. 
Public voting (1 = public; 0 = secret) -0.071 0.138 
Satisfaction with own share -0.091 0.015*** 
Expectation 1 other vote -0.079 0.172 
Expectation 2 other votes 0.326 0.164** 
Satisfaction x public voting -0.020 0.022 
Public voting x expectation 1 other vote 0.111 0.208 
Public voting x expectation 2 other votes -0.509 0.218** 
Female and private information (dummy) -0.037 0.089 
Middle income and private information (dummy) -0.023 0.073 
Round -0.005 0.008 
N 930  
Pseudo R-squared 0.3725  
Wald chi2(12) 238.98  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  
Note. Probit regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations. 
Significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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 4 
 
Social Networks and Exclusion:  
A Field Experiment on Distributive Decision Making in a Poor 
Rural Community 
Chapter 4 
Social Networks and Exclusion 
1. Introduction26 
More than seventy per cent of the world’s poor live in rural areas (World Bank, 
2003). They live with less than one dollar a day and their situation has barely 
changed over the past decades. Whereas the rest of the world has benefited from 
increasing trade and specialization at the global level, rural areas face severe 
limitations to economic development, such as their unfavourable access to 
public services, infrastructure and markets, and the pro-urban bias of most 
public policies. 
 Facing these limitations, people living in poor rural communities rely 
highly on social networks within their livelihood strategies (Dercon & de 
Weerdt, 2002; Krishnan & Sciubba, 2004; Fafchamps & Gubert, 2007). In poor 
areas these networks are mainly local. According to Woolcock (1998), it is only 
with increased development through specialization and more complex economic 
exchange that linkages with people outside the community become increasingly 
                                                        
26 I thank Guy Delmelle, Ligia Gómez, Miguel Alemán, Francisco Pérez, Selmira Flores and 
Alfredo Ruíz for interesting methodological discussions; Tania Paz Mena, Leonardo Matute, 
Francisco Paiz Salgado, Edna García Flores, Fátima Guevara, Silvia Martinez Arróliga and Will 
Tellez for support in the field work; Vanessa Castrillo and Jazmina Andino for their help in the 
search for sufficient coins of money; Elizabeth Campos and Manuel Bermudez for offering a safe 
in one of their local banking offices; the local support of community leader Francisco Varela; 
colleagues at MU and IOB-UA for comments on the experimental design; participants of the sixth 
workshop on ‘Dynamic Networks’ at Utrecht School of Economics, ESA 2007 (Rome), ECINEQ 
2007 (Berlin), a seminar at CIDIN (Radboud University) and the Young Talent Day of the 
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important, whereas intra-community social links are relatively more important 
with lower levels of economic development. This, however, does not imply that 
all members in poor communities are intensely connected with each other 
resulting in high levels of cooperation, as is sometimes believed by policy 
makers (Cleaver, 1999; Kothari, 2001; Mosse, 2001; Platteau & Abraham, 
2002). Heterogeneity in economic and social capital tends to be considerable. 
 Given the limited availability of economic opportunities and the pervasive 
inequality in rural areas, a justified policy direction is to look at the most 
excluded groups and to look for the reasons behind their exclusion. As intense 
use is made of local social networks in rural communities, it is warranted to 
study how these networks influence access to (and thus exclusion from) these 
limited economic opportunities. In particular, what network characteristics are 
important in this respect? Are agents with a central position in networks 
favoured as they have more power (Burt, 1992; 2005)? Or, is the density of 
social networks important as – according to Coleman (1990) – it favours a 
respect for social norms? Finally, to know who tends to be most affected by the 
effects of social networks, we should turn to the determinants behind social 
network formation. Are certain people more likely to have less favourable 
network positions, and therefore face more limited opportunities to improve 
their living conditions? 
 When looking for answers to these questions, we should not overlook an 
important and necessary additional question: “what networks?” Rural societies 
are characterized by pluriform networks. People are not only connected through 
friendship relations, they may also be connected because they support each other 
economically or engage in economic transactions. Others may be connected 
through kinship or because they go to the same church, or they meet each other 
at the village school when picking up their children, etc. Consequently, to assess 
the importance of social networks for the distribution of limited economic 
opportunities, and, indirectly, what groups are put at a disadvantage by these 
social networks, it will matter what networks we look at. 
 To address these research questions, we organized a series of dictator game 
experiments in a rural Nicaraguan village. In particular, we asked village 
participants (‘dictators’) to distribute a fixed sum of money to a particular 
village ‘recipient’. We supplemented experimental data with information on the 
complete village network, and with those individual characteristics that we 
expect to influence dictator giving, directly or indirectly through their influence 
on social network formation. 
 Our results clearly confirm that it matters what networks we look at. Lower 
social distance between dictator and recipient on general networks (i.e. irrespec-
Social Networks and Exclusion 
 
 
81
tive of its type), friendship networks and extended family networks favour 
dictator generosity. Network positions and structures are also important for 
dictator giving. In particular, generosity increases the more the dictator’s friends 
have relatively few other friends. It also increases with denser support networks 
of the dictator. Moreover, generosity increases the smaller the family networks 
of the dictator or the recipient (if both have a direct family relation), or the 
smaller the recipient’s network through social public activities. Finally, our 
results indicate that economic relations do not exert any influence on generosity. 
 Taking account of the demonstrated importance of social distance for 
dictator giving and the determinants behind link formation, we conclude that the 
poor, the less mobile, women and young people are most vulnerable to exclusion 
because they tend to be socially more distant from other people in their village, 
and thus the persons who distribute economic resources. The same applies for 
people who are very distant neighbours of those who distribute economic 
resources. As we do not find any evidence of dictators taking account of the 
individual characteristics of the disadvantaged that might weaken these social 
network effects, these people might face a real poverty trap. 
2. Literature 
Studying the influence of social networks on distributive decision making 
complements the growing literature that looks at the social roots of generosity. 
An interesting starting point in this literature is Bohnet & Frey (1999) who 
showed that dictator offers increase when participants present themselves before 
the experiment. A similar result is obtained when the family name of the 
participants is told before the dictator game (Charness & Gneezy, forthcoming). 
Recent work has extended this focus in the direction of self-reported social 
distance. An important study by Leider et al. (2007) demonstrated that dictators 
give 50% more to friends than to strangers. Goeree et al. (2006) organized a 
dictator game experiment with teenage girls, complemented with social network 
data captured through a survey. They show that giving decreases with larger 
social distances in teenage girl networks. Brañas-Garza et al. (2006) showed 
how the individual centrality in networks under the form of ‘betweenness 
centrality’27 increases dictator giving. 
                                                        
27 The ‘betweenness centrality’ of an individual is equal to the proportion of all shortest paths 
connecting any pair of subjects in the network that pass through that particular individual. 
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 Our dictator game experiment differs from this literature in several ways. 
First, we conducted our experiment in the field, where heterogeneity of human 
agents tends to be much larger than in student populations and on multiple 
dimensions (e.g. sex, age, education, economic variables, etc.). Second, in real 
life people may be connected with each other by means of multiple networks. 
This is especially characteristic for small-scale societies (such as the rural 
village of our study) where everybody knows each other and where social 
linking with the outside is limited. An important implication of this pluriformity 
of social networks is that when explaining giving behaviour it might matter what 
networks we look at. Third, we conducted our experiment in a rural society that 
differs substantially from Western student populations in socio-economic and 
cultural terms. As demonstrated by Henrich et al. (2004), who conducted field 
experiments in different socio-economic and cultural settings, this might be an 
important element to consider when studying distributive decision making. 
3. Research design 
In this section, we briefly describe the main features of our research design. For 
the questionnaires, the experimental instructions or procedural details, we refer 
to appendices 2 to 6. 
3.1. Household and social network survey 
Before the experiment we carried out a household survey to capture general 
socio-economic data and a network survey at the level of individual household 
heads. With the household survey we gathered data on income, economic assets, 
economic activities, family composition, education, age, etc. (see appendix 5 for 
the questionnaire). To gather data on individual networks, we used small cards, 
each card representing a household in the village. On each card we put the 
names of the household heads. We asked for each of these cards whether the 
interviewed person knew the household and whether he/she had a social relation 
of any kind with one of its members. If a social relation was identified we asked 
for details on the type of social relation. This method enabled us to capture 
individual networks on multiple dimensions, such as friendship, family, 
neighbours, etc. (see appendix 6 for questionnaire). 
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3.2. Dictator game experiment28 
Each participant was explained that he/she would be sequentially given six small 
cylinder-boxes with 20 coins of 1 Córdoba (the Nicaraguan currency) each and 
be free to divide the coins of each box with one other person. The first recipient 
was always an unknown person from another village in the region. The five 
other recipients were randomly selected village members. The random selection 
involved the dictator drawing cards out of a bag containing all 123 household 
heads. The dictator got to know the names of the recipient sequentially, i.e. the 
name of the next recipient was drawn after having finished the previous distribu-
tion decision. Thus, before their first decision, dictators knew that their maxi-
mum possible earnings were 120 c$ (6.7 US$, i.e. more than two days average 
income). We tried to conduct the experiment with as many households as 
possible, but with only one household head per household. In case of a two-
headed household it was randomly determined who was asked to participate. 
 In contrast with most experiments conducted in small-scale societies where 
participants gather on one public spot (Henrich et al., 2004; Cardenas et al., 
2000), we organized our field experiment in a decentralized way. For the 
experiment, we employed five Nicaraguan assistants. Each visited a randomly 
selected participant at his/her home. This has several advantages. First, it allows 
us to avoid self-selection. Some people are more inclined to participate in public 
events. By random selection of the participants we avoid any bias due to self-
selection. Second, it avoids that participants are ‘watched’ by other village 
members, which could influence behaviour by perceived peer pressure. Third, at 
the moment of taking decisions participants cannot discuss or communicate in 
any way with other participants. This is important because a joke or an opinion 
expressed by for instance a local authoritative actor may substantially influence 
behaviour. 
 To minimize the influence of behavioural motives based on direct reciproc-
ity, social prestige or social pressure, we implemented a one-way anonymity 
design. Only the dictator knows the identity of the recipient, and the recipient 
does not get to know who has distributed these resources29. Dictators were 
                                                        
28 For detailed instructions and procedures see appendices 2 and 3. 
29 We did not reveal the identity of the dictators to the recipients, nor did we explain them how 
many dictators had participated. We did not tell how much the others earned in total. In this way, 
the influence of direct reciprocity is minimized, though it is not completely excluded. Note that, as 
argued by Camerer & Thaler (1995), people may bring to the lab certain manners, which may have 
been shaped under influence of reciprocity outside the lab. We also implemented this one-way 
anonymity design because of ethical considerations. 
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informed about this. To reduce the possibility that participants’ decisions were 
influenced by the assistant’s presence30, the experimental procedures included 
the following three elements. First, decisions were made in full privacy. When-
ever possible, participants went inside their house or a separate room to take a 
decision. Otherwise, the assistant turned his/her back when the dictator was 
handling the coins. The assistant also asked them not to make any comments 
about their decisions. Second, after taking a decision, the assistant asked 
dictators to fill up the box with metal rings, so that the final weight of the boxes 
would remain constant irrespective of the amount of coins they left in the box. 
Third, the boxes were sealed with tape, so that the assistants could not open the 
boxes. The decisions were recorded by the supervisor who does not have any 
interaction with the participants. 
 Furthermore, we were aware that participants’ decisions might be influ-
enced by their trust towards the assistant. Whereas the part they keep for 
themselves might be considered safe earnings, they might have doubts whether 
the share they leave to recipients is really transferred to them by the assistant. 
This is an important element as the region is characterized by low trust levels 
vis-à-vis strangers and people had not participated in experiments before. To 
build trust with local people, we started with the household and social network 
survey. The support of the local well-respected community leader was crucial at 
this moment, as he presented our team to each household and asked people to 
cooperate.  
 After finishing the network survey (which took four days), we immediately 
organized the experiment. By conducting the experiment in only one day we 
minimized contagion. 94.5% of the participants told us they had not talked about 
the experiment with other village members who had already participated before. 
The assistants also made a subjective evaluation about the participant’s dedica-
tion, trust and understanding of the experiment. We did not notice any serious 
problems that could have affected the dictators’ decisions. After the experiment 
the participants were asked to answer some post-experimental questions (see 
appendix 4). 
                                                        
30 Hoffman et al. (1996) showed how anonymity between the dictator and the experimenter lowers 
the offers made by the dictator. 
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4. Results 
We start the empirical section with some descriptive statistics on the studied 
village. In particular, we present some important socio-economic household data 
and we look at important network measures of different types of networks 
separately as well as the overlap between the different types of networks. 
Thereafter, we use network data and the individual characteristics of dictators 
and recipients to explain dictator giving. In a final subsection, we look at 
network formation, since some variables although not directly important when 
explaining dictator giving might have an indirect influence through their effect 
on network formation. 
4.1. Some descriptive statistics 
a. General socio-economic characteristics of the studied village 
We conducted our study in a rural village in the Northern part of the Pacific 
region of Nicaragua, close to the border with Honduras. The difficult agro-
ecological conditions (dry season, irregular rainfall, low fertility of soils, etc.) 
make agricultural activities little profitable. Cattle-breeding is one of the most 
interesting economic activities in the region, as it is both an income source and 
an important savings instrument that enables local people to bridge the long and 
harsh dry season. During the dry season, economic activity drops drastically in 
the region and many people temporally migrate to Costa Rica, El Salvador or 
Guatemala, where they work in the construction, agricultural or cattle-breeding 
sector. 
 Table 4.1 shows some descriptive statistics on data gathered with the 
household survey. There are 66 households in the studied village, of which 9 
single-headed households and 57 two-headed households. As a result the village 
has 123 household heads in total. We gathered household data on 58 of the 66 
households (87.9%) in the village. In Table 4.1 we observe that more than 60% 
of the households in the village are landless and more than half of them do not 
possess any cattle. Moreover, average education levels of the household heads, 
measured in the number of years of schooling, are lower than 5 years. At the 
same time, we observe that there is much heterogeneity in this village. First, 
economic inequality regarding cattle and land property (the two most important 
economic assets in the region) is extreme, with standard deviations higher than 2 
Chapter 4 
 
 
86 
times the mean. 53% of the households do not have any cattle and 65% are 
landless, whereas cattle and land property have an average of 3.55 cows and 
8.22 hectares respectively. Heterogeneity regarding education, age, number of 
years of residence and contact with urban centre (measured by the number of 
visits made last month to the urban centre) is somewhat lower, but still consider-
able. 
 
Table 4.1. Village level descriptive statistics 
 Min Max Mean St. dev. N 
Land (in ha.) of household 0 84 8.22 17.33 58 
Land (dummy; 1 = has land) 0 1 0.35 0.48 58 
Cattle (number of cows) of household 0 50 3.55 9.44 58 
Cattle (dummy; 1 = has cattle) 0 1 0.47 0.50 58 
Sex (1 = male; 0 = female) of household head 0 1 0.50 0.50 107 
Education of household head 0 13 4.19 3.60 107 
Age of household head 21 86 45.86 14.55 107 
Number of years of residence  0.5 70.0 33.22 15.63 100 
Contact with urban centre 0 26 2.07 3.36 100 
b. Some descriptive network statistics 
With the social network survey we gathered network data for 100 of the 123 
household heads (81.3%). As is characteristic for small-scale societies, almost 
everybody knows each other. This was also the case in the village of our study 
where in 93.5% of all possible directed ties the other was known. Another 
characteristic of such small communities is their pluriform character of interac-
tion. Many are not only related through kinship relations, but are also connected 
because they support each other or they engage in economic transactions. Others 
may be connected because they go to the same church, or they meet each other 
at the village school when picking up their children, etc. Concomitantly, the 
influence of social networks on dictator game giving might be highly contingent 
on the type of network we look at. For instance we expect friendship networks 
to be more important than economic relations, as the latter are based on a 
market-logic where there is little room for generosity. 
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 To investigate the influence of different types of networks, we distin-
guished six dimensions. General relations are relations irrespective of their type 
and thus aggregate all types of relations. With a support relation we refer to a 
relation where support is given in at least one of both directions. Relations 
through social public activities are relations through activities related to religion, 
political parties, the village school, sport, cooperative organization, development 
projects or the village committee. Economic relations are relations that result 
from an exchange of land or labour, a commercial activity, a service provision 
or a lending activity. Family relations are kinship relations with grandparents, 
parents, brothers/sisters, children or grandchildren. We extended these family 
relations by also including relations of godparenthood, which are important in 
Nicaraguan rural life. Table 4.2 presents each of these dimensions with its 
respective reciprocity, density, centrality and closure measures. 
 
Table 4.2. Different types of social networks and its characteristics 
  
Reciprocated 
ties a 
Density b 
Freeman’s 
graph 
centralization 
measure b 
Overall 
graph 
clustering 
coefficient b 
1 General relation 30.24% 35.35% 44.06% 0.554 
2 Friendship relation 11.49% 18.59% 1.01% 0.384 
3 Support relation 2.11% 3.21% 21.73% 0.181 
4 Neighbour relation 14.52% 7.29% 0.99% 0.372 
5 Social public activities 17.14% 4.62% 27.79% 0.259 
6 Economic relation 8.79% 4.53% 48.72% 0.374 
7 Extended family relation 42.34% 3.28% 8.33% 0.377 
a (# (x → y AND x ← y) / # (x → y OR x ← y); including all ties except intrahousehold relations. 
b OR-networks; intrahousehold relations are considered as valid links 
 
Leider et al. (2007) when recording friendship networks had a reciprocation 
degree of 36.7%, which is very similar to the 30.24% reciprocation degree of 
general relations in our case. The percentage of reciprocated ties becomes lower 
when we disaggregate between the different types of relations. Undoubtedly, 
there exists a methodological trade-off between the possibility of capturing 
multiple networks and reciprocated ties. People likely put different emphasis on 
different types of networks, which might lower the percentage of reciprocated 
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ties when trying to record multiple networks. An important exception is ex-
tended family relations, which are considered important by most people. 
Reciprocation is very low with support relations. As this type of relation may be 
very asymmetric, it is not evident that both support giver and receiver put the 
same emphasis on this type of social relation31. 
 To process the information on social relations we proceeded in the follow-
ing way. First, we only took account of the household heads, as only in a very 
limited number of cases did people identify links with other household mem-
bers. Second, we consider intrahousehold links as valid links irrespective of the 
type of relation we are looking at. Ultimately, household members are not only 
family, they also tend to be friends, support each other, have an economic link, 
etc.). Third, we symmetrised the resulting adjacency matrix32. For each dyad, we 
took the maximum value of each of both directions and missing values were 
eliminated by the non-missing value in the other direction. In this way we 
obtained the OR-networks (a relation is assumed to exist if at least one node 
mentions the relation).  
 There are two arguments in favour of using OR-networks instead of AND-
networks (where a relation is only assumed to exist if both nodes mention the 
relation). Both arguments are based on the danger that actually existing links 
tend to be omitted when the AND-networks are used. First, those who have 
relations with many people are more likely to forget to mention a link, in 
comparison with those who have only few relations. This mostly occurs when 
open lists are used to capture social links, and is therefore limited in our case as 
we covered the entire village population with the small identity cards (and thus 
all potential dyads). A second argument which is more relevant for our case is 
the fact that people when being asked for multiple relations tend to put different 
emphasis on different types of relations. This may make people forget to 
mention certain types of links. 
 In the following we discuss the density, centrality and clustering of the 
different OR-networks. Regarding the density of the networks, measured as the 
sum of the ties divided by the number of possible ties, it comes as no surprise 
that networks of general relations, which aggregate all types of relations, have 
the highest density. Friendship networks are also relatively dense, whereas other 
                                                        
31 This is supported by the following evidence. Considering all support relations where at least one 
of both nodes identified this relation, nodes who posses cattle mentioned significantly less of their 
support relations themselves in comparison with nodes without cattle (50.5% versus 66.2%; two-
sided P = .005 based on a chi-square test). The same holds when comparing between nodes with 
land and nodes without land (45.1% versus 65.8%; two-sided P = .000 based on a chi-square test). 
32 Many network indices can only be calculated with symmetric network data. 
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networks have lower densities. This is the result of friendship relations being a 
broader category in comparison with other types of relations. As we will show 
below (Table 4.3), in many cases having a specific type of relation implies also a 
friendship relation. 
 Network centrality is important when one wants to study the importance of 
brokerage in networks (Burt, 1992; 2005). To measure centrality we use a graph 
centralization measure, which approaches 100% the more it resembles a star-
shaped network. Table 4.2 shows that centrality is highest in case of general 
networks and economic networks, followed by support networks and networks 
through social public activities (For a graphical representation of support 
networks and economic networks see Figure 4.1.). The high centrality in 
economic relations and support relations is likely to be related to the very 
unequal economic structure in the village. As indicated before, 53% of the 
households do not have cattle and 65% does not have land, whereas there is a 
small number of economically strong households who have up to 50 cows and 
84 hectares of land. The centrality in support relations and social public activi-
ties is also related to the brokerage pattern that we often observe in support 
networks. In many cases, some agents assume a broker role by providing 
support to large part of the village or taking the lead in many social public 
activities. 
 
Figure 4.1. Support networks and economic networks in the village 
a- Support relations b- Economic relations 
 
Another characteristic of social networks is its clustering degree. This measure 
is important if one is interested in Coleman’s ideas (1990) on the importance of 
clustering in social networks to sustain cooperation or social norms. For this we 
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use a clustering coefficient, which is equal to the average of the densities of the 
ego-networks of all actors33. Table 4.2 shows that clustering is highest with 
general type networks, with an average density of the ego-networks higher than 
0.5. Clustering is lowest with support networks and networks through social 
public activities, which is consistent with the brokerage idea behind support 
giving and the organization of social public activities as discussed above. We 
also observe that the village network of economic relations while having the 
highest centrality has also a considerable clustering level. Economic ego-
networks tend to be dense, whereas at the village level economic relations are 
centralized around some economically strong nodes. 
 Since we look at multiple networks, a final network characteristic that is of 
interest is the level of overlap between different types of networks. It might be 
that the fact that two agents are linked with each other on one particular dimen-
sion (e.g. they are friends) increases the likelihood that they have a link on 
another dimension as well. Table 4.3 shows the percentage of overlap between 
different types of relations at the dyad level. To interpret this table we need to 
start with the horizontal dimension. For instance, cell 1-2 indicates that 6.38% of 
the friendship dyads are also support dyads, whereas 42.93% of the support 
dyads are also friendship dyads as indicated by cell 2-1. 
 
Table 4.3. Overlap between different types of social relations 
 Friendship Support Neighbour Soc. act. Economic Ext. family 
Friendship 100.00% 6.38% 12.67% 9.44% 8.93% 2.74% 
Support 42.93% 100.00% 25.54% 10.33% 15.76% 5.43% 
Neighbour 40.15% 12.02% 100.00% 5.12% 5.37% 1.79% 
Soc. act. 40.34% 6.55% 6.90% 100.00% 5.17% 1.38% 
Economic 36.75% 10.25% 7.42% 5.30% 100.00% 2.83% 
Ext. family 17.99% 5.29% 3.70% 2.12% 4.23% 100.00% 
Note. (dyad level - OR-links; ignoring intra-household links) 
 
We observe that for most network types a high percentage of the dyads overlaps 
with friendship dyads, as demonstrated by the high percentages in the first 
column. Furthermore, there is a relatively large overlap between support and 
                                                        
33 Ego-networks or neighborhoods are defined as the set of agents ‘ego’ has a direct link with. 
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neighbour relations, as more than a quarter of support relations is between 
neighbours. Finally, a special category is extended family relations who show a 
low overlap with other types of relations. This is likely related to the very 
specific nature of extended family relations. In contrast with most other rela-
tions, extended family relations are not the result of an explicit decision-making 
process. More importantly, having an extended family relation often implies 
other types of relations (such as support, friendship, neighbour, etc.), which are 
not mentioned but naturally existing. 
 Taking account of the overlap but also the considerable differences between 
the different networks, we expect a differentiated influence of different layers of 
social networks on dictator giving. For this reason, our analysis of the influence 
of individual characteristics and social networks on dictator giving will be done 
separately for the different types of social networks. 
4.2. Experimental results 
In total 57 dictators participated in the experiment34. The left-hand histogram in 
Figure 4.2 shows the pooled dictator distributions with village recipients. We 
observe that the mode is the equal split. The rest of the decisions are more or 
less equally distributed around the mode (with a small exception with leaving 
nothing), implying a symmetric distribution. Note that this is very different from 
dictator game experiments conducted in common laboratory settings. 
 
Figure 4.2. Distribution of dictator decisions 
 
 
                                                        
34 Because of non-presence of some of the households and the fact that we opted for organizing the 
experiment in one day we did not manage to visit all 66 households for the experiment. 
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Table 4.4. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
Coins to village recipient 285 9.6 4.58 0 20 10 
Coins to village recipient – coins to stranger 285 0.4 4.63 -15 16 0 
Coins to stranger 57 9.2 5.43 0 20 10 
 
Participants in our dictator game show higher generosity than university students 
in experimental laboratories who rarely give more than 50% of the resources. 
This is even the case if we compare with single-blind procedures where dicta-
tors’ generosity is somewhat higher as result of the lower social distance 
between the dictator and the experimenter (Hoffman et al., 1996). With single-
blind procedures used in lab settings still a limited 21 percent of the dictators left 
the equal split and more than 20 percent left nothing to the recipient (Forsythe et 
al., 1994). It is unlikely that the higher generosity in our experiment in compari-
son with single-blind procedures can be attributed to differences of social 
distance between the dictator and the experimenter, as our procedures guaran-
teed that this social distance was actually lower in our experiment35. 
 The higher generosity in our experiment is likely to be related with the 
lower social distance between dictator and recipient. As shown by Bohnet & 
Frey (1999) letting the recipients present themselves before the experiment 
dramatically increases dictators’ generosity. In our experiment the social 
distance between dictator and recipient was lowered in a similar way, in 
particular by revealing the name of the recipient to the dictator36. Leider et al. 
(2007) similarly found that dictators were less generous towards someone 
anonymous than towards someone whose name was revealed. 
                                                        
35 Although the social distance between the dictator and the experimenter might be lowered by the 
face-to-face interview that precedes the experiment, it is actually the distance with a third 
supervisor that matters, as it is this person who records the dictator’s decisions. As discussed 
before, this person does not have any social contact with the dictators. 
36 Social distance might also have been reduced by the fact that dictators knew that they distributed 
the resources with someone from their village or someone from a village in the region. This might 
be important in communities where reciprocity is part of daily life, even when directed reciprocity 
is not possible in the experiment. Ensminger (2004) who conducted a dictator game experiment in 
East Africa where dictators knew that the recipient was someone from their village, found similarly 
high frequencies of the equal split. An important difference with our experiment, however, lies in 
the very low frequency of distributions they observed where more than 50% is left to the recipient. 
A plausible explanation for this is that in contrast with our experiment they did not reveal the 
recipients’ name. 
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 Leider et al. (2007) then considered the generosity towards the anonymous 
recipient as baseline generosity. We followed a similar procedure. We used the 
share dictators leave to the stranger as a proxy for ‘general generosity’, whereas 
we considered the share they leave to known village members as ‘directed 
generosity’37. We observe that general generosity is an important personality 
trait that explains part of people’s generosity towards particular village recipi-
ents, as confirmed by a high and significant Spearman correlation (0.562; two-
sided P = .000; N = 285). 
 We are aware that part of this correlation could also be attributed to an 
‘anchoring’ effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), i.e. people who face a multiple 
decision task tend to stick to previously made decisions. The large variation of 
the difference between the share left to the village recipient and the share left to 
the stranger, shown in the right-hand histogram of Figure 4.2, indicates that this 
effect is limited. Also the variation of decisions made by the same dictator is 
considerable. Only 6 dictators (10.5%) gave the same amount to all village 
members (5 of them chose the equal split and one left 8 coins to each recipient; 
4 of them gave also the same amount to the stranger)38. 
 Finally, the large variation of the difference between the share left to the 
village recipient and the share left to the stranger indicates that large part of the 
variation of directed generosity is not explained by general generosity. In the 
rest of this section we will look for further explanations behind this variation. 
 Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the influence of the social 
distance (measured by the number of links in the shortest path between dictator 
and recipient) on dictator giving, in dependence of the different types of 
networks. We observe that the effect of social distance is quite different between 
the network types, but there are also some similarities. Generally, in comparison 
with the stranger, dictators show higher generosity towards persons they have a 
direct link with (a distance of 1). Moreover, this generosity tends to be higher 
towards direct relations in comparison with indirect relations (distance 2). This 
                                                        
37 In contrast with Leider et al. (2007) we also revealed the name of the stranger. This lowers the 
difference between the share left to the stranger and what is left to the village recipients, and 
probably explains why in contrast with their results this difference is not significantly different 
from zero. As shown by the right-hand histogram in figure 1, it is even symmetrically distributed 
around zero. In many occasions dictators give less to a village recipient than what they left to the 
stranger. 
38 When looking for other variables that explain the variation of generosity towards village 
recipients besides general generosity, such as individual characteristics and social network 
structures, an anchoring effect would not be problematic, as it reduces the variation of the explained 
variables, and thus only but leads to an underestimation of the correlation with these other 
explanatory variables. 
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effect is relatively large with extended family relations, and to a lower extent 
with friendship relations, support relations and general relations. For most of the 
networks we do not observe a consistent social distance effect beyond step 2. 
Regarding economic networks we do not observe any social distance effect at 
all. 
 
Table 4.5. Social distance effect along different network types 
  
Coins to . . . 
    
Stranger 
Distance 
1 
Distance 
2 
Distance 
3 
Distance 
4 
≥ distance 
5 
        
mean 9.18 10.07 9.29 9.00 – – 
st.dev. 5.43 4.40 4.70 .   General type 
N 57 114 170 1 – – 
        
mean 9.18 10.80 9.26 9.83 – – 
st.dev. 5.43 4.80 4.52 4.30   
Friendship 
relation 
N 57 54 207 24 – – 
        
mean 9.18 11.00 9.90 9.78 9.66 8.66 
st.dev. 5.43 5.72 5.25 4.84 4.24 3.59 
Support 
relation 
N 57 12 48 95 74 56 
        
mean 9.18 11.14 9.07 9.00 9.75 9.80 
st.dev. 5.43 3.93 5.38 3.85 4.71 4.65 
Extended 
family 
N 57 7 29 52 65 132 
        
mean 9.18 10.35 10.19 8.96 9.94 9.31 
st.dev. 5.43 4.69 4.43 4.89 4.34 4.05 
Social 
public 
activities  N 57 17 91 109 36 32 
        
mean 9.18 9.67 9.99 9.11 9.52 9.48 
st.dev. 5.43 5.33 4.69 4.70 3.40 4.31 
Economic 
relation 
N 57 15 128 94 27 21 
        
 
As indicated by the standard deviations, variation around the average levels for 
each of the social distances is considerable, which might obscure social distance 
effects on dictator giving when testing them statistically. It is therefore war-
ranted to control for additional variables that might explain part of the variation 
in dictator giving. In particular, we will build a model that controls for individ-
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ual characteristics of dictator and recipient, the social distance between them, 
their ego-network characteristics and their level of general generosity. 
 
For the estimation we use the following regression model39: 
 ijijij eXY ++= βα ,  
with i and j being the dictator and the recipient. However, independence of 
observations is not guaranteed. The same dictator is asked to make five distribu-
tion decisions with community members, so that [ ] 0, ≠ikij eeE for all k, and 
different dictators may have been asked to make a distribution decision with the 
same recipient, so that [ ] 0, ≠kjij eeE for all k. To correct standard errors for these 
dependencies and thus to obtain correct inference we apply clustering on both 
dimensions separately (for a more elaborate and technical discussion see e.g. 
Cameron et al., 2007). 
 Our research strategy in estimating the determinants of dictator giving is the 
following. In a first model we control for individual characteristics of the 
dictator and the recipient, which are likely to influence dictator-giving. In 
particular, we look at the influence of sex, age and wealth, which previous 
studies found to be correlated with dictator giving (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; 
1998; Harbaug et al., 2003; Brañas-Garza, 2006). As a proxy for wealth we use 
a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the respective household owns 
cattle40, which is an important asset in the region. Besides these variables we 
control for education (measured by the years of schooling), the years of resi-
dence in the village, and the frequency of contact with the nearest urban centre 
(measured by the number of visits in last month). We expect these variables to 
be particularly important for social link formation (see section 4.3), but we also 
wanted to control for them in dictator decisions. 
 In a second model, we additionally control for the amount the dictator has 
left to the ‘stranger’. This enables us to isolate ‘directed’ generosity. In a third 
model, we add the social distance between dictator and recipients – measured by 
the number of steps needed to link them – as explanatory variable. 
 In a fourth model, we add more sophisticated network variables which we 
expect to influence directed generosity. For both dictator and recipient we add 
the following variables. First, we control for their embeddedness in the village 
                                                        
39 We also estimated a tobit regression model with random-effects at the level of the dictator 
(results not shown). Due to the very limited censoring (see left-hand histogram of Figure 4.2) 
results were very similar. 
40 As more than half of the village population does not have any cattle at all, we expect this dummy 
variable to have more explanatory power than controlling for the exact amount of cattle. 
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by adding a variable ‘size of ego-network’, i.e. the number of nodes they have a 
direct link with. Second, we look at the nodes in their ego network and the links 
these nodes have. According to Coleman (1990), the more connections there are 
between the nodes the more beneficial a network tends to be for sustaining 
collective action and social norms. As this possibly influences dictator giving, 
we control for this by adding a variable ‘number of ties in ego-network’. Third, 
according to Burt (1992; 2005) an agent has more power if he/she is connected 
to many nodes that have few links and thus are very dependent on him/her. As 
this power possibly influences the dictator’s generosity, we control for this by 
adding a variable ‘two step reach’, which measures the percentage of the 
population that is reached within two steps. 
 Following this stepwise procedure and looking at general-type relations, we 
observe in the first model of Table 4.6 (see appendix 1) that the sex dummies are 
important explanatory variables. Male recipients receive on average 2.7 coins 
more from male dictators than what they receive from female dictators. At the 
same time, on average male dictators give to female recipients 2.2 coins more 
than what female dictators give to male recipients. This contrasts with previous 
lab dictator game experiments (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; 1998) that demon-
strated that female dictators are more generous than male dictators. Young 
female students in Northern universities, however, can hardly be compared with 
poor women who struggle with fulfilling every day life responsibilities such as 
child health and education. In particular, a plausible explanation for this differ-
ence can be found in studies on gender differences regarding income spending in 
poor countries. As demonstrated by Thomas (1990) in urban Brazil the influence 
of unearned income (e.g. social benefits) in mother’s hands on the children’s 
health is substantially higher than the influence of this income controlled by 
fathers. Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) showed in Cote d’Ivoire that the share of 
income controlled by women is positively correlated with food shares. Taking 
account of this evidence we think female dictators keep a larger part of the coins 
not because they are less generous, but because they are eager to spend it in 
health or food related household consumption, whereas they are reluctant to give 
it to male recipients who are expected to spend it more on non-household related 
consumption (alcohol, cigarettes, etc.). 
 Education, age and the number of years of residence in the village do not 
exert any influence on dictator giving. The contact with the nearest urban centre 
of the dictator, however, does exert an influence on dictator giving. Dictators 
give more when they have more contact with urban centres and ceteris paribus 
the less they differ with the recipient on this variable. 
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 Looking at economic variables the regression results indicate that dictators 
with cattle give on average 2 coins more than a dictator without cattle. Whether 
the recipient has cattle or not does not influence the distribution decision of the 
dictator. Thus, dictators do not compare with the economic status of the recipi-
ent, but only look at their own economic situation. This effect becomes much 
less important once we control for the number of coins left to the stranger 
(model 2). This indicates that dictators without cattle give less in general, 
irrespective of the recipient being a stranger or not. Moreover, as expected, the 
coins left to the stranger as proxy for general generosity results a very important 
and significant explanatory variable. 
 In a third model we control for the social distance between dictator and 
recipient. It is sufficient to include only one dummy variable since all but one 
dictators are connected with recipients at a maximum distance of two. We 
observe that on average, dictators give almost one coin less to indirect relations 
than to direct relations. The effect of social distance is only significant at 10% 
(two-sided)41. In a fourth model, we add the network characteristics of the 
dictator and the recipient as explanatory variables. They do not exert any 
significant influence on the dictator decisions, probably because of the low 
variance in these network characteristics (most people are connected at a 
maximum distance of 2). 
 In the following we present the estimations of models 3 and 4 for the 
separate network types. The same network measures will be used as with 
general-type networks. In the models in Table 4.7 (see appendix 1) we focus on 
friendship networks. We observe that the sex dummy variables have a similar 
effect as in the models with general-type relations. Also similarly, the social 
distance effect in model 3 is significant at the 10% (two-sided)42. Results 
regarding the influence of more specific network characteristics (model 4), 
however, are different. We observe that a higher percentage of the population 
reached within two steps along a dictator’s friendship ties reduces generosity. A 
higher percentage of the population reached within two steps keeping the size of 
the ego-network constant reduces the centrality of the dictator. According to 
Burt’s theory (1992; 2005) this reduces the power of the dictator. It is however 
not directly clear how to interpret this positive correlation between power and 
                                                        
41 As we expect social distance to be highly correlated with the sex dummy variables (for further 
analysis on this see next section), we exclude the latter (model not shown) and the effect of social 
distance becomes significant at 5% (two-sided). 
42 Here again, when excluding the sex dummy variables, social distance becomes significant at 5%. 
Moreover, by doing so the effect becomes stronger as the coefficient decreases to -1.424. 
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generosity. A plausible explanation is that power in such small-scale societies 
tends to be based on clientelism and can only be maintained if sufficient 
resources are transferred to the dependent clients (Wolf, 1977). Although direct 
reciprocity is limited in our experiment, it is plausible that participants bring this 
common patron-clientelistic logic to the experiment. Dictators connected with 
lowly connected nodes may therefore feel the obligation or responsibility to 
share with others, irrespective of the latter belonging to their ego-network. 
 In Table 4.8 we study the influence of support networks. Also in these 
models individual characteristics exert little influence on dictator giving, except 
for the sex dummy variables. Social distance does not exert a significant 
influence on dictator giving, even if we remove the sex dummy variables which 
are correlated with social distance (model not shown). An important difference 
with general type and friendship networks is the influence of the density of the 
dictator’s ego-network. The higher this density (increasing the number of ties 
the nodes in the ego-network have among each other for a given size of the ego-
network, or reducing the size of the ego-network for a given number of ties 
among the nodes in the ego-network), the more a dictator tends to give to the 
recipient. This higher generosity is consistent with Coleman’s evidence (1990) 
on the positive correlation between network clustering and the respect for social 
norms. When more people in the ego-network of a dictator interchange support, 
the more the dictator finds it to be a rightful behaviour to let part of the re-
sources to the receiver, irrespective of his/her personal relation with the recipi-
ent. 
 In the models in Table 4.9 we focus on social links through social public 
activities. Interesting in these models is the influence of the ego-network of the 
recipients. Dictators give less to recipients with large ego-networks. These 
recipients are central and therefore have a leader position in social public 
activities. It is plausible that because of their favourable access to local and 
external opportunities they are deemed less entitled to additional resources. We 
also observe that recipients with cattle receive on average 1.5 coins less from 
dictators without cattle than from dictators with cattle. This effect which has 
been present only at a statistically insignificant level in most previous models 
becomes here significant as these economic variables are not correlated with 
network variables along social public activities (see next section for evidence on 
this). 
 In the models in Table 4.10 that look at economic relations, we do not find 
any statistically significant influence of network variables on dictator giving. 
This does not surprise us as economic relations in contrast with other types of 
relations (such as support relations, friendship relations or family relations) are 
Social Networks and Exclusion 
 
 
99
based on a market-logic where there is little room for generosity. Market 
transactions are based on a quid pro quo basis, where the conditions are clearly 
defined. Unconditional generosity as observed through dictator giving is 
therefore not more likely between nodes that have an economic relation. 
 In Table 4.11 we look at extended family networks. Here too, the influence 
of the social distance between dictator and recipient is important. Interestingly, 
the size of the coefficient is high (more than 2), although only significant at the 
10%. On average, dictators give 2 coins less to a recipient they have not a direct 
family relation with. To control for the other network characteristics in model 4, 
we decided not to control for the number of ties within the ego-network, since 
given our definition of extended family relations the density of extended family 
ego-networks is almost always complete. Instead, we added an interaction effect 
between social distance and the size of the ego-network. The main results are the 
following. The social distance coefficient drastically decreases and becomes 
significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the larger the size of a dictator’s family 
network, the lower becomes his/her generosity. As indicated by the significant 
and positive interaction effect, this effect is lower for people that do not belong 
to the ego-network. This can be interpreted as follows. Dictators embedded in a 
larger family network have probably weaker ties with each family member, 
reducing their generosity towards a given recipient within their network. The 
same applies for the recipient’s family networks. The larger the size of the 
recipient’s family networks, the weaker the recipient’s family ties and the lower 
the dictator’s generosity if the dictator belongs to the recipient’s family net-
works. 
 The results in this section have confirmed that to explain generosity it 
clearly matters what networks we look at. Lower social distance between 
dictator and recipient on general networks (i.e. irrespective of its type), friend-
ship networks and extended family networks favour generosity. The network 
position and the structure of these networks also result important. In particular, 
generosity increases the more the dictator’s friends have relatively few other 
friends, or with denser support networks of the dictator. Generosity also in-
creases the smaller the family networks of the dictator or the recipient (if both 
have a direct family relation), or the smaller the recipient’s network through 
social public activities. Finally, economic relations do not exert any influence on 
generosity. 
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4.3. Social link formation 
In previous section we have seen how individual characteristics of dictators and 
recipients influence distributive decision-making. We have observed that once 
we control for network variables, most coefficients of individual-specific 
characteristics (except sex dummy variables) become insignificant, whereas 
some network variables become powerful explanatory variables. This effect is 
likely due to the close relation between individual characteristics and social 
relations. To study the indirect effect of individual characteristics on distributive 
decision-making through its relation with social links, we conduct a separate 
analysis on link formation. 
 For each type of social relation43, we examine a model that explains the 
probability of an undirected link. For this we consider all potential links between 
the 123 household heads, excluding intra-household links44. For the estimation 
of the models we use the following logistic regression model: 
( ) ( ) ijijjiji
ij
ij
ij ewzzzzp
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⎛
−= γββα 211ln  
With pij being the probability of a link between nodes i and j, zi and zj being 
characteristics of nodes i and j, and wij characteristics of the link between i and j, 
such as the fact that they are also neighbours and/or family. For each attribute of 
the nodes, we add the sum and the absolute value of the difference of the 
attributes. The former measures the effect of the combined level whereas the 
latter measures the effect of differences in attributes. Controlling for the 
differences in attributes allows us to test the homophily hypothesis. As illus-
trated extensively people have a tendency to associate with similar others 
(McPherson et al., 2001). 
 Dyadic observations involving the same node, however, are not independ-
ent. Thus, [ ] 0, ≠ikij eeE for all k, and [ ] 0, ≠kjij eeE for all k. To correct standard 
errors for these dependencies, and thus to obtain correct inference we apply 
clustering on both dimensions separately (Cameron et al., 2007; Fafchamps & 
Gubert, 2007). 
                                                        
43 We did not estimate such model for family relations or neighbor relations as they are only to a 
limited extent the result of a deliberate decision. 
44 It is assumed that household members are not only family, they also tend to be friends, support 
each other, have an economic link, etc. However, we did not capture information on the type of 
intra-household relations. Moreover, even with this information it would not be a good idea to pool 
intra-household and extra-household relations, because of their different character. 
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 Individual-specific variables we included in the model are the same as used 
in the regression models on generosity, namely sex, age, education, the number 
of years of residence in the village and the frequency of contact with the urban 
centre45. Moreover, we control for the number of geodesic paths of length two 
between both nodes. This allows us to test the hypothesis of preferential linking 
(Jackson & Rogers, 2007). In particular, we expect the likelihood of a link 
between two nodes to increase with the number of common direct links both 
nodes have with each other. We also control for the possibility that both nodes 
have a direct family or neighbour relation, as this might increase the likelihood 
of having a relation on other dimensions as well. To study the formation of 
‘general’ relations (i.e. irrespective of its type) we do not control for family or 
neighbour relations, as these are included in the general relation. 
 Table 4.12 (see appendix 1) shows the results. Our results indicate that the 
probability of a support link is significantly lower between female and male 
persons in comparison with a situation where both persons are males. This 
applies to all types of links. We also observe that the formation of friendship 
links and general links is also less likely between women. 
 Larger age differences reduce the likelihood of a support relation or a 
relation through public social activities. Education levels exert a positive 
influence on the formation of friendship links. In particular, a higher combined 
level of both nodes increases the likelihood that a friendship relation or a 
relation through social public activities is formed. The number of years of 
residence in the village is relevant for the formation of general links. The 
likelihood of a general relation increases with a larger combined level or with a 
smaller absolute difference between both nodes. Regarding the contact with the 
nearest urban centre measured by the number of visits during last month, we 
observe that a larger difference between both nodes reduces the likelihood of a 
friendship link, a link through social public activities or an economic relation. 
The likelihood of a general relation or an economic relation also lowers with a 
smaller sum of both nodes. 
 Economic variables are especially important for the formation of economic 
relations. In comparison with a situation where both nodes have cattle, if only 
one node has cattle the likelihood of a link decreases, and it does even more if 
both nodes do not have any cattle. A similar pattern is observed for the forma-
tion of friendship links. This effect is not observed for general relations. This is 
likely due to multicollinearity between land, cattle and education. The influence 
                                                        
45 Other studies have analyzed the influence of individual characteristics on social capital 
formation. See for instance Glaeser et al. (2002). 
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of cattle becomes significant, only when we exclude land and education (model 
not shown). 
 In all models the number of paths of length 2 results a very significant 
explanatory variable. The more relations both nodes have in common the higher 
the likelihood that they have a direct relation46. Finally, we observe that geo-
graphical distance between both nodes as measured by the distance along 
neighbour links lowers the probability of a support link or a friendship link. 
Having a kinship relation does not influence the likelihood of having another 
type of relation. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter explores how social networks and individual characteristics 
influence distributive decisions within small rural societies. It reports the results 
of a series of dictator game experiments in a poor village in rural Nicaragua. Our 
results indicate that the only individual characteristics that directly influence 
dictator giving are the gender of the dictator and recipient. Women give signifi-
cantly less to recipients, and even less when recipients are male. 
 Looking at networks, our results indicate that dictator giving correlates with 
network characteristics and social distance; though the kind of correlation is 
highly contingent upon the type of network we look at. Lower social distance 
between dictator and recipient on general networks (i.e. irrespective of its type), 
friendship networks and extended family networks favour generosity. The 
characteristics of friendship networks, support networks, family networks and 
networks through social/public activities are also important for dictator giving. 
Generosity increases the more the dictator’s friends have relatively few other 
friends, the denser the support networks of the dictator, the smaller the family 
networks of the dictator and/or the recipient (if both have a direct family 
relation), and the larger the recipient’s network through social/public activities. 
 Taking account of the demonstrated importance of social distance for 
dictator giving and the determinants behind link formation, we conclude that the 
poor, the less mobile, women and the young are most vulnerable to exclusion 
because they tend to be socially more distant from others in their village (when 
looking at friendship relations), and thus from the persons who distribute 
economic resources. The same applies for people that are very distant 
                                                        
46 Being aware of possible inverse causality, we also estimated a model without this variable. 
Results were not very different, with most significant variables remaining significant. 
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neighbours of those who distribute economic resources. As we do not observe 
any evidence of dictators taking account of the individual characteristics of the 
disadvantaged which might weaken these social network effects, these people 
might face a real poverty trap. 
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Appendix 1: regression results 
Table 4.6. Dictator giving and general-type networks (a) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.198 1.200* 2.293 0.836*** 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.730 1.225** 2.738 0.897*** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.072 0.619* 1.293 0.619** 
Age (dictator) 0.058 0.062 0.053 0.041 
Absolute value of difference of age -0.025 0.023 0.001 0.022 
Education (dictator) 0.016 0.209 0.020 0.134 
Absolute value of difference of education 0.056 0.087 -0.032 0.078 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.067 0.043 -0.040 0.029 
Absolute value of difference of residence 0.008 0.025 -0.008 0.021 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.370 0.181** 0.128 0.135 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.144 0.036*** -0.071 0.049 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.483 0.553 -0.415 0.468 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -2.428 0.988** -1.158 0.650* 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -2.189 0.927** -0.782 0.750 
Distance > 1 (dummy) – – – – 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – – – 
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) – – – – 
Two step reach (dictator) – – – – 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – – – 
Number of ties in ego-network (recipient) – – – – 
Two step reach (recipient) – – – – 
Coins to stranger – – 0.477 0.083*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.160 0.149 -0.118 0.141 
Constant 9.235 2.845*** 3.785 2.437 
R-squared 0.1605  0.4294  
F 3.85  12.20  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Table 4.6. Dictator giving and general-type networks (b) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.320 0.845*** 2.579 2.430** 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.518 0.920*** 2.692 2.640*** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.255 0.632** 1.431 1.920* 
Age (dictator) 0.052 0.041 0.049 1.220 
Absolute value of difference of age 0.002 0.021 0.005 0.300 
Education (dictator) 0.015 0.132 0.010 0.080 
Absolute value of difference of education -0.036 0.078 -0.045 -0.570 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.043 0.029 -0.037 -1.340 
Absolute value of difference of residence -0.003 0.022 -0.005 -0.210 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.124 0.132 0.138 1.020 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.074 0.050 -0.077 -1.480 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.326 0.453 -0.275 -0.600 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -1.131 0.659* -1.240 -1.730* 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -0.817 0.754 -0.992 -1.250 
Distance > 1 (dummy) -0.834 0.435* -0.903 -1.730* 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – -0.006 -0.040 
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) – – 0.000 0.070 
Two step reach (dictator) – – -0.684 -1.210 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – -0.019 -0.320 
Number of ties in ego-network (recipient) – – 0.000 0.250 
Two step reach (recipient) – – 0.342 1.050 
Coins to stranger 0.478 0.084*** 0.462 5.420*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.110 0.139 -0.106 -0.740 
Constant 4.358 2.271* 38.903 0.640 
R-squared 0.4365  0.4483  
F 11.76  8.77  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Table 4.7. Dictator giving and friendship networks 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.284 0.838*** 2.080 1.067* 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.490 0.888*** 2.780 0.974** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.280 0.608** 0.732 0.853 
Age (dictator) 0.050 0.041 0.058 0.038 
Absolute value of difference of age 0.004 0.021 0.009 0.020 
Education (dictator) 0.011 0.128 0.026 0.116 
Absolute value of difference of education -0.043 0.078 -0.036 0.083 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.042 0.029 -0.038 0.027 
Absolute value of difference of residence -0.007 0.021 -0.017 0.022 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.107 0.129 0.124 0.114 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.067 0.052 -0.069 0.043 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.310 0.480 -0.435 0.498 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -1.074 0.667 -1.061 0.691 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -0.652 0.741 -0.876 0.704 
Distance > 1 (dummy) -1.071 0.652 -1.361 0.708* 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – 0.091 0.125 
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) – – -0.004 0.007 
Two step reach (dictator) – – -0.074 0.024*** 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – 0.001 0.072 
Number of ties in ego-network (recipient) – – -0.002 0.004 
Two step reach (recipient) – – -0.009 0.028 
Coins to stranger 0.481 0.083*** 0.482 0.080*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.102 0.140 -0.111 0.150 
Constant 4.793 2.420** 11.421 3.008*** 
R-squared 0.4370  0.4671  
F 12.02  10.49  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Table 4.8. Dictator giving and support networks 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.311 0.834*** 2.497 0.812*** 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.714 0.910*** 3.007 0.931*** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.330 0.613** 1.221 0.612** 
Age (dictator) 0.055 0.042 0.057 0.043 
Absolute value of difference of age 0.001 0.021 0.001 0.022 
Education (dictator) 0.025 0.136 0.037 0.150 
Absolute value of difference of education -0.031 0.077 -0.028 0.081 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.039 0.030 -0.038 0.028 
Absolute value of difference of residence -0.006 0.022 -0.013 0.022 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.128 0.133 0.149 0.133 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.064 0.048 -0.076 0.047 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.423 0.488 -0.512 0.486 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -1.117 0.649* -1.021 0.621 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -0.718 0.757 -0.740 0.715 
Distance > 1 (dummy) -1.054 0.801 -1.099 0.960 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – -0.329 0.181* 
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) – – 0.198 0.094** 
Two step reach (dictator) – – 0.008 0.035 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – -0.049 0.142 
Number of ties in ego-network (recipient) – – 0.038 0.054 
Two step reach (recipient) – – -0.009 0.030 
Coins to stranger 0.477 0.083*** 0.447 0.081*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.125 0.142 -0.113 0.141 
Constant 4.569 2.185** 5.504 2.633** 
R-squared 0.4314  0.4576  
F 11.59  12.95  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Table 4.9. Dictator giving and networks through social public activities 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.307 0.831*** 2.836 0.909*** 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.766 0.883*** 3.165 0.904*** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.295 0.616** 1.414 0.600** 
Age (dictator) 0.054 0.041 0.063 0.045 
Absolute value of difference of age 0.000 0.022 -0.006 0.022 
Education (dictator) 0.019 0.132 0.048 0.152 
Absolute value of difference of education -0.028 0.077 0.000 0.086 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.040 0.029 -0.033 0.029 
Absolute value of difference of residence -0.008 0.021 0.001 0.019 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.131 0.136 0.129 0.159 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.074 0.050 -0.048 0.042 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.408 0.482 -0.231 0.515 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -1.156 0.649* -1.590 0.751** 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -0.798 0.752 -1.039 0.840 
Distance > 1 (dummy) 0.421 1.171 0.494 1.093 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – 0.302 0.189 
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) – – -0.026 0.022 
Two step reach (dictator) – – -0.056 0.032* 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – -0.106 0.046** 
Number of ties in ego-network (recipient) – – 0.014 0.008* 
Two step reach (recipient) – – 0.021 0.013* 
Coins to stranger 0.477 0.083*** 0.502 0.080*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.116 0.139 -0.124 0.135 
Constant 3.350 2.774 2.190 3.007 
R-squared 0.4298  0.4640  
F 11.50  9.93  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Table 4.10. Dictator giving and economic networks 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.293 0.838*** 1.912 0.949** 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.742 0.896*** 2.511 0.902*** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.295 0.622** 1.189 0.651* 
Age (dictator) 0.053 0.041 0.049 0.044 
Absolute value of difference of age 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.019 
Education (dictator) 0.020 0.134 -0.029 0.142 
Absolute value of difference of education -0.032 0.078 0.006 0.087 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.040 0.029 -0.040 0.030 
Absolute value of difference of residence -0.008 0.021 -0.001 0.023 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.128 0.135 0.106 0.137 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.071 0.049 -0.069 0.053 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.417 0.471 -0.344 0.522 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -1.153 0.644* -0.901 0.695 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -0.791 0.751 -0.527 0.744 
Distance > 1 (dummy) 0.128 0.497 0.720 0.770 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – 0.277 0.344 
Number of ties in ego-network (dictator) – – -0.060 0.095 
Two step reach (dictator) – – -0.009 0.015 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – -0.038 0.202 
Number of ties in ego-network (recipient) – – 0.017 0.052 
Two step reach (recipient) – – 0.000 0.009 
Coins to stranger 0.477 0.083*** 0.468 0.086*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.119 0.141 -0.102 0.160 
Constant 3.663 2.337 2.764 2.892 
R-squared 0.4294  0.4453  
F 11.46  9.56  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Table 4.11. Dictator giving and extended family networks 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Dictator = male; recipient = female (dummy) 2.322 0.823*** 2.336 0.737*** 
Dictator = male; recipient = male (dummy) 2.760 0.880*** 2.747 0.846*** 
Dictator = female; recipient = female (dummy) 1.363 0.613** 1.423 0.664** 
Age (dictator) 0.048 0.039 0.042 0.038 
Absolute value of difference of age 0.002 0.022 0.007 0.021 
Education (dictator) 0.008 0.132 -0.058 0.132 
Absolute value of difference of education -0.034 0.080 -0.031 0.080 
Years of residence (dictator) -0.040 0.029 -0.019 0.026 
Absolute value of difference of residence -0.005 0.022 -0.009 0.020 
Contact with urban centre (dictator) 0.114 0.138 0.166 0.134 
Absolute value of difference of contact urban centre -0.066 0.048 -0.031 0.048 
Cattle dictator yes; recipient no -0.253 0.459 -0.257 0.495 
Cattle dictator no; recipient yes -1.026 0.641 -1.043 0.694 
Cattle dictator no; recipient no -0.684 0.741 -0.651 0.710 
Distance > 1 (dummy) -2.299 1.242* -14.053 2.497*** 
Size of ego-network (dictator) – – -1.009 0.279*** 
Distance > 1 (dummy) * Size of ego-network (dictator) – – 0.449 0.173** 
Two step reach (dictator) – – 0.092 0.107 
Size of ego-network (recipient) – – -1.336 0.361*** 
Distance > 1 (dummy) * Size of ego-network 
(recipient) 
– – 1.237 0.288*** 
Two step reach (recipient) – – 0.018 0.059 
Coins to stranger 0.483 0.083*** 0.500 0.085*** 
Number of decision (min. = 1; max. = 5) -0.121 0.141 -0.095 0.156 
Constant 6.080 2.441** 18.427 2.652*** 
R-squared 0.4352  0.4748  
F 11.72  12.59  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Note. Robust standard errors were obtained by means of two-way clustering (dictator and recipient 
level); significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%; N = 273. 
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Appendix 2: Experimental instructions 
We now ask you to participate in an experiment in which you can earn money. 
The amount of money you earn is yours, whatever the amount. 
 
Shortly, I will give you 20 coins of 1 Córdoba and you will be free to divide this 
amount between yourself and another person. For this, we use this small black 
box [show the box]. In this box, you will find 20 coins of 1 Córdoba [open the 
box and show the 20 coins]. You are allowed to take as many coins as you wish. 
The coins you leave in the box will be given to another person. In particular, we 
ask you to do the following: 
 Take the number of you coins you want and leave the coins you want to 
give to the other person. Fill the box with these small rings and put the lid on the 
box. In this way, I will not be able to see how many coins you will have left in 
the box, or to have an idea about it through the weight of the box. The weight of 
the box will always be the same whatever the amount of coins you leave in the 
box. 
 Thereafter, we put a sticker on the box with the name of the person who 
will get the coins and we put some tape on it to seal the box. I will give the box 
to my supervisor, who is at the vehicle and who will bring the coins to the other 
person. Note that you will know the identity of the other person, whereas that 
other person will NOT know you identity. 
 
I will now give you some arbitrary examples to clarify more the experiment. 
[Take the coins of one of the boxes and use them during the explication of the 
examples]. 
 
1)  You have here 20 coins of 1 Córdoba. Imagine that you decide to take 2 coins 
out of the box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 2 
equals 18) 
2)  I will give you another example. Imagine that you decide to take 10 coins out 
of the box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 10 
equals 10) 
3)  I will give you a final example. Imagine that you decide to take 20 coins out 
of the box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 20 
equals 0). 
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We will repeat this experiment 6 times. Each time, you will be able to take coins 
and leave coins for the other person, who will each time be a different one. 
Thus, I will give you 6 boxes of 20 coins to divide between yourself and another 
person. Each time, this person will be a different one. The first time you will 
divide the 20 coins with someone from another village in this region. You will 
not know this person. The other 5 times you will divide 20 coins with someone 
from your community. Once again, note that these other person will NOT know 
your identity. 
 
To select the 5 persons of your community, I will ask you to take small cards 
from this bag. Each card has a different number, and each number corresponds 
to a different person in the community. After having taken a number, I will look 
up this number on a list and I will give you the name of that person. Thereafter, I 
will give you a box with coins, so that you can decide on the number of coins 
you keep and how many you give to the other person. When taking this decision, 
I will give you complete privacy. You can go inside your house, (if not possible: 
I will turn my back so that I will be unable to know your decision; give me a 
signal when you are ready). Please do not tell me the decision you make. 
 
After having made this decision and having closed the box, you are not allowed 
anymore to change your decision. At that moment, we will seal the box. 
Thereafter, we will draw another number from the bag and I will ask you to take 
the next decision. Do you have any questions at the moment? 
 
I now write the first name on the first box [Ask whether the participant knows 
this person. If this is the case, select another person. Make sure you are not able 
to look at the participant when he/she handles the coins. Give him/her privacy. 
After the participant has made his/her decision seal the box and put the number 
on the sticker; thereafter the participant will not be allowed to change his/her 
decision.] 
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Appendix 3: Procedures of household survey, network survey and experi-
ment 
The following criteria were taken into account to select the experimenter-
assistants. We selected assistants with research experience in rural areas. They 
all worked as employee of the research and development institute Nitlapán of 
the Central American University, we have a close cooperation with. This 
enabled us to screen the researchers on their dedication, their capacity to work in 
a systematic way, their trustworthiness and their capacity to radiate trust towards 
other people (such as the participants in our experiment). 
 The training of the assistants was crucial as none of them had any prior 
experience with conducting experiments. To make them familiar with experi-
mental methods we let them play an ultimatum game. Thereafter, we explained 
them the instructions of our dictator game experiment and let them play a role-
playing game where each assistant acted out the role of dictator and experi-
menter. The other assistants observed each role-playing session and were 
allowed to comment afterwards. The aim of this was to come to a common 
understanding of the experimental procedures. Thereafter, we conducted two 
different pilots. After each pilot the assistants informed the other assistants about 
their experience, who could then give their comments or suggestions. One 
session by one assistant was recorded by video. After these pilots, the video 
material was shown to the team and allowed us to clear away any remaining 
vagueness. 
 To build trust with local people in the village, we started with the household 
and social network survey. We made ample use of the support of the local well-
respected community leader who before the start of our study presented our 
team to each household and asked people to cooperate. He also explained the 
village members that our study was not related with politics, religion or aid 
projects in any way, and that we would treat the obtained information in a 
confidential way. 
 For the household survey we interviewed as many households as possible. 
If a household head was not present, we interviewed the other household head. 
For the social network survey we interviewed both household heads (in case of a 
two-headed household) of as many households as possible. In case one house-
hold head was absent we figured out whether he/she would be available within 
the time span of our field planning and returned to interview this person. This 
procedure enabled us to obtain satisfactory coverage rates. The good timing of 
our study was also important in this respect. At the moment of our study most 
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temporal migrants had already returned to the village and economic activity was 
still low as villagers were awaiting the start of the economically more active rain 
season. 
 For the social network survey, we used small cards, each representing a 
household in the village. On each card we put the names of the household heads. 
In case of two-headed households the names of both husband and wife were put 
on the card. We asked for each of these cards whether the interviewed person 
knew the household and whether he/she had a social relation of any kind with 
one of its members. If a social relation was identified we asked for details on the 
type of social relation. Before the start of this exercise we had explained the 
different types of relations (see codes in appendix 6), so that each participant 
would consider the same types of social relations. 
 After finishing the household survey and the network survey (which took 
four days), we immediately organized the experiment. By conducting the 
experiment in only one day we minimized contagion. To explain the instruc-
tions, fixed scripts were used, which were memorized by the assistants (we 
decided not to read them aloud from paper as this could make participants 
loosing interest). After explaining the instructions to the participant, some pre-
play questions were asked to test whether the participant had understood the 
instructions. We prohibited our assistants to invent other examples than the ones 
included in the instructions, to make references to the daily life of the partici-
pants when explaining the instructions, to make jokes (e.g. about the money the 
dictator could keep to him/herself) or to remove the tap of one of the small 
boxes once they were sealed. 
 We tried to conduct the experiment with as many households as possible, 
but with only one person per household, as letting two household heads sequen-
tially participate in the experiment puts the door open to contagion. If the 
selected household head was not present (and would not be present on the same 
day of our experiment) we selected the other household head in case of a two-
headed household. The assistants also asked some post-experimental questions 
(see appendix 4) and made a subjective evaluation about the participant’s 
dedication, trust and understanding of the experiment. For this, the following 
questions were used: 
 
1. How dedicated was the participant within the 
experiment? 
1. Well dedicated 
2. Neutral 
3. Aversive; distrust towards the aim 
of the experiment 
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2. Did the participant understand the instruc-
tions? 
1. No problems 
2. Some questions for clarification 
3. I have serious doubts about 
whether he/she completely under-
stood them 
3. Was he/she reluctant to take a decision? [ ] 1. Yes – [ ] 0. No 
4. On average, how much time did he/she take to 
make a decision? 
1. Instantly 
2. More than a minute 
3. More than three minutes 
 
 
Other personal observations 
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Appendix 4: Post-experimental questionnaire 
 
1. Please describe how you made your distribution decision. What were the 
elements you used to take into account when making this decision? 
 
 
2. What did the experiment remind you of in real life? 
 
 
3. Did someone of the village who participated before in the experiment, talk to 
you about the experiment? 
[ ] 1. yes . . . [ ] 0. no 
 
If yes, what did you talk about? 
 
 
 
A. Economic ranking 
 
Imagine the richest and the poorest household of the village. We put both 
households on a straight line with the poorest on the most left-hand side and the 
richest on the most right-hand side (see figure on next page; show this figure to 
the peasant). All other households of the village find themselves somewhere on 
this line. Where would you put yourself? Where would you put . . . (do this for 
all 5 persons of the experiment he/she was linked with) 
 
Poorest Richest 
1 98765432
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B. Cause of economic welfare 
 
First go through the first row before starting with the second row, . . . !!! 
 
Recipients of the experiment 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. According to your opinion, did this person in 
recent years have a lot of bad luck affecting him/her 
economically? 
1. Quite a lot 
2. Not more than normal 
3. Very little 
          
b. According to your opinion, has this person spent 
time and effort to improve his/her economic 
situation? 
1. A lot of effort 
2. Not more than normal 
3. Very little 
          
c. You talk to this person about any kind of problem 
in this village . . . 
1. Regularly 
2. Sometimes 
3. Very rarely or never 
     
 
 
 
C. Accountability 
 
A. Imagine there are two farmers in this village, who have the same age, similar 
experience and have the same economic activities. Each of them has 1 hectare of 
land. This year the first one has had a bad harvest so that his production was 
only 100 kg of maize, whereas the other farmer obtained a normal production of 
200 kg. As a result the first farmer can give his family only one meal per day to 
eat, whereas the second one does not face any food difficulties. At a certain 
moment in time, a development program arrives at the village. 
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The program gives each farmer 100 US$. Do you agree with the program’s 
decision? 
Agree – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – Disagree 
 
The program gives the poorer farmer 150 US$ and the other farmer 50 US$. Do 
you agree with the program’s decision? 
Agree – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – Disagree 
 
B. Imagine now that the bad harvest of the first farmer is due to a plague of 
insects. 
The program gives each farmer 100 US$. Do you agree with the program’s 
decision? 
Agree – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – Disagree 
 
The program gives the poorer farmer 150 US$ and the other farmer 50 US$. Do 
you agree with the program’s decision? 
Agree – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – Disagree 
 
C. Imagine now that the bad harvest of the first farmer is due to a lack of effort. 
In comparison with the second farmer he has dedicated little time to his plot. 
 
The program gives each farmer 100 US$. Do you agree with the program’s 
decision? 
Agree – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – Disagree 
 
The program gives the poorer farmer 150 US$ and the other farmer 50 US$. Do 
you agree with the program’s decision? 
Agree – 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – Disagree 
 
 
 
D. Trust towards strangers 
 
Imagine that someone you have never seen before visits your village, for 
instance someone who proposes you to buy cattle or your harvest. This person 
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proposes you to take your cattle or harvest to the market in the urban centre, and 
after selling it pays you according to the price in the market. 
1.  Would you accept such proposal?  [ ] 1. yes. . . . [ ] 0. no 
2.  If you only accept this proposal with a cash advance, what is the minimum 
percentage that this person needs to give you to accept this proposal? . . .  . .  . % 
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Appendix 5: Household Survey 
 
 Number: ____ 
 
 
 
Name of interviewer: __________________ 
Name of the household head: __________________   
Replacement: _____________ 
 
A. General data 
 
1. Name of the interviewed person: __________________________________ 
 
2. Sex of the interviewed person: __________________________________ 
 
3. How many years do you live in this village? _____________ years 
 
4. Last month, how many times have you been in the urban centre? _____________  
 
 
 
B. Household data 
 
1. How many persons live in your house (during most of the year) and share the same dish?  
 
 
2. How many of these persons are older than 8 years?  
 
(Only include members older than 8 years!) 
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3.  
a. Name 
 
b. Relation 
(family relation with the 
interviewed person) 
 
1 = partner 
2 = father 
3 = mother 
4 = son/daughter 
5 = son/daughter-in-law 
6 = grandchild 
7 = grandfather/mother 
8 = other (specify)  
 
c. Sex 
 
d. Age 
 
e. What is 
the last 
approved 
year of 
education? 
 
(2do year = 8) 
 
Adult 
education = 
98 
1   M – F   
2   M – F   
3   M – F   
4   M – F   
5   M – F   
6   M – F   
7   M – F   
8   M – F   
9   M – F   
10   M – F   
11   M – F   
12   M – F   
 
 
C. Economic activities 
 
1. During the entire last year what economic 
activities did realize your family? 
 
 
a.Who realizes this 
activity? 
Indicate the number on 
the list of question 2; 
In case of several 
members, only indicate 
those who take decisions 
b. Estimated income 
(in c$) per year, 
after deducting costs 
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D. Land 
 
 
1. Has your family own plots of land?  [ ] 1. yes . .. [ ] 0. no (go to question 3) 
 
a. Plot (area) b. Family member - owner 
 
Use numbers on the list of question B3
 
1.                  
2.                  
3.                  
 
 
E. Subjective well-being 
 
1. How do you consider the economic situation of your family? 
 
(read the options) 
[ ] 1. very good 
[ ] 2. good 
[ ] 3. regular 
[ ] 4. difficult 
[ ] 5. very difficult 
 
2. In comparison with five years ago, your family lives in . . . 
conditions? 
 
(read the options) 
[ ] 1. a lot better 
[ ] 2. better 
[ ] 3. similar 
[ ] 4. worse 
[ ] 5. a lot worse 
 
 
F. Livestock 
 
1. Do you have cattle?  [ ] 1. yes . .. [ ] 0. no 
 
2. How many . . . do you have?  
a. Cows b. Heifer c. Bull calf d. Young calf e. Bullock f. Bull 
      
 
3. How many . . . do you have? 
a. Pigs b. Chicken c. Turkey d. Duck e. Other:  
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Appendix 6: Network Survey 
We now ask you about the social relations you have with the other households in 
the village. We have here a pile of cards. Each card represents a household of 
the village. All households are included in this pile of cards. For each household 
we will ask you whether you have a social relation with one of its members. If 
you have a social relation, we will ask you to specify the type of relation. For 
this, we first explain you all possible types of social relations. 
 
Household 
Do you 
know? 
1. yes 
0. no 
Relation? 
1. yes 
0. no 
 Household Name Sex Code Description 
1   
2   
 
  M - F   
3   
4   
 
  M - F   
6   
8   
 
  M - F   
9   
10   
 
  M - F   
11   
13   
 
  M - F   
14   
15   
 
  M - F   
16   
17   
18   
 
  M - F   
19   
20   
21   
22   
Codes: 
1. Land rental 2. Labour transaction 3. Religion 4. 
Politics 5. School 6. Sports 7. Cooperatives 8. 
Projects 9. Neighbours 10. Family 11. Health 12. 
Friendship 13. Support 14. Commercial relation 15. 
Other, specify 
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 5 
Social Capital Formation and Economic Inequality: 
A Laboratory Study 
Chapter 5 
Social Capital Formation and Economic Inequality 
1. Introduction47 
The results in the previous chapter confirmed that social ties are very important 
in distributive decision making and exclusionary processes. We also observed 
that the economically-poorer agents have a lower likelihood of having a social 
tie with other members in their community, which puts them at a disadvantage 
when economic resources or opportunities are distributed. To identify the 
correlations between social ties and economic variables, we implicitly assumed 
that social ties are dichotomous, and we looked at them in a static way. In 
reality, however, social ties are not dichotomous and static. They vary in 
intensity and may be under a continuous process of adaptation. Considering 
one’s friendship ties, for instance, in most cases they are not all equally intense. 
Some friendship ties may be very intense, whereas others may be less intense. 
Moreover, some friendship ties dissolve with time while new ones are formed. 
 In this chapter, we will re-examine the relation between economic inequal-
ity and social ties, following these more realistic assumptions. In particular, we 
study the influence of economic inequality on the formation of social ties and 
allow for variable tie intensity. For this, we look at the individual decision 
making behind the formation of social ties. The underlying assumption is that 
social ties have a functional value from which people obtain benefits, and that 
                                                        
47 I thank Hermann Brandstaetter for the support on the measurement and analysis of the personal-
ity characteristics of the participants in the experiment. I benefited from comments of colleagues at 
MU on the experimental design. I also thank Jeroen Weesie and Vincent Buskens of the Utrecht 
School of Economics and participants at a BEE meeting at MU for comments on earlier versions of 
this chapter. 
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people form social ties because they conceive of them as investments from 
which they expect a return (Lin, 2001). 
 An important type of social tie, consistent with this conceptualization and 
which we will focus on in this chapter, is that formed through the exchange of 
favours. A favour can be understood as support that is given to a person who 
has requested this support, and the future repayment of which is indefinite. 
Support-giving in this form is a common transaction in small-scale societies. 
Examples extend from personal recommendations or information sharing on the 
job floor in companies in well-developed economies, to lending small amounts 
of money, labour and/or food in rural villages confronted with extreme poverty. 
 To study the formation of networks of social ties through exchanges of 
favours and the influence of economic inequality, we conduct an experimental 
repeated ‘favour game’ with groups of six players. In each round, one player is 
randomly selected to have the opportunity to request support from one or more 
of the other five players. Each player who is asked for support decides on the 
amount of support to give, which is then multiplied with an efficiency factor. 
We also ask the participants for the support they expect to receive. This enables 
us to obtain better insights into reciprocity and trust, two closely-related 
behavioural motives behind support-giving. Economic inequality is introduced 
in the experiment by allocating different endowments to the participants at the 
beginning of each round. 
 Our experimental favour game bears some resemblance to the intensively-
studied trust game. Also, recent extensions to this trust game; that allow for 
repeated play, endogenous partner selection and economic inequality, have 
identified mechanisms that are at work in our favour game. An important 
distinguishing feature of our experiment, however, relates to the variable time 
interval between the different transfers. According to our experimental results, 
this has an important behavioural influence, suggesting that people follow 
certain ‘equality matching’ over time. 
 Other results of our experiment confirm that both the decisions to request 
support and to give support are influenced by direct reciprocity motives and by 
the individual expectations about future returns, which corroborate our concep-
tualization of social ties as investments from which people expect a return. 
Furthermore, we observe that both expected returns and direct reciprocity are 
somewhat biased by economic inequality. In particular, low-endowment players 
expect high-endowment players to return more support than other low-
endowment players. This explains why they give more support to high-
endowment players. We also observe that they are more likely to request 
support from high-endowment players than from other low-endowment players. 
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At the same time, high-endowment players give more support to low-
endowment players than they receive from them. This difference becomes 
greater the larger the most recent support they received from low-endowment 
players. This bias in reciprocity and expected returns lies at the basis of certain 
centralization in the formed networks. It also explains why in the inequality 
treatment we observe low and high-support paths. Whereas most groups evolve 
towards very low support levels, equal or lower than the lowest levels in the 
equality treatment, groups with high support given early in the game evolve 
towards very high support levels, exceeding the highest support levels in the 
equality treatment. 
2. Related literature 
Since the seminal work of Putnam et al. (1993), the concept of social capital has 
been intensively debated in the social sciences48. A large part of this debate has 
evolved around the conceptualization of social capital, and different, often 
competing, theories have been formed. Despite the very different views on 
social capital, according to Lin (2001) there is a premise which is consistent 
with most social capital theories, and which amounts to “investment in social 
relations with expected returns in the marketplace”. Whatever the type of 
marketplace (e.g. economic, political, community, etc.), people form social ties 
because they expect a return from doing so. 
 Investing in a social tie requires making oneself vulnerable to exploitation 
by others, so that a minimum level of ‘trust’ is needed for the investment to be 
made. We, therefore, expect trust and social ties to be closely-related. Conse-
quently, investments in social ties show some resemblance to the intensively-
studied trust game (Berg et al., 1995; for a recent overview of trust game 
experiments, see Ostrom & Walker, 2003) and the similar gift-exchange game 
(Fehr et al., 1998; Brandts & Charness, 2004)49. Therefore, in the rest of this 
section we will briefly review the experimental trust game literature and its 
findings on trust formation. We will pay attention to some recent extensions that 
have allowed for repeated play, endogenous partner selection and economic 
                                                        
48 For empirical evidence on the role of social capital in development and poverty reduction, see 
Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002). 
49 The formation of social ties has also been experimentally studied in the context of public good 
games. Sonnemans et al. (2006) and Van Dijk et al. (2002) found that participants, after having 
played a public good game, were found to have more intense social ties with participants who had 
contributed more to the public good. 
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inequality, and that have identified mechanisms that are also at work with social 
tie formation through favour-giving. Thereafter, we review some elements that 
distinguish favour-giving from trust games. 
 In the trust game, one player (the trustor) receives a fixed amount of 
resources, part or all of which he/she can transfer to a second player (the 
trustee). The transferred amount is increased and the second player, then, has to 
decide how much to return to the first player. Standard economic theory predicts 
that the second player would not return anything, and the first player, anticipat-
ing this, would not transfer anything in the first place. This assumes an absence 
of reciprocity and trust. Evidence in experimental labs, however, has shown that 
people have a non-negligible initial trust in other people, as considerable 
proportions (50% in the one-shot trust game) are transferred by the trusters. On 
average 95% of the initially invested amount is returned (Camerer, 2003). 
Recently, extensions have been made to this basic trust game, which allow for 
repeated play, endogenous partner selection and economic inequality. Through 
these extensions, mechanisms have been identified that are also at work with 
social tie formation through favour-giving. We will briefly review them in the 
rest of this section. 
 Recently, repeated trust game experiments have been conducted. Compar-
ing it with the one-shot trust game allows the identification of those mechanisms 
responsible for the reinforcement or break-down of trust. Cochard et al. (2004) 
used a repeated trust game with fixed pairs of players and compared it with a 
one-shot trust game. They showed that more is sent (75% vs. 50%) and returned 
(56% vs. 38%) in comparison with the one-shot trust game (for a similar result 
on gift-exchange, see Falk et al., 1999). Moreover, at the end of the game, 
returning behaviour is again similar to the one-shot experiment. They argue that 
this confirms that, besides reciprocity, strategic anticipation remains important 
in repeated trust games. Moreover, Engle-Warnick & Slonim (2006) showed 
that trust reinforcement needs time, and that it increases with the length of 
repeated trust games. Players who play longer trust games learn that trusting and 
reciprocating pays and will, in this sense, adapt their strategies. 
 In her field experiments in Zimbabwe, Barr (1999) also identified the 
importance of successful reciprocation on trust levels. She played the trust game 
in both resettled and non-resettled villages, and observed significantly less-
trusting behaviour in resettled villages. She attributed this result to ‘a lack of 
familiarity and to the consequentially greater uncertainty faced by resettled 
villagers when trying to predict each other’s behaviour in strategic situations’. 
 Whereas in the one-shot trust game the trustor is driven by trust and the 
trustee by reciprocity, in a repeated setting both trust and reciprocity may be 
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important for all players. In a repeated setting, the support the trustee receives 
not only influences the support he/she will return through some reciprocity 
motive. The trustee may also consider the support he/she receives as returned 
support, which may influence his/her trust as a belief about the support the 
trustor will reciprocate. Consequently, it becomes difficult to distinguish 
between reciprocity and trust. Actually, both motives are intrinsically related. In 
a repeated setting, trust is updated by what people have received in previous 
interaction. As Alesina & La Ferrara (2002: 209) put it: “... trust may be based 
on past experience. One trusts others if he is used to be treated fairly by his 
fellow men. This is a sort of a reciprocity argument for trust.” 
 In contrast with most trust games where the trustor is randomly paired with 
one trustee, in reality people themselves select the persons they request support 
from. Recent experimental trust game studies on the influence of endogenous 
partner selection are interesting in this respect. Bornhorst et al. (2004) played a 
repeated trust game with multiple players. In each round players can freely 
choose one and only one of the other players with whom to interact. In their 
experiment, the amounts sent are higher than in the one-shot game (also con-
firmed by Eckel & Wilson, 2000), and people tend to interchange more, the 
more rounds they manage to continue reciprocating with each other. 
 A final extension to the basic trust game, which might be of interest for our 
study, relates to the influence of economic inequality between trustor and 
trustee. When behaving reciprocally or trusting others, people may also take 
account of their economic position relative to others, possibly causing a bias in 
reciprocity and trust. Only recently, however, has trust game literature started to 
pay attention to inequality and other-regarding preferences. This interest came 
with the doubts thrown on the explanatory power of trust and trustworthiness in 
trust games. More particularly, trust-like behaviour in trust games might also be 
explained by social preferences instead of real trust (i.e. as an expectation of 
reciprocity by the trustee). The investments made by trustors in trust games 
might be the result of both trusting other people (that they would reciprocate) 
and (outcome-based) other-regarding preferences. Also, the return by the 
trustees might be the result of both reciprocity and other-regarding preferences.  
 Gneezy et al. (2000) confirmed the importance of trust and reciprocity in 
the trust game. By varying the upper bound on repayments for the trustees, they 
observed more trusting behaviour in treatments with higher possible repayments. 
At the same time, they did not completely refute the distributional preferences 
hypothesis. Cox (2004) elaborated a triadic design to disentangle both effects for 
single-game trust experiments. He observed significant explanatory power of 
trust, reciprocity and social preferences. 
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 In trust game experiments with economic (endowment) inequality, social 
preferences might come more into prominence, which might also influence trust 
and reciprocity. Interesting questions become then, whether an economically 
worse-off player should always reciprocate a favour, and if not, whether the 
better-off would then be inclined to offer support to the worse-off, in the first 
place. A similar question would be whether economically better-off players 
reciprocate more than worse-off players, and if this is the case whether worse-
off players would therefore invest more in the better-off. 
 An important trust game experiment that allows for inequality is Brülhart & 
Usunier (2004). They conducted a one-shot trust game experiment with different 
show-up fees. They let trustors play simultaneously with a poor and a rich 
trustee. They did not find a significant negative relationship between the amount 
transferred by the trustor and the trustee’s wealth. Anderson et al. (2005) also 
conducted a trust game experiment with economic inequality created by 
different show-up fees. Letting participants play a repeated trust game, with 
constant roles but with each player randomly re-paired each round, they did not 
find a statistically significant effect on the behaviour of the trustor, but they 
found that trustees with lower show-up fees return somewhat less. 
 An important feature which distinguishes ‘favour-giving’ from trust games 
and constitutes an important innovation in our research is related to the sequence 
of the different transfers. In contrast with trust games, every favour is not 
automatically followed by an opportunity for the opponent to reciprocate. With 
favour-giving the decision moment of the opponent is not determined a priori. 
Fate determines who is able to request support, and the person who is able to 
request support is not obliged to request support from the person he/she received 
support from. Thus, requesting support is an important condition for favour-
giving, which it is not for trust games. 
 This implies that the time interval between support-giving and support-
receiving is variable, and it is not guaranteed that every act of support is 
followed by an opportunity to reciprocate. For instance, before providing an 
opportunity to reciprocate, fate can attribute a second need for support to the 
same person. We expect that those who are able to request support in two 
consecutive occasions may receive lower levels of support the second time, if 
support was not yet reciprocated. As explained by Fiske (1992: 705), people 
tend to follow an ‘equality matching’ principle: “People think about how much 
they have to give to reciprocate or compensate others to come out even with 
them. Equality matching always entails some kind of additive tally of who owes 
what and who is entitled to what”.  
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 After this short literature review, we present in a next section the design of 
our experiment. Thereafter we present the empirical results. A final section 
summarizes our main results and concludes. 
3. Experimental design 
To experimentally study the formation of networks of social ties through favour-
giving and investigate how it is influenced by endowment inequality we set-up 
an experimental repeated favour game. We group participants in groups of six. 
Group composition remains unchanged. In each round, all players receive a 
constant and individual endowment, which is public knowledge. In each round, 
the computer randomly chooses one group member to be the ‘investment 
player’50, who is allowed to ask (at a positive but low cost) one or more of the 
other five players for support (called ‘support players’). Each support player that 
is asked for support can transfer part or all of his/her endowment to the ‘invest-
ment person’. Transferred resources are multiplied by 1.451. 
 
Each round consists of the following six steps: 
1° step:  The computer randomly selects the ‘investment player’ in the current 
round. 
2° step:  The investment player decides from whom of the other persons (‘sup-
port players’) to request support. Each request for support costs five 
‘francs’. Before taking this decision the investment player may review all 
past interactions he/she had with all other players. 
3° step: The investment player is asked how much he/she expects to receive 
from each of the players he/she asks for support. 
4° step: Each support player who is asked for support decides how much of 
his/her endowment to transfer to the ‘investment player’. Before taking this 
                                                        
50 In the experiment we told the participants that this person faces an investment opportunity for 
which he/she needs the support of the other group members. 
51 Note that this differs from the trust game where only the transfer from the trustor to the trustee 
entails an efficiency gain whereas the return from the trustee to the trustor does not. In our favor 
game, in contrast, every transfer is multiplied with an efficiency parameter. This is consistent with 
the fact that in each round we have a new investment opportunity, for which support from other 
group members is required. 
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decision each support player may review all past interactions he/she had 
with the other players. 
5° step:  After taking the support decision, each ‘support player’ is asked how 
much he/she expects the investment player to transfer to him/her when the 
roles would be reversed in one of the future rounds, i.e. when the support 
player faces an investment opportunity and asks the current investment 
player for support. 
6° step:  Each ‘investment player’ receives information on the transfers he/she 
received from the ‘support players’ he/she asked for support. The invest-
ment player’s ‘earnings’ are then equal to the total received support (after 
multiplication by 1.4) plus their endowment minus the costs of requesting 
support. 
 
The experiment lasts 30 rounds, which is public knowledge before the start of 
the experiment. To study the influence of economic inequality we organized two 
treatments52, one with economic equality and another with economic inequality. 
Economic inequality is introduced in the experiment by allocating different 
endowments to the participants at the beginning of each round. More particu-
larly: 
1-  Equal endowments: six participants receive 100 ‘francs’ each at the begin-
ning of each round 
2-  Unequal endowments: five participants receive 80 ‘francs’ each and one 
participant receives 200 ‘francs’ at the beginning of each round53. 
 
The endowment a player receives at the beginning of each round is fixed 
throughout all 30 rounds and is determined before the start of the first round in a 
                                                        
52 We guaranteed that the sequences of the randomly chosen investment players were pair wise the 
same between both treatments. In particular, for each group in the equality treatment we have a 
group in the inequality treatment with the same sequence of randomly selected investment players. 
That these sequences were prepared before the start of the experiment does not imply any form of 
deception, because this does not change that investment players were indeed selected randomly, as 
was explained to the participants in the instructions (see appendix 1 for instructions and proce-
dures). 
53 As we want to isolate the effect of inequality the total endowment in each group (600 ‘francs’) is 
the same in both treatments. 
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completely arbitrary way54. Information on these endowments is public. To 
reduce spill-over effects from support decisions (e.g. through imitation), 
information on the support transfers is private. This information is only accessi-
ble for the players directly involved. In other words, the investment player 
obtains information on the support received from individual support players and 
the support players have information on the support they have given but not on 
the support the other players have given. 
 As we expect personality characteristics of the participants to influence 
their decision-making in this experiment, we included a list of personality 
questions in the post-experimental questionnaire, which was created and tested 
by Brandstätter (1988; see also Brandstätter & Königstein, 2001). Students are 
asked to self-report on their personality on 16 primary personality adjective 
scales, which are converted into 5 global personality dimensions (see appendix 2 
for a description of the global personality dimensions)55. Before the experiment, 
subjects also participated in a circle test (Offerman et al., 1996) to measure their 
social value orientation towards a ‘generalized other’. 
 The experiment was conducted in the behavioural computer lab of Maas-
tricht University in spring 2006. It was computerized using Z-tree software 
(Fischbacher, 2007). In total 132 students participated in 22 groups, most of 
them students in economics and business administration, all at Maastricht 
University. Average age was 22.5 with a minimum of 18 and maximum of 34. 
53% of the participants were male. Students had not participated in a similar 
experiment before. Each session took between 90 and 120 minutes and average 
earnings were 17.91 Euros, with the highest earnings 36.80 Euros and lowest 
earnings 11.40 Euros. More detailed experimental procedures and the instruc-
tions can be found in Appendix 1. 
4. Empirical findings 
This empirical section is structured in the following way. We start with some 
descriptive statistics. We then proceed with an analysis of the density of the 
formed networks of social ties and its evolution over time. Thereafter, we look 
                                                        
54 Thus, inequality is difficult to justify morally. In reality, however, it is common that economic 
inequality is justified by certain actors. This might reduce the influence of inequality. Therefore, we 
decide to include this somewhat more extreme case (where economic inequality is determined ad 
random) and to compare it with a situation with complete equality. 
55 This list can be filled in within a short period of time (5 minutes) and is therefore very useful as 
part of a post-experimental questionnaire. 
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at the determinants of individual decision-making behind social tie formation. 
Recall that the formation of a directed tie between two agents is made by two 
consecutive decisions. First, the investment player has to ask a support player 
for support, and second, conditional on being asked for support the support 
player decides on the amount of support to give. Both decisions will be exam-
ined in two consecutive subsections. We then return to the density of the formed 
networks and use our findings on individual decision-making to explain the 
large diversity across groups we observed. Finally, we look at the implications 
of individual decision-making for the network structures and the final economic 
distribution between the group members. 
 Pooling all support decisions over all rounds and players, Table 5.1 presents 
the mean and the standard deviations of the given support and the expected 
return, grouped by the different combinations of the endowments of support 
player and investment player56. The following observations are important. First, 
the average support 80-endowment players give to 200-endowment players, 
S(80-200)57, is clearly higher than the average support they give to other 80-
endowment players, S(80-80). Second, the support 80-endowment players 
expect to receive from 200-endowment players is substantially higher in 
comparison with the other endowment combinations. Third, in all endowment 
combinations except for 200-80 the expected returns are higher than the given 
support. 200-endowment players expect to receive less from 80-endowment 
players than what they give to them. Putting all observations together, this 
suggests that inequality exerts an important influence on the support that is 
given and the support that is expected to receive in return. 
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Treatment Equality Inequality 
 100 – 100 80 – 80 80 – 200 200 – 80 
Mean support (st.dev.) 
31.61 
(30.41) 
22.49 
(23.16) 
31.96 
(27.51) 
37.10 
(28.86) 
Mean expected return (st.dev.) 
36.40 
(31.46) 
29.35 
(25.85) 
50.78 
(44.24) 
33.07 
(25.02) 
    
                                                        
56 For all empirical analyses in this chapter, support is measured before multiplication by the 
efficiency factor, unless otherwise stated. 
57 S(x-y) refers to the support players with endowment x give to players with endowment y. 
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4.1. The evolution of network density 
In this section, we look at the density of the formed networks of social ties and 
compare it between both treatments. To study the social ties in our favour game, 
we need to take account of two aspects that are important for each (directed) tie: 
1) whether player j requests support from player i in a certain round t, i.e. 
1=tjir , otherwise 0=tjir  
2) the amount of support tijs player i gives to player j in round t. 
While the first variable is dichotomous, the second is ‘continuous’ and allows us 
to study the strength of a directed tie. To study a directed tie tijd  from i to j over 
time, we apply the following updating formula: 
1−= tijtij dd  if 0=tjir  
t
ij
t
ij sd =  if 1=tjir  
with 1=tjir  if player j has an investment opportunity and asks player i for 
support, otherwise 0=tjir . Thus, if j faces an investment opportunity but does 
not request support from i, we assume that the tie strength remains unchanged. 
The reason for this is that the trust relation is not put to the test and therefore the 
tie strength is expected to remain constant58. 
 As a measure of the density of the formed networks of social ties, we use 
the group aggregated tie strength, i.e. the sum of the intensities of all directed 
ties in a group. We normalized this variable by the maximum attainable group 
aggregated tie strength, taking into account that only players that have had an 
investment opportunity are able to receive support. Figure 5.1 plots this variable 
for each group over time and by treatment. 
 The following observations are important. First, in the last 5 rounds, group 
aggregated tie strength sharply declines. This indicates that favours are only 
important as long as the game is repeated. Once the end of the game comes close 
support players may anticipate that they will not receive anything in return 
anymore. This is consistent with the premise that social capital is formed by 
investments in social relations. Social relations have a functional value as long 
                                                        
58 One could argue that the tie strength between an investment player and a particular support 
player decreases if the investment player when having a new investment opportunity does not 
request support again from the support player. However, as we will see in next section, the average 
probability that an investment player does not request support again from a particular support 
player when he/she has already done so in a previous investment opportunity is very low (around 
20%) and decreases the more support he/she has received before from the support player. 
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as they are profitable (Lin, 2001). That is why support levels drop once their 
expected return decreases, which is the case at the end of the game. 
 Second, we observe large variation across the groups. In both treatments, 
there are groups that reach a considerably high level, with levels of up to about 
50% of the maximum attainable level, whereas other groups remain at very low 
levels. 
 
Figure 5.1. The evolution of group aggregated tie strength 
  
Third, we observe that in the inequality treatment most groups have support 
levels that are equal or lower than the lowest support levels in the equality 
treatment. Average levels, however, are not significantly different between both 
treatments. Calculating for each group the average group aggregated tie strength 
between rounds 15 and 2559, this variable is not significantly different between 
both treatments (Mann-Whitney U = 46.0; two-sided P = .365). This is the result 
of a few groups in the inequality treatment which attain support levels that are 
even higher than the highest support levels in the equality treatment (the thick 
line in Figure 5.1). 
 In other words, in the inequality treatment one can identify low and high 
trajectories. Consequently, when studying the influence of inequality on the 
formation of social ties, it becomes crucial to know what conditions drive an 
economically unequal group to a higher or a lower support path. We will come 
back to this question at the end of this empirical section, after having studied 
individual decision-making behind support-giving and support-requesting. 
                                                        
59 We select these rounds, as we expect social ties to be most stable then. After round 25 directed 
tie intensities tend to drop drastically, whereas before round 15 support decisions may be relatively 
more volatile as some players have not had any investment opportunity yet. 
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4.2. Requesting support 
As explained before, the formation of a directed tie tijd  from player i to player j 
depends on two consecutive decisions. First, player j when facing an investment 
opportunity has to decide whether to ask player i for support. Second, only then 
can player i decide on the amount of support to give to j. In our analysis, we deal 
separately with both decisions. In this section, we address what drives people to 
ask a particular other group member for support, whereas in the next section we 
look at the determinants behind support-giving conditional on being asked for 
support. 
 
Table 5.2. Number of requests for support when facing an investment opportunity 
 # Percent 
0 9 1.36% 
1 17 2.58% 
2 67 10.15% 
3 116 17.58% 
4 144 21.82% 
5 307 46.52% 
Total 660 100.00% 
Note. Pooling all investment opportunities over all groups, rounds and both treatments 
 
Table 5.2 indicates that in about half of the cases investment players request 
support from all five other players in their group. This may not be too surprising, 
given the low cost of asking another person for support (only 5 ‘francs’ for each 
support request) and the potentially high benefits. In the other half of the cases 
the investment player does not request support from all other group members. At 
the dyad level, in 20.91% of the potential requests for support (660 x 5 = 3300) 
the investment player does not ask the support player for support. As requesting 
support is a necessary condition for ties to be formed at all, it is of interest to 
study what drives an investment person to request support from a particular 
other group member. 
 For this, we examine a probit regression model with the following explana-
tory variables. First, we control for the support received the previous time the 
investment person had requested support from that group member. Given the 
nature of social capital as investments in social ties, we expect that the lower the 
support received from a support person, the less inclined an investment player 
will be to ask this person for support again. Second, investment players may 
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follow a certain reciprocity logic when requesting support from support players. 
In particular, an investment player may be more reluctant to request support 
from a particular group member if the latter has never asked him/her for support 
before while having the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, we add dummies for 
the endowments of both the investment person and the group member that may 
be asked for support. We also add time dummies and we control for the person-
ality characteristics60 of the investment person. 
 Before presenting the results, we provide some details about the model 
estimation. The error terms of all decisions of a specific support-giver tend to be 
correlated due to omitted variables. Due to the random sequence of the invest-
ment player selection and the fact that investment players do not necessarily 
request the support from all other group members our data are too unbalanced to 
estimate a panel data model. For that reason we correct for the dependencies of 
the errors in another way. To guarantee correct standard errors, we use robust 
(Huber-White) standard errors61. As decisions of different players may also be 
correlated within the same group, we decide to use robust standard errors at the 
group level instead of the individual level. The same procedure will be applied 
to all other regression models in this chapter. 
 Table 5.3 shows the results of a probit regression, which estimates the 
probability that an investment person requests support from a particular group 
member. We estimate two separate models: one model with only the dyads 
where the investment person has not yet requested support from the other group 
member, and a second model with only the dyads where the investment player 
has already requested support at least once before from the other group member. 
We do this, because we can only control for the ‘most recent support received’ 
(an important variable we expect to influence the investment player’s decision), 
if the investment player has already requested support from the other group 
member before. 
 In the first model, we observe that the probability that ‘ego’ requests 
support from ‘alter’ is 25.8% lower if ‘alter’ has not requested support from 
                                                        
60 In another model (not shown) we also controlled for the age and the sex of the investment player. 
Coefficients were not significant and close to zero, whereas the model was robust to adding these 
variables. We therefore do not include them in this model. 
61 We could make specific assumptions about the type of autocorrelation between the decisions of 
the same investment player. However, as the selection of investment player is completely at 
random, autocorrelation can have a very complex structure. We therefore prefer not to make any 
assumptions about autocorrelation in the model and we use robust standard errors, which deals in a 
conservative way with these dependencies. 
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‘ego’ before but had the opportunity to do so, i.e. he/she had an investment 
opportunity. The same effect is present in the second model. 
 Previously received support is an important determinant of requesting 
support again (model 2). The larger the previously received support the higher 
the probability of requesting support again. This is consistent with the conceptu-
alization of social capital as investment in social ties. People seem to select 
deliberately people with whom they can make profits. 
 
Table 5.3. Requesting support in directed ties 
 Model 1. Model 2. 
Had already requested support before? No Yes 
 
Marg. 
Prob. S.E. 
Marg. 
Prob. S.E. 
Alter did not ask for support but had the opportunity -0.258 0.126** -0.320 0.073*** 
Most recent received support  – – 0.006 0.001*** 
100 – 100 (dummy) -0.117 0.119 -0.027 0.070 
80 – 80 (dummy) -0.259 0.063*** -0.058 0.087 
200 – 80 (dummy) -0.135 0.093 -0.071 0.053 
Personality (self-control) 0.010 0.038 0.009 0.016 
Personality (anxiety) -0.030 0.016 -0.006 0.009 
Personality (independence) 0.031 0.015** -0.002 0.012 
Personality (tough-mindedness) -0.010 0.039 -0.040 0.013*** 
Personality (extraversion) 0.015 0.024 -0.006 0.011 
Round 6-10 (dummy) -0.052 0.080 0.114 0.022*** 
Round 11-15 (dummy) -0.246 0.084 0.091 0.037** 
Round 16-20 (dummy) -0.337 0.137*** 0.085 0.035** 
Round 21-25 (dummy) -0.477 0.229*** 0.044 0.035 
Round 26-30 (dummy) -0.736 0.049** -0.069 0.049 
N 704  1996  
Pseudo R-squared 0.1986  0.1768  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  0.0000  
Wald chi2 507.90  634.38  
Observed probability .7386  .7921  
Note. Probit regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations. 
Significance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
We also observe that, when support is requested for the first time (model 1), 80-
endowment players have a 25.9% lower probability to request support from 
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another 80-endowment player than from a 200-endowment player. This suggests 
that they expect to receive more support from 200-endowment players. As we 
only have data on the expected support for those who decided to request support, 
we cannot do any test on this. However, as will be demonstrated later, similar 
differences in expectations are observed when they have to decide on the 
support to give before having had a possibility to request support.  
 This endowment effect disappears once support has already been requested 
before (model 2). We can assume that the investment player when having 
requested support before, did so because he/she expected to receive sufficient 
support from the support player, so that possible differences in expectations 
between high and low-endowment player are not determinant anymore when 
deciding to request support (again). 
 Other interesting results are related to the influence of the individual 
characteristics of the investment player. According to the regression results, 
people with higher values on ‘independence’ are more inclined to request 
support from a particular group member if they have not done so before. As 
suggested by the description of this personality characteristic in appendix 2, this 
may be due to their lower inhibition by social considerateness or fear of con-
flicts. In the second model we observe that keeping all other variables constant 
investment players with higher values on ‘tough-mindedness’ are somewhat less 
likely to request support from a particular support player if they have already 
done so before. They are thus more likely to switch their decision. Support 
players may interpret such behaviour as a signal that their behaviour was not 
approved of by the investment player. As suggested by the description of this 
personality characteristic in appendix 2, ‘tough-minded’ people have lower 
empathy and may therefore care less about such possible interpretation by the 
other group member. 
 Furthermore, we observe that the probability of requesting support changes 
over time. In the first model, time has a negative effect on the probability of 
requesting support. The more rounds have passed while the investment player 
has not yet requested support from a particular group member, the less likely it 
becomes that the investment person will still request support. Moreover, the 
probability of requesting support sharply declines in the last five rounds, where 
it becomes 70% less likely that support is requested in comparison with the first 
five rounds. This suggests that investment players anticipate an end-game effect. 
It is very unlikely that investment players suddenly request support in the last 
rounds if they have not done before and if they anticipate support levels to 
decline in the last rounds (see more on this in next section). 
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 In the second model, we observe that in comparison with the first five 
rounds, the probability that the investment player requests support becomes 10% 
higher after round 5 up to round 20. If an investment player within the first five 
rounds has to decide whether to ask a particular group member for support while 
he/she has already requested support from this person before, the same invest-
ment person faces two investment opportunities in a relatively short term. The 
results suggest that on average investment persons are relatively less inclined to 
ask the same group member two times for support in such a relatively short time 
period. This confirms that certain ‘equality matching’ over time is taken into 
account by the investment player. Furthermore, in the last ten rounds this 
difference with the first five rounds disappears. The probability of requesting 
support again from a particular support player declines due to an anticipated 
end-game effect and is therefore not significantly different anymore from the 
first five rounds. 
4.3. Giving support 
In this section, we examine determinants of support-giving62. A first important 
element people may consider when deciding on the amount of support to give is 
their expectations about future returns. Moreover, based on the large experimen-
tal literature which confirms the importance of reciprocity in human interaction, 
we also expect reciprocity to be an important determinant behind support-
giving. The influence of these determinants might be contingent on the number 
of investment opportunities one has had before, because expectations about 
future returns can only be updated when a player faces an investment opportu-
nity and asks other players for support. 
 For these reasons, when looking at these and other determinants of support-
giving we structure this section in the following way. In a first subsection we 
study whether there is a general upwards or downwards tendency of support-
giving by the number of investment opportunities one has had before. We then 
build explanatory models on support-giving (both in absolute and relative terms) 
and its difference with expected returns. Here we differentiate between the 
situation before and after having had the first investment opportunity, as only 
after having received support for the first time, may reciprocity start to influence 
                                                        
62 The analyses in this section look at support-giving and thus only consider those cases where a 
support player is asked for support by the investment player. 
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individual decision-making. These situations will be separately studied in a 
second and third subsection. 
a. Support-giving and the number of preceding investment opportunities 
In this section, we test whether there is a general influence of the number of 
preceding investment opportunities on individual support decisions. For this, we 
compare the average support levels by the number of preceding investment 
opportunities of the support player63. As individual support decisions are not 
independent within a group, we look at group averages. In addition, we disag-
gregate this variable for the different endowment combinations of support player 
and investment player. 
 
Figure 5.2. Support and preceding investment opportunities 
 
                                                        
63 We only include support decisions before round 25 to exclude any end-game effect. From this 
round onwards it becomes more likely that one ends with supporting other persons without 
receiving a return. Round 25 may be focal as from this round there are still 6 rounds to go, equal to 
the number of players in each group. 
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Figure 5.2 shows a box-plot of the group averages of the given support by the 
number of preceding investment opportunities and by endowment combination. 
In the 100-100 endowment combination, we observe a positive and significant 
correlation between the support levels and the number of investment opportuni-
ties the support player had before (Spearman’s rho = 0.596; two-sided P = .000). 
This upwards tendency of support-giving with each investment opportunity, 
may be the result of the fact that trust formation requires time. Part of these 
dynamics may also be due to the fact that – as previously confirmed – people 
who give little support are not asked for support again and therefore are ex-
cluded from the observations. In the inequality treatment, in contrast, this 
correlation is much lower and statistically insignificant for all endowment 
combinations (for 80-80 Spearman’s rho = 0.106, two-sided P = .495; for 80-
200 Spearman’s rho = 0.047, two-sided P = .766; for 200-80 Spearman’s rho = 
0.099, two-sided P = .572). 
b. Support-giving before first investment opportunity 
To study the individual decision-making behind support-giving before the first 
investment opportunity, we pool all support decisions before the support 
players’ first investment opportunity over all rounds and both treatments. We 
estimate three different OLS models, all having the same explanatory variables 
but each with a different dependent variable. In the first two models, we 
examine the support provided by the support player in absolute terms and in 
terms relative to his/her endowment. In a third model we look at the difference 
between the given support and the expected support in return. This model gives 
us insight in the importance of expected returns when support players decide on 
the amount of support to give. 
 In each model we control for the endowment combination of support player 
and investment player. The benchmark endowment combination is the situation 
where support is given by 80-endowment players to 200-endowment players. 
We also control for sex, age and personality characteristics of the support player. 
Here we also control for the decisions made in the circle test. In particular, we 
use the angle of the distribution decision made in this social value orientation 
test, with a higher angle indicating a higher orientation towards a ‘generalized 
other’. 
 Finally, we control for the number of times the support player has given 
support before to the current investment player (‘Times support before’). Due to 
the randomness of the selection of the investment player it is possible that a 
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specific support player is repeatedly asked for support by the same player while 
the support player has not yet had any investment opportunity. If support players 
follow certain ‘equality matching’ over time we expect that support players who 
have not had any investment opportunity will lower their support the more times 
the investment player has asked them for support before. 
 
Table 5.4. Support given before first investment opportunity 
 Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. 
 Support 
Support / own 
endowment 
Support – expected 
return 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
100 – 100 (dummy) -5.305 3.303 -0.123 0.034*** 18.654 6.304*** 
80 – 80 (dummy) -11.598 2.078*** -0.143 0.024*** 13.179 4.739** 
200 – 80 (dummy) 6.116 8.042 -0.146 0.064** 30.765 9.149*** 
Angle circle test 0.100 0.082 0.001 0.001* -0.046 0.077 
Personality (self-control) -3.643 1.343** -0.027 0.012** -0.427 1.615 
Personality (anxiety) -3.781 1.237*** -0.032 0.012** 0.096 0.864 
Personality (independence) 3.201 1.070*** 0.036 0.013** 0.330 1.416 
Personality (tough-mindedness) -3.136 1.978 -0.028 0.020 5.712 3.313 
Personality (extraversion) 2.143 1.652 0.028 0.017 -0.472 1.082 
Sex (1 = male; 0 = female) 14.372 4.187*** 0.156 0.043*** -3.392 4.304 
Age -1.094 0.593* -0.010 0.006 -1.008 1.273 
Times support before -4.041 1.232*** -0.043 0.013*** -11.112 4.355** 
Constant 74.868 26.866** 0.633 0.261** -12.943 22.304 
N 382  382  382  
R-squared 0.3249  0.3298  0.3183  
F 27.68  60.57  10.12  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Note. OLS regression with robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations. Signifi-
cance levels (two-sided): * = 10%, ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the regression results. Looking at the influence of the endow-
ment variables in the three models, we observe that 80-endowment players give 
on average 11 ‘francs’ less to other 80-endowment players than what they give 
to 200-endowment players. When looking at support relative to the endowment 
of the support giver (model 2) we observe that 80-endowment players do not 
only give larger proportions of their endowment to 200-endowment players in 
comparison with what they give to other 80-endowment players. They also give 
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larger proportions of their endowment to 200-endowment players in comparison 
with 100-100 and 200-80.  
 According to the mean predicted value of the difference between the given 
support and the expected return (model 3), which is equal to -9.3377, support 
players expect on average to receive 9 ‘francs’ more in return than what they 
give. Model 3 indicates that this difference is larger when 80-endowment 
players give support to 200-endowment players, as confirmed by the significant 
positive coefficients of the endowment dummy variables. This suggests that 
their relatively higher support to 200-endowment players is the result of the 
higher profits they expect to obtain from supporting 200-endowment players. 
 Other interesting results are the influence of the individual characteristics of 
the support player. The regression results indicate that support players with a 
high value on ‘independence’ give more support to the investment person, both 
in absolute and relative terms. As suggested in appendix 2, these support players 
have a dominant personality. They give much support, imposing their will to 
receive much in return, i.e. they disregard that by giving support they oblige 
other people to reciprocate. People with a high value on ‘self-control’ or on 
‘anxiety’ tend to give less support, both in absolute and relative terms. Self-
control induces support players not to start with very high support levels, 
whereas anxiety by its affinity with risk aversion makes support players wary of 
the potential losses of giving support to the investment person. 
 The influence of the angle of the circle test is only significant in the second 
model. People with a higher social value orientation towards a ‘generalized 
other’ tend to give more support relative to what they are able to give. We also 
observe that sex is important. Male participants tend to give on average 14 
‘francs’ more. This effect also remains when measuring support in relative 
terms. This is consistent with previous experimental studies that confirmed that 
male participants are less risk averse (Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Gupta et al., 
2005). 
 Finally, the results confirm that people also follow certain ‘equality 
matching’ over time. Keeping all other variables constant, the more times the 
support player has given support to the current investment person before, the 
less support he/she tends to give to this investment person, both in absolute and 
relative terms, and as confirmed by model 3 the more he/she expects to receive 
in return from this investment person in the future. 
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c. Support-giving after first investment opportunity 
After looking at what drives individual agents when making support decisions 
before having had their first opportunity to receive support, we look here at 
additional motives that enter individual decision-making after having had at 
least one investment opportunity before. One such behavioural motive that we 
expect to influence support-giving is ‘reciprocity’. What people received before 
from a specific group member may influence support-giving to this person when 
he/she requests support. 
 To study reciprocity we estimated the support given to the current invest-
ment player as a function of the most recently received support64 from that 
investment player. To test whether reciprocity depends on the endowment of the 
players involved we add endowment dummies and interaction terms between the 
received support and these endowment dummies. We also add time dummies to 
control for any time trend. 
 The results reported in Table 5.5 confirm that the most recent support 
received from the current investment person is a very important determinant 
when support players have to decide on the support to give to this investment 
person, both in absolute and relative terms. The strength of the reciprocal 
relation is also partly influenced by the endowment of both support player and 
investment player, as indicated by the significant interaction effect between the 
most recently received support and the 200-80 dummy. The marginal effect of 
the most recent support is 0.118 higher for support decisions taken by 200-
endowment players in comparison with decisions made by 80-endowment 
players on the support to give to 200-endowment players. At the same time, the 
200-80 dummy is also a significant determinant for the support given in absolute 
terms. Combining both results, we conclude that 200-endowment players give 
more to 80-endowment players than what the latter give to 200-endowment 
players, and that this difference becomes larger, the larger the most recent 
support 200-endowment players received from 80-endowment players. 
                                                        
64 We look at the most recent support because it is the most salient. We do not exclude the 
possibility that also other less recent support might still exert an influence on current support-
giving. 
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 This bias in reciprocity is also reflected in the expectations about the 
returned support. In model 3, we observe that the difference between given 
support and expected return, which has a predicted mean value of -5.04, is 
significantly more negative for 80-endowment players who give support to 200-
endowment players in comparison with the inverse situation (and also compared 
with 80-80 and 100-100). This combined with the bias in reciprocity indicates 
that both 80-endowment and 200-endowment players have realistic expectations 
about the support to receive from each other. 
 Furthermore, the results confirm that also after their first investment 
opportunity male support players continue to give more support than female 
support players, both in absolute and relative terms65. 
 Finally, as was already indicated in Figure 5.1, the regression results 
indicate a strong end-game effect behind the support decisions, both in absolute 
and relative terms. Looking at the difference between the given support and the 
expected return in model 3, we observe that this difference starts to change 
already before the observed end-game effect of the support levels, i.e. already 
from rounds 16-20. This suggests that support levels are earlier affected by an 
anticipated end-game effect than the expected returns. In the last five rounds, the 
difference between support levels and expected return become similar again to 
the first five rounds, which indicates that in these rounds the expected returns 
decrease at a faster rate than support levels. 
 As it might be that support decisions do not only depend on the support 
previously received from the current investment person (the direct reciprocity 
motivation we confirmed above) but also on the support previously received 
from other group members, we control for this in a next model. We estimate 
separate models for different endowment combinations of support person and 
investment person. We do this as the ‘other group members’ might be very 
different in dependence of the endowment combination of support person and 
investment person. For instance, when support is given between 80-endowment 
players, the ‘other players’ consist of 80-endowment players and one 200-
endowment player, whereas in case support is given to the 200-endowment 
player the ‘other players’ form a homogenous group of 80-endowment players. 
                                                        
65 We also estimated models with controls for the support players’ personality characteristics and 
their social value orientation towards a generalized other, captured by the circle test. Coefficients of 
these variables were low and statistically not significant, whereas the estimates of the coefficients 
of the other variables were robust to adding these variables. This indicates that the influence of 
these individual characteristics (which was confirmed by regression models in Table 5.4) is wiped 
out once reciprocity becomes a possible behavioural motive, i.e. after having had at least one 
investment opportunity. 
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We distinguish two possible effects. First, the more a support player has 
received from the other players (except the current investment player), the more 
support he/she may be willing to give to the current investment player. This 
effect has been described by Kolm (2006: 390): “ . . . you tend to help others if 
you have been helped yourself, to be nice if others have been nice to you, and so 
on, even if the people you help or favour are not those who favoured or helped 
you in the first place.” 
 Second, there may be an effect that goes in the opposite direction. The more 
a support player has received from the other players except the current invest-
ment player, the lower the previously received support from the current invest-
ment player is valued by the support player. The coefficient of the total received 
support of the other players is positive if the first effect outweighs the second 
effect, whereas it is negative if the second effect outweighs the first effect. 
Looking at the results reported in Table 5.6, only in the third model we detect a 
significant influence of the received support from the 200-endowment player. 
The coefficient is positive, which indicates that support among 80-endowment 
players is stimulated with higher support received from the 200-endowment 
player. 
4.4. Explaining differences in group aggregated tie strength 
In this and next subsections we use our acquired knowledge on individual 
support-giving to understand better what social tie structures are more likely to 
be formed, and under what conditions. More specifically, we look at the role of 
economic inequality on the group aggregated tie strength and the centrality of 
the formed group networks of social ties. 
 As shown by Figure 5.1., there exists large variation between the different 
groups both in the equality and inequality treatment. A plausible explanation for 
this variation is the initial decisions made, which might determine which path is 
followed thereafter. To test this, we look at the correlations between the group 
average of all support decisions (divided by the own endowment) before the 
support players’ first investment opportunity and the average over rounds 15-25 
of the group aggregated tie strength. As in the inequality treatment there are 
three different endowment combinations of support player and investment 
player, we calculate the average of the support decisions before the support 
players’ first investment opportunity separately for each endowment combina-
tion. Consequently, in total we have four different correlations with the average 
group aggregated tie strength. Figure 5.3 shows the scatter plots for the different 
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endowment combinations and a simple linear fit. Each observation refers to one 
group, which is labelled by the number of support decisions. 
 For the equality treatment Spearman’s rho is equal to 0.236 (two-sided P = 
.484). When we ignore the outlier in the under-right corner, Spearman’s rho 
increases and becomes significant at the 10% (0.552, two-sided P = .098). For 
support-giving among 80-endowment players Spearman’s rho is equal to 0.745 
(two-sided P = .008). For support-giving from 80-endowment players to 200-
endowment players Spearman’s rho is equal to 0.571 (two-sided P = .084) 
whereas for support-giving in the other direction Spearman’s rho is equal to 
0.669 (two-sided P = .035). 
This evidence indicates that for all endowment combinations the support 
decisions before the first investment opportunity tend to influence which path is 
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followed thereafter. There are however large differences as to the strength of 
this influence. The regression coefficients indicate that this influence is particu-
larly strong for the 80-80 combination, whereas for the 100-100 combination it 
is substantially weaker. The latter is consistent with our previously observed 
positive correlation between the number of preceding investment opportunities 
and the group average support (see Figure 5.2). The variation in the group 
aggregated tie strength in the equality treatment is relatively less determined at 
the start of the game, but created while the game proceeds. 
 Remind that in the inequality treatment we observed high and low trajecto-
ries of group aggregated tie strength. The three groups with the highest average 
group aggregated tie strength in the inequality treatment are the same groups 
that were represented by thick lines in Figure 5.1 before. In these groups average 
group support before the first investment opportunity is not only high from 80-
endowment players to other 80-endowment players, but also from 80-
endowment players to 200-endowment players. 
4.5. Structure of the formed networks of social ties 
Is the formation of social ties such that certain group network structures are 
more likely to be formed? When studying the formation of social ties we 
identified three mechanisms with possible implications for the structure of the 
evolving networks of social ties. 
 First, 80-endowment players tend to give more support to 200-endowment 
players than to other 80-endowment players, which may stimulate certain 
centralization in the network structures, i.e. around the 200-endowment player. 
Before having had an investment opportunity, 80-endowment players tend to 
give on average 11 ‘francs’ more to 200-endowment players than they give to 
other 80-endowment players. At the same time, they expect 200-endowment 
players to return relatively more. Second, the expectations 80-endowment 
players have about the support-giving of 200-endowment players is confirmed, 
as after having had at least one investment opportunity, 200-endowment players 
return relatively more support to 80-endowment players than other 80-
endowment players do. This stimulates the formation of intense social ties 
between 80-endowment and 200-endowment players. Third, we observed that 
the support 80-endowment players give to each other increases with the support 
received from the 200-endowment player. This mechanism may counteract the 
centralization of networks of social ties. 
 To study network centrality with variable tie strength, we make use of the 
centrality measure proposed by Kretschmer & Kretschmer (2006) which, in 
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contrast with standard degree centrality measures, takes account of the tie 
strength. According to their measure individual degree centrality of a node A is 
equal to the geometric mean of the total strength of the social ties of A (we refer 
to section 4.1. where we defined ‘tie strength’) and the ‘number of ties’ A has 
with the other nodes. The ‘number of ties’ of A, ADC , is weighted by the 
strength of each tie.  
 In particular, 
( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−∑ ==
z
i ii
hh
ADC
1 2
log
2 , with ∑== zi iii KKh 1 , iK representing the tie 
strength with node i. As the social ties at the basis of the formed networks in our 
experiment are directed ties, we calculate separate measures for in-degree (based 
on support-receiving) and out-degree (based on support-giving). 
 We decide to take a snapshot of the network in each group at round 20, with 
each directed dyad representing the most recent transfer. We do this at round 20, 
as support levels are then expected to be at their highest level. Many rounds 
have passed since the start of the game, so that participants have had multiple 
opportunities to build trust and increase support levels. At the same time, the 
end of the game is still remote, so that participants do not yet reduce their 
support levels. For a graphical representation of the formed networks in each 
group we refer to appendix 466. To test whether the 200-endowment player has a 
significantly higher in-degree or out-degree centrality in comparison with the 
other players we applied a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. According to this test the 
out-degree centrality of the 200-endowment player is significantly larger than 
the average out-degree centrality of the other group members (two-sided P = 
.008). In-degree centralities are not significantly different between the 200-
endowment player and the average in-degree centrality of the other group 
members (two-sided P = .328)67. These results are in line with our previous 
observation that 200-endowment players give more to 80-endowment players 
than what the latter give to 200-endowment players. This difference in support-
giving makes the difference of the degree centrality between the 200-
endowment players and the 80-endowment players larger when measured as out-
degree than when measured as in-degree. 
                                                        
66 In the inequality treatment player 6 is the 200-endowment player. 
67 We have done the same analyses for the social ties at rounds 19 and 21, and obtained similar 
results. For out-degree centrality two-sided P-values are respectively .008 and .008 whereas for in-
degree centrality they are respectively .131 and .182. 
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4.6. Final distributive results 
In a final analysis we look at the distributive implications of the formation of 
social ties. We have seen that 200-endowment players give more support than 
80-endowment players, but they also receive more support. To assess its 
distributive implications, we look at the individual final profit for the entire 
experiment. For this we use a profitability ratio, defined as the proportional 
difference between the total profit in the experiment (i.e. endowment, plus 
received support, minus given support and costs of requesting support) and the 
sum of the endowments received in the experiment. This ratio indicates how 
profitable it has been for a specific agent of being active in the favour game in 
comparison with only receiving the constant endowment each round. Note that 
the individual total profit also depends on the randomly determined number of 
investment opportunities. 
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Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of this profitability measure for the different 
types of players. We observe that 100-endowment and 80-endowment players 
have an average profitability ratio which is significantly larger than zero, 
whereas the profitability ratio for 200-endowment players is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 80-endowment players have the highest profitability – slightly higher than 
100-endowment players – whereas 200-endowment players face the lowest 
profitability. Based on a regression with the profitability ratios of 80-endowment 
and 200-endowment players and only adding a dummy which equals 1 for a 
200-endowment player, 200-endowment players have a significantly lower 
profitability ratio than 80-endowment players (coefficient of the dummy equals  
-0.065, two-sided P = .025). This indicates some redistribution in favour of 80-
endowment players, although not strong enough to level out inequalities. 
 The latter would only be possible in case 80-endowment and 200-
endowment players transfer almost their entire endowment to investment 
players. As shown in Table 5.6, in such a case, the profitability of 200-
endowment players would be -0.554 (leading to an equivalent endowment of 
less than 100), whereas the profitability of low-endowment players would be 
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0.465 (leading to an equivalent endowment of almost 120)68. As shown by 
Figure 5.5, however, 200-endowment players do not incur a negative profitabil-
ity. In the end, 80-endowment players have similar profitability ratios as 100-
endowment players and are incapable of benefiting from their potentially better 
position, i.e. their maximum attainable profitability ratio (see Table 5.7) is 
almost 4 times as high in comparison with 100-endowment players (0.465 
versus 0.125). 
 
Figure 5.5. Distribution results: profitability ratio by endowment of player 
Note. Two-sided P-values were calculated by estimating an OLS regression with only a constant 
term and applying robust standard errors to correct for intra-group correlations 
 
                                                        
68 The theoretical maximum profitability is attained when each investment player asks all support 
players for support and all support players transfer their entire endowment to the investment player. 
To calculate this theoretical maximum in the inequality treatment, we also assume that each player 
has 5 investment opportunities (the average number of investment opportunities with 6 players and 
30 rounds). 
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Table 5.7. Theoretical and observed profitability 
  Maximum support-giving a Mean observed 
Endowment Total endowment Profit Profitability Profitability 
100 3000 3375 0.125 0.053 
80 2400 3515 0.465 0.058 
200 6000 2675 -0.554 -0.007 
a Assuming each player has 5 investment opportunities, each investment player asks everyone for 
support and all support players transfer their entire endowment. 
5. Conclusion 
To study the formation of social capital, conceived as social networks of social 
ties, and how endowment inequality influences its density and centrality, we 
conducted an experimental repeated favour game with groups of six players. In 
each round, one player is randomly selected to have the opportunity to ask one 
or more of the other five players for support. A player who is asked for support 
decides on the amount of support to give, which is then multiplied with an 
efficiency factor. 
 Two closely-related behavioural motives that influence support requests 
and support-giving are direct reciprocity and the expectations about future 
support. First, consistent with the investment idea behind social capital forma-
tion, individual decision making is influenced by individual expectations about 
future returns. We observed that the higher the previously received support the 
higher the probability of requesting support again. We also observed how 
endowment inequality, through its influence on expectations about future 
returns, influences individual decision making. As 80-endowment players expect 
to receive more in return from 200-endowment players than from 80-endowment 
players, they have a 25.9% higher probability to request support from a 200-
endowment player than from another 80-endowment player, and they give 
significantly more support to 200-endowment players than to other 80-
endowment players. 
 Second, favour requests and support-giving are also driven by direct 
reciprocity motives. We observed that the probability that an investment player 
requests support from a specific support player is more than 25% lower if that 
support player has not requested support from the current investment player 
before but had the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, regarding support-giving, 
the influence of personality characteristics, which was important before having 
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had any investment opportunity, is eliminated by the influence of the ‘most 
recent support received’, once people have received support. 
 Furthermore, we observed how endowment inequality biases expectations 
and reciprocity. 200-endowment players return more than 80-endowment 
players, which is consistent with the expectations 80-endowment players have 
about returns from investing in social relations with 200-endowment players. It 
is this bias in reciprocity and expectations which lies at the heart of certain 
centralization in the formed networks of social ties, and which explains why in 
the inequality treatment very high levels of support-giving are obtained if much 
support is given between 80-endowment players and from 80-endowment 
players to 200-endowment players early in the game. 
Appendix 1: Experimental procedures and instructions 
Experimental procedures 
Several measures were taken to guarantee anonymity. To exclude the possibility 
that participants could make inferences about the group to which they belonged 
each session was organized with at least two groups. Moreover, participants 
were seated randomly in the computer lab with isolated cubicles. It was ex-
plained that computer numbers were used to recognize participants during the 
experiment and the data analysis afterwards, but could not be linked to the 
participants’ names. In addition, during the experiment no communication was 
allowed, mobile phones were switched off and no participants could leave the 
lab. If participants had a question they were asked to raise their hand so that one 
of the experimenters could come and answer the question in private. 
 After reading the instructions, the participants had to go through some 
control questions. The experiment did not start before all participants had 
correctly answered these questions. At the end of the experiment, participants 
were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. After all had completed this question-
naire, they were paid out confidentially in cash. 
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Instructions 
 
In this experiment, you can earn money. The experiment consists of two 
unrelated parts. In both parts you can earn ‘francs’. The ‘francs’ you earn will be 
converted to Euro according to 200 ‘francs’ = 1 Euro and paid out to you 
privately and confidentially. 
 
During the whole experiment you are not allowed to communicate with the other 
participants in any other way than described in these instructions. 
Instructions for part 1 
In part 1 of the experiment you have to make a single choice. The choice 
concerns the allocation of an amount of ‘francs’ to yourself and to a randomly 
chosen other participant. You will not get to know the identity of this other 
participant, nor will this other participant get to know your identity. 
 
You have to choose one single point on a circle on a sheet of paper handed out 
to you. With the choice you make you can make yourself and the other earn 
more or less. 
 
At the same time another participant will have to make a similar decision on an 
allocation between him/her and you. This other participant, however, will not be 
the one you are linked with. 
Instructions for part 2 
In the second part of the experiment you are in a group of 6 participants. Group 
compositions do not change during the whole experiment. 
 
The composition of your group is anonymous. 
 
Each group member receives randomly one of the letters A, B, C, D, E, F as 
‘ID’. Each letter corresponds to the same person during the entire experiment. 
 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 rounds. 
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You and all other members in your group receive a fixed amount of ‘francs’ at 
the beginning of each round. This is called your ‘endowment’. This endowment 
is the same for everybody. Each member of your group receives 100 ‘francs’ at 
the beginning of each round69. The endowment does not change over rounds. 
 
In each round, one of the six group members will be randomly selected to have 
an investment opportunity and is, therefore, called ‘investment person’. In each 
round each group member has the same chance to be selected. 
 
To make use of the investment opportunity the investment person needs support 
from the other group members. The other group members are called ‘support 
persons’ in that round. 
 
The investment person can ask one or more of the support persons for support. 
Each request for support costs the investment person 5 ‘francs’. 
 
If a support person is asked for support, he/she can transfer nothing, part or all 
of his/her endowment to the investment person. The amount of ‘francs’ a 
support person transfers to the investment person is multiplied by 1.4. A support 
person who is not asked for support can not do anything. 
 
The earnings of an investment person in a round is equal to the endowment plus 
the total amount of ‘francs’ all the support persons transfer to the investment 
person (multiplied by 1.4) minus the costs of requesting support. 
 
The earnings of a support person in a round will be equal to the endowment 
minus the amount of ‘francs’ he/she transferred to the investment person. 
 
Before taking any decision in a specific round as an investment person or a 
support person you can review all interactions you had in all past rounds. You 
can only receive information about your own personal history. 
                                                        
69 With the inequality treatment this phrase was replaced by: “This endowment is not the same for 
everybody but depends on the letter ID. One member of your group receives 200 ‘francs’ at the 
beginning of each round and each of the other members receives 80 ‘francs’ at the beginning of 
each round.” 
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Appendix 2: Personality dimensions (Brandstätter, 1988) 
Extraversion 
Extravert people search and find contact easily. They go public, are communica-
tive and sociable. At the same time they are also interested in the feelings and 
needs of others. They take to it like a duck to the water if ‘something is happen-
ing’. They enjoy being in the centre of attention. 
 
Introvert people like to withdraw themselves in order to be alone. They are not 
easily accessible and appear being reserved. They do not feel themselves at ease 
in a loud and turbulent environment. They do not like to attract the attention of 
other people on themselves. 
Anxiety 
Anxious (emotionally unstable) people are easily detuned and vulnerable. They 
suffer from self doubts and mood changes. They often perceive challenges as a 
threat. They tend to underestimate their abilities. 
 
Emotionally stable people do not easily let themselves getting disconcerted. 
They are calm, and satisfied with themselves. In their interaction with others 
they appear confident and easy-going. They get along well with stress. They are 
mentally resilient. Every now and then they tend to underestimate the difficulties 
of tasks. 
Self-control 
People with pronounced self-control do not let themselves go. They are con-
scious about rules and they are inclined to perfectionism. Social conventions are 
important to them. They take their obligations seriously. They are well-planned 
and systematic in their work. 
 
People with low self-control follow their internal impulses, do not care a lot 
about rules by which they feel constrained. Preparing themselves thoroughly and 
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making long-term plans is not their thing. They can surprise with unorthodox 
ideas and ways of acting. 
Independence 
Independent people cut their own path with their own ideas. They are willing 
and able to stand one’s ground. Every now and then they appear dominant and 
often claim leadership. Social considerateness is not their strength. 
 
Low values on this dimension mark people who avoid conflicts. They are ready 
to adapt themselves and leave leadership to others. They do not oppose strongly 
against attempts to be influenced. 
Tough-mindedness 
People with high values on tough-mindedness are rather insensitive, down-to-
earth and realistic. They are not easily irritated. One could say they are rather 
thick-skinned and not easily impressed. They somewhat lack the willingness and 
ability for empathy and flexibility. 
 
People with low values on tough-mindedness are sensitive and tender-footed, 
they are open for ideas. They show value imaginativeness and a more artistic 
view of the world. They have less interest in strong and down-to-earth facts. 
They are somewhat ‘dreamy’. 
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 6  
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This work has examined how the embeddedness of economic agents in small-
scale societies influences distributive decision making and exclusion processes 
of economic resources. Looking at small-scale societies characterized by 
considerable economic inequality, one of the main research questions has 
focused on the processes behind the reproduction of economic inequality. In 
particular, we have studied to what extent and under what conditions the poor 
face a relatively higher likelihood of being excluded from economic resources. 
Although important in many settings, we have focused on the relevance of these 
issues for local development and poverty reduction. 
 To study this research question, we have not only looked at the individual 
decision making of agents who distribute economic resources, but also at the 
decision making of potential recipients of these resources when they are given 
the means to react. In other words, we have also examined the political dimen-
sions at work when economic resources are distributed within small-scale 
societies. Consolidating our analyses and conclusions, we have acquired the 
following insights regarding the processes behind the reproduction of economic 
inequality. These are related to the less-beneficial position of the poor in both 
social and political terms. 
 Looking at the social dimension, the results of chapter 4 indicate that social 
network positions correlate strongly with generosity, but that this correlation is 
highly contingent upon the type of network we look at. Social proximity in 
general networks, friendship networks and extended family networks, increases 
generosity. As poorer agents have a lower likelihood of having friendship links 
with other agents, they are more vulnerable to exclusion because they tend to be 
more socially isolated from others. 
 Chapter 5 enriches this analysis by looking at the determinants of the 
dynamic formation of social links through support giving and its relation with 
economic inequality. Based on experimental evidence, we conclude that 
reciprocity and expectations about future returns are very important behavioral 
motives, which are biased by economic inequality. The poor are more likely to 
request support from rich agents than from other poor agents. If asked for 
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support they tend to give more support to rich agents than to other poor agents. 
They do so because they (correctly) expect higher returned support from rich 
agents. These results are consistent with the poor’s lower likelihood of having 
friendship links, as observed in chapter 4. 
 The poor may not only have less beneficial network positions. They may 
also face disadvantages in the political field. To look at this, we examined in 
chapter 3 the decision making of a permanent group representative, being the 
richest of an economically heterogeneous group, who distributes resources 
among the group members. The latter are given the opportunity to punish the 
representative by means of simple majority voting. 
 We have observed that punishment, instead of enforcing representatives to 
reduce their share, actually induces them to increase the share they keep to 
themselves. Only when voting decisions are made public and distribution 
decisions remain private, are representatives able to limit punishment rates. 
They do so by successfully applying an exclusion strategy. They give two 
respondents more than their acceptance threshold so that they do not vote in 
favour of punishment. Because of the majority voting rule the approval of the 
third respondent is then not required to avoid punishment, and this respondent is 
completely excluded from the resources. When voting is public, the poor are 
relatively more vulnerable to this type of exclusion. As the poor are more 
inclined to vote in favour of punishment, they have a higher likelihood of being 
excluded by the representative when the latter receives information on the 
individual voting decisions. 
 Chapter 3 also demonstrated that if the poor in some way or another 
manage to take the representative’s role, punishment rates drop and distributions 
become substantially more equal. Thus, political change in favour of the poorest 
is not only beneficial in distributional terms. It also reduces efficiency losses due 
to punishment. 
 The situation simulated in chapter 3 mainly applies to communities where a 
single representative remains firmly in power. In such conditions it is difficult to 
make the representative accountable to the community members. The distribu-
tion decisions made by the representative, however, might be different when 
alternative representatives are ready to take his/her place. 
 Chapter 2, which studied the distribution of development aid in rural 
villages, complements the analysis in this respect, as it abandons the assumption 
of a single permanent representative. Making use of a household survey it 
looked at aid flows and the extent to which mediation of these flows is monopo-
lized by a limited number of representatives/brokers. The results demonstrated 
that higher brokerage concentration leads to a higher proportion of the village 
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that is completely excluded from aid. Moreover, the analysis showed that, in 
contrast with the situation modelled in chapter 3 where all group members 
equally depend on the representative for access to outside resources, in reality 
the poor make relatively more use of brokerage to get access to aid. Besides the 
higher vulnerability of the poor to deliberate exclusion by the representative as 
observed in chapter 3, this higher reliance of the poor on brokerage as such 
makes political change even more relevant for the poor, especially when 
brokerage is highly concentrated. 
 Political change in favour of the poor, however, is not evident. Chapter 2 
showed that where political change is most needed (i.e. where brokerage is 
highly centralized) political alternatives are less identified in general, hampering 
any political change. Moreover, if representatives are replaced it is not likely 
that poorer agents benefit from such political change. Persons excluded from the 
resources of outside aid donors, know fewer political alternatives that could 
replace the ruling political representatives and thereby improve their representa-
tion, which is necessary to reduce their exclusion. Given the observed impedi-
ments to political change in favour of the poor, a more active or engaged role for 
outside aid donors may be appropriate. In particular, aid donors should look for 
new political actors that represent the most excluded even if they are not very 
intensively identified by community members. Because of the lower identifica-
tion by community members, however, it increases search and operation costs, 
and requires more time and energy than aid donors usually invest in such 
activities. 
 A final observation relates to the ability of aid donors to support political 
change processes. Chapter 2 showed that relations with market-oriented donors 
are less mediated by brokers. Consequently, market-oriented aid donors may 
have less capacity to change brokerage structures. Relations with other aid 
donors are more likely established through the mediation of community brokers, 
so that these donors may have more potential to change local brokerage struc-
tures. This may be counteracted, however, if these donors require the support of 
community brokers to facilitate their local operations, making them vulnerable 
to local resistance from the ruling brokers to any political change. This may 
constitute a real dilemma, which hampers donors to make an effort to expand 
their outreach beyond the networks of the ruling brokers. Given the demon-
strated benefits of a more decentralized brokerage, this is an important research 
question, which requires further research. 
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Dit werk onderzoekt individuele verdelingsbeslissingen en de daaruit volgende 
uitsluitingprocessen in economisch ongelijke micro-samenlevingen. Het bouwt 
daarbij op de groeiende erkenning binnen de economische wetenschap dat 
economische actoren ingebed zijn in sociale structuren, die een belangrijke 
invloed uitoefenen op hun beslissingen en de resulterende werking van markten 
en organisaties (Granovetter, 1985). Onder een micro-samenleving verstaan we 
een samenleving waar er een herhaald en frequent contact bestaat tussen haar 
leden. Voorbeelden gaan van de sociale relaties op de arbeidsvloer in bedrijven 
in sterk ontwikkelde economieën, tot sociale relaties in landelijke dorpen in 
landen die geteisterd worden door extreme armoede.  
 In het bijzonder bestuderen we op welke manier de sociale inbedding van 
economische actoren in micro-samenlevingen een invloed uitoefent op verde-
lingsbeslissingen en processen van uitsluiting. We zullen niet enkel het indivi-
duele beslissingsgedrag onder de loep nemen van de actoren die economische 
middelen verdelen, maar ook het beslissingsgedrag van mogelijke ontvangers 
van deze middelen wanneer hen de mogelijkheid gegeven wordt om te proteste-
ren. We zullen, in andere woorden, ook de politieke dimensie bestuderen van de 
verdeling van economische middelen in micro-samenlevingen. Rekening 
houdend met het beslissingsgedrag van zowel de verdelers als de potentiële 
ontvangers van economische middelen, willen we uiteindelijk de processen 
identificeren en begrijpen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de bestendiging van 
economische ongelijkheden. 
 Hoewel deze zaken van toepassing zijn op vele en zeer verschillende 
omgevingen, leggen we waar mogelijk de nadruk op hun relevantie voor locale 
economische ontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding. Recent nog heeft economi-
sche gelijkheid en rechtvaardigheid opnieuw aandacht gekregen binnen het 
internationale debat rond armoedebestrijding en economische ontwikkeling. De 
Wereldbank besluit in haar World Development Report van 2006 dat economi-
sche gelijkheid en rechtvaardigheid belangrijk zijn in het tot stand brengen van 
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structurele ontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding. Beleidsmakers moeten daarom 
ook belang hechten aan de implicaties van het beleid dat ze uitstippelen in 
termen van economische gelijkheid en rechtvaardigheid. 
 Dit debat is zeer relevant in Latijns Amerika, waar een groot deel van het 
empirisch onderzoek van dit werk uitgevoerd werd en waar inkomensverdelin-
gen de meest ongelijke van de ontwikkelingswereld zijn. Reeds in 1990 beweer-
de de Wereldbank dat “nergens anders in de ontwikkelingswereld de contrasten 
tussen armoede en nationaal inkomen groter zijn dan in Latijns Amerika en de 
Caraïben. Ondanks gemiddelde inkomens die vijf tot zes keer hoger zijn dan in 
Zuid-Azië en Sub-Sahara Afrika, leeft bijna één vijfde van de bevolking nog 
steeds in armoede” (World Bank, 1990: 141). Gebaseerd op recente gegevens, 
kunnen we stellen dat deze situatie nauwelijks veranderd is in de laatste decen-
nia, aangezien de economische ongelijkheid in dit continent bij de hoogste in de 
ontwikkelingswereld blijft (WDR, 2006). Eén van de hoofdvragen is dus 
waarom economische ongelijkheid zo hardnekkig kan zijn. 
 Eén van de belangrijkste redenen heeft betrekking op het gebrek aan 
politieke haalbaarheid van beleidsmaatregelen die economische ongelijkheden 
trachten te verminderen (Sen, 1995). Het komt er natuurlijk op neer dat wanneer 
dergelijke beleidsmaatregelen ontworpen en geïmplementeerd worden, beleids-
makers aandacht moeten schenken aan de preferenties van de kiezers en dat de 
armste groepen politiek zwak vertegenwoordigd zijn. In dezelfde zin, wordt er 
vaak geargumenteerd dat programma’s of beleidsmaatregelen die enkel de 
armen bevoordelen uiteindelijk van slechte kwaliteit zijn (Goodin & Le Grand, 
1987), omdat ze de steun missen van de minder arme en machtigere sectoren. 
 In dit werk nemen we twee elementen onder de loep die tot nog toe 
onvoldoende aandacht gekregen hebben in het beleidsdebat en die toch een zeer 
belangrijke invloed uitoefenen op de politieke haalbaarheid van maatregelen ter 
vermindering van economische ongelijkheden. Beide hebben te maken met de 
‘sociale afstand’ tussen de betrokken actoren. 
 Ten eerste, wordt er vaak over het hoofd gezien dat de mensen die getroffen 
worden door (her)verdelingsmaatregelen ingebed zijn in sociale netwerken. Het 
belang van sociale netwerken en hun invloed op de haalbaarheid van 
(her)verdelingsmaatregelen wordt zeer goed geïllustreerd door de gewapende 
boerenopstand tegen de Nicaraguaanse overheid in de jaren ’80. Het is heel 
opmerkelijk dat dezelfde arme boeren die eerder gevochten hadden voor de 
Sandinistische revolutie daarna de wapens opnamen tegen de revolutionaire 
Sandinistische overheid. Deze guerrillaopstand was onder andere het gevolg van 
een reactie tegen de negatieve gevolgen die een nationale landhervorming zou 
hebben op locale sociale netwerken (Horton, 1998). Vele arme boeren hadden 
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informele hulprelaties gevormd met locale grootgrondbezitters, die hen een 
geprivilegieerde toegang verschaften tot economische middelen. De Sandinisti-
sche landhervorming confisqueerde grote landeigendommen en bedreigde 
daarmee ook de sociale relaties die vele arme boeren hadden met deze groot-
grondbezitters. Daarom beschouwden vele arme boeren dit overheidsprogramma 
als een serieuze bedreiging, ook al beloofde de overheid hen land, werk en 
sociale diensten. Dit geeft aan dat sociale netwerken serieus genomen moeten 
worden wanneer herverdelingsmaatregelen uitgevoerd worden, omdat ze een 
belangrijke bron van middelen en mogelijkheden vormen. 
 Ten tweede, wordt er vaak verondersteld dat de actoren die verdelingsbe-
slissingen nemen zich op een sociaal grote afstand bevinden van potentieel 
bevoordeelden en benadeelden. Dit is het geval wanneer de centrale overheid de 
enige is die verdelingsbeslissingen neemt. Deze assumptie wordt echter zeer 
onrealistisch nu beleidsmakers alsmaar meer aandacht schenken aan decentrali-
satie en locale participatie (World Bank, 2000). In de mate dat verdelingsbeslis-
singen meer en meer genomen worden op het locale niveau verkleint natuurlijk 
de sociale afstand tussen degenen die economische middelen verdelen en 
potentieel bevoordeelden en benadeelden. 
 Het is het doel van deze studie om tot een beter begrip te komen van de 
complexe processen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor sociale uitsluiting en de 
instandhouding van economische ongelijkheden, en de invloed die sociale 
netwerken en economische ongelijkheid daarop uitoefenen. Daarvoor bestuderen 
we verdelingsbeslissingen in micro-samenlevingen met behulp van enquêtes, 
laboratoriumexperimenten en veldexperimenten. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert de resultaten van een veldstudie over de invloed 
die gemeenschapsvertegenwoordigers uitoefenen op uitsluiting van ontwikke-
lingsmiddelen. Gebruik makende van een huishoudenquête in 33 Nicaraguaanse 
landelijke dorpen, observeren we dat vele huishoudens hun toevlucht nemen tot 
een dorpsvertegenwoordiger om toegang te verkrijgen tot de economische 
middelen die externe hulpdonoren aanbieden. Bovendien blijkt dat de vertegen-
woordigingsstructuren op dorpsniveau een bepalende invloed uitoefenen op de 
uitsluiting van externe hulp. Hoe meer deze vertegenwoordiging gemonopoli-
seerd wordt door een beperkt aantal vertegenwoordigers, hoe groter de groep die 
uitgesloten blijft van externe hulpmiddelen. Aangezien het voornamelijk de 
armsten zijn die relatief meer gebruik maken van gemeenschapsvertegenwoor-
digers om toegang te verkrijgen tot externe hulp, zijn zij ook het kwetsbaarst 
voor deze uitsluiting. Om deze redenen, hebben we gekeken naar de locale 
politieke dimensie die verantwoordelijk is voor de bestendiging of transformatie 
van deze vertegenwoordigingsstructuren.  
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 We hebben verschillende mechanismen geïdentificeerd die politieke 
verandering belemmeren. Ten eerste, in dorpen met zeer gecentraliseerde 
vertegenwoordigingsstructuren worden minder politieke alternatieven geïdenti-
ficeerd, wat de perspectieven voor een meer gedecentraliseerde structuur 
beperkt. Ten tweede, de meest uitgeslotenen kennen minder vertegenwoordigers 
en hebben dus minder capaciteit om politieke alternatieven voor te stellen. 
Bijgevolg, als politieke verandering tot stand komt met locale steun is het vrij 
onwaarschijnlijk dat het de vertegenwoordiging van de meest uitgeslotenen 
verbetert. Dit pleit voor een actievere rol voor externe hulpdonoren. 
 In de andere hoofdstukken diepen we dit werk uit in twee richtingen: de 
politieke economie die in werking treedt bij verdelingsbeslissingen in micro-
samenlevingen en het belang van sociale relaties en sociale netwerk posities. In 
hoofdstuk 3, kijken we naar de politieke economie wanneer een permanente 
groepsvertegenwoordiger economische middelen verdeelt onder de groepsleden. 
We bestuderen daarbij de strategieën van de groepsleden die de mogelijkheid 
hebben om te protesteren tegen de verdelingsbeslissingen van de groepsverte-
genwoordiger en dit in wisselwerking met de strategieën van de vertegenwoor-
diger. Hiervoor maken we gebruik van een gedragsexperiment in een computer-
labo. Het experiment bestaat uit een herhaald spel waarbij een permanente 
groepsvertegenwoordiger die de rijkste is van een economisch heterogene groep, 
economische middelen verdeelt onder de groepsleden. De groepsleden hebben 
dan de mogelijkheid om de vertegenwoordiger te straffen door middel van een 
meerderheidsstemming. We onderzoeken daarbij de invloed van de toegang tot 
informatie over de verdelingsbeslissingen en het stemgedrag. 
 De experimentele resultaten tonen aan dat hoe minder middelen men 
ontvangt van de vertegenwoordiger, hoe lager de voldoening is met het ontvan-
gen deel. Wanneer men informatie ontvangt over de volledige verdeling, 
vermindert deze voldoening ook indien men minder krijgt in vergelijking met de 
andere groepsleden. Zoals verwacht verhoogt een lagere voldoening de bereid-
heid om te stemmen voor het straffen van de vertegenwoordiger. Bovendien zijn 
er ook belangrijke strategische elementen die het stemgedrag beïnvloeden. 
Wanneer het stemmen publiek is, zal men minder geneigd zijn om te stemmen 
tegen de vertegenwoordiger, maar dit effect verzwakt met een lagere voldoe-
ning. Hoe meer men verwacht dat twee andere groepsleden zullen stemmen voor 
straffen, hoe meer men geneigd zal zijn het zelfde te doen. Vrouwelijke en 
rijkere groepsleden zijn minder geneigd om te stemmen voor straffen tenzij zij 
informatie krijgen over de volledige verdeling. 
 Aangezien de groepsvertegenwoordiger een groot verlies lijdt waneer hij 
gestraft wordt, is hij geneigd om alle middelen voor zich te houden wanneer hij 
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gestraft wordt. Dit is het geval tenzij de stemmingsprocedure publiek is en 
informatie over de volledige verdeling niet publiek gemaakt wordt. De groeps-
vertegenwoordiger is dan in staat om te vermijden dat er een meerderheid stemt 
om hem te straffen. Vele vertegenwoordigers volgen daarbij een uitsluitingstra-
tegie. Zij zorgen ervoor dat ze de politieke steun krijgen van twee groepsleden 
en sluiten de derde volledig uit. In de meeste gevallen is het de armste van de 
groep die op deze manier uitgesloten wordt. 
 Om de invloed van een politieke verandering ten voordele van het armste 
groepslid te onderzoeken, organiseren we ook een tweede deel waarbij het 
armste groepslid de rol van groepsvertegenwoordiger overneemt. We zien dat de 
uiteindelijke verdeling minder ongelijk wordt en dat straffen veel minder 
frequent voorkomt. Dergelijke politieke verandering is dus niet enkel verdedig-
baar omdat het de uiteindelijke verdeling rechtvaardiger maakt, maar ook in 
termen van het lagere efficiëntieverlies door straffen. 
 In hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we de invloed van sociale netwerken op indivi-
dueel verdelingsgedrag. We onderzoeken in welke mate er rekening gehouden 
wordt met de individuele positie in sociale netwerken wanneer economische 
middelen verdeeld worden. Hiervoor organiseren we een dictator spel in een 
Nicaraguaanse dorp aangevuld met een enquête om sociale netwerken in kaart te 
brengen. De resultaten geven aan dat vrijgevigheid sterk correleert met sociale 
netwerken en de individuele positie daarin, maar dat deze correlatie sterk 
afhankelijk is van het type netwerk dat we bekijken. Sociale nabijheid in 
algemene netwerken, vriendschapsnetwerken of familienetwerken verhoogt 
vrijgevigheid. Bovendien stijgt vrijgevigheid hoe meer de vrienden van de 
dictator relatief weinig andere vrienden hebben, hoe dichter de hulpnetwerken 
van de dictator, hoe kleiner de familienetwerken van de dictator of de ontvanger 
(indien de dictator en de ontvanger een directe familieband hebben), of hoe 
groter het netwerk van de ontvanger op het vlak van sociale publieke activitei-
ten. Ten slotte, kijken we naar de bepalende factoren van netwerkformatie. We 
vinden dat arme mensen, minder mobiele mensen, vrouwen of jonge mensen 
met een lagere waarschijnlijkheid een sociale relatie met een specifiek ander van 
hun dorp hebben. Als gevolg zijn deze groepen kwetsbaarder voor sociale 
uitsluiting omdat ze over het algemeen zich op een sociaal grotere afstand 
bevinden van andere mensen uit hun dorp. 
 Omdat deze resultaten het belang van sociale netwerken aantoonden voor 
individuele verdelingsbeslissingen, bestuderen we in hoofdstuk 5 hoe sociale 
netwerken gevormd worden en hoe economische ongelijkheid hierop een 
invloed uitoefent. Hiervoor organiseerden we een gedragsexperiment in een 
computerlabo dat bestaat uit een herhaald ‘gunsten’-spel met groepen van zes 
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spelers. In elke ronde krijgt een willekeurig gekozen speler de mogelijkheid om 
één of meer van de andere vijf groepsleden om hulp te vragen. Elke speler die 
om hulp gevraagd wordt beslist over de hoeveelheid hulp die hij geeft, waarna 
deze hulp vermenigvuldigd wordt met een efficiëntiefactor. 
 De resultaten bevestigen dat zowel het vragen naar hulp als het geven van 
hulp beïnvloed wordt door motieven van directe wederkerigheid alsook door 
individuele verwachtingen over toekomstige tegenprestaties. Economische 
ongelijkheid zorgt voor een zekere asymmetrie in de invloed die verwachte 
tegenprestaties en directe wederkerigheid uitoefenen. Rijke spelers geven meer 
hulp aan armere spelers dan wat zij krijgen van arme spelers. Dit verschil wordt 
groter, hoe groter de meest recente hulp die ze ontvangen hebben van arme 
spelers. Tegelijkertijd zijn arme spelers meer geneigd om hulp te vragen van 
rijke spelers. Bovendien zullen arme spelers meer hulp geven aan rijke spelers 
dan aan andere arme spelers. Zij doen dit omdat zij hogere tegenprestaties 
verwachten van rijke spelers. Het is deze asymmetrische wederkerigheid die aan 
de basis ligt van een zekere centralisering in de gevormde sociale netwerken in 
economisch ongelijke groepen. Het verklaart ook waarom er in economisch 
ongelijke groepen zeer hoge niveaus van hulp bereikt kunnen worden als in het 
begin van het spel arme spelers veel hulp geven aan andere arme spelers en aan 
de rijke spelers. 
 Als we alle analyses samenvoegen komen we tot de volgende inzichten 
over de bestendiging van economische ongelijkheden. Gegevens uit enquêtes en 
gedragsexperimenten tonen aan dat armere actoren zich in minder voordelige 
posities bevinden op sociaal en politiek vlak. Zij hebben niet alleen minder 
voordelige posities in sociale netwerken die hun toegang tot economische 
middelen bepalen. Hun zwakkere sociale inbedding maakt hen ook politiek 
zwakker. In de context van toegang tot middelen van hulpdonoren, kennen 
mensen die uitgesloten worden van deze middelen minder politieke alternatie-
ven die de heersende politieke vertegenwoordigers zouden kunnen vervangen, 
wat hun toegang tot economische middelen zou kunnen verbeteren. Het verster-
ken van hun politieke stem om dit te verhelpen kan echter een risicovolle 
onderneming zijn, vooral wanneer dit impliceert dat hun stem publiek gemaakt 
wordt. De heersende vertegenwoordigers hebben dan de mogelijkheid om 
strategisch te reageren. Om hun winsten te maximeren kunnen zij doelbewust 
deze armere actoren uitsluiten, die in vergelijking met minder armere actoren 
moeilijker tevreden te stemmen zijn, omdat ze aanspraak maken op een groter 
deel van de beschikbare economische middelen. Om de uitsluiting van deze 
armere actoren daadwerkelijk te verminderen dienen zij zelf politiek leidershap 
op te nemen. Rekening houdend met de geïdentificeerde hinderpalen voor 
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dergelijke politieke verandering kan hiervoor een actievere inmenging van 
externe hulpdonoren nodig zijn. 
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